Samantha S. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.
Decision Date | 08 May 2020 |
Docket Number | 5:19-CV-621 (ATB) |
Parties | SAMANTHA S., Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York |
VICTORIA H. COLLINS, ESQ., for Plaintiff
FERGUS J. KAISER, Special Asst. U.S. Attorney for Defendant
MEMORANDUM-DECISION and ORDER
This matter was referred to me, for all proceedings and entry of a final judgment, pursuant to the Social Security Pilot Program, N.D.N.Y. General Order No. 18, and in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), Fed. R. Civ. P. 73, N.D.N.Y. Local Rule 73.1, and the consent of the parties. (Dkt. Nos. 4, 7).
On March 7, 2016, plaintiff filed an application for Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB"), alleging disability beginning June 1, 2011. (Administrative Transcript ("T") 216-22). Plaintiff's application was denied initially on April 29, 2016. (T. 113-20). Plaintiff requested a hearing, which was held before Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") Victor Horton on February 13, 2018. (T. 35-82, 127-28). At the hearing, plaintiff amended her disability onset date to June 24, 2015. (T. 39-40). Then, the ALJ heard testimony from plaintiff, as well as vocational expert ("VE") Terri Crawford. (T. 41- 81). On June 6, 2018, the ALJ issued an order denying plaintiff's claims. (T. 17-34). The ALJ's decision became the Commissioner's final decision when the Appeals Council denied plaintiff's request for review on April 11, 2019. (T. 1-6).
42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B).
The Commissioner uses a five-step process, set forth in 20 C.F.R. sections 404.1520 and 416.920, to evaluate disability insurance and SSI disability claims.
First, the [Commissioner] considers whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity. If he is not, the [Commissioner] next considers whether the claimant has a "severe impairment" which significantly limits his physical or mental ability to do basic work activities. If the claimant suffers such an impairment, the third inquiry is whether, based solely on medical evidence, the claimant has an impairment which meets or equals the criteria of an impairment listed in Appendix 1 ofthe regulations. If the claimant has such an impairment, the [Commissioner] will consider him disabled without considering vocational factors such as age, education, and work experience . . . . Assuming the claimant does not have a listed impairment, the fourth inquiry is whether, despite the claimant's severe impairment, he has the residual functional capacity to perform his past work. Finally, if the claimant is unable to perform his past work, the [Commissioner] then determines whether there is other work which the claimant can perform.
Berry v. Schweiker, 675 F.2d 464, 467 (2d Cir. 1982); see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. The plaintiff has the burden of establishing disability at the first four steps. However, if the plaintiff establishes that her impairment prevents her from performing her past work, the burden then shifts to the Commissioner to prove the final step. Id.
In reviewing a final decision of the Commissioner, a court must determine whether the correct legal standards were applied and whether substantial evidence supported the decision. Selian v. Astrue, 708 F.3d 409, 417 (2d Cir. 2013); Brault v. Soc. Sec. Admin, Comm'r, 683 F.3d 443, 448 (2d Cir. 2012); 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)). Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Talavera v. Astrue, 697 F.3d 145, 151 (2d Cir. 2012). It must be "more than a scintilla" of evidence scattered throughout the administrative record. Id. However, this standard is a very deferential standard of review " - even more so than the 'clearly erroneous standard.'" Brault, 683 F.3d at 448.
"To determine on appeal whether an ALJ's findings are supported by substantial evidence, a reviewing court considers the whole record, examining the evidence from both sides, because an analysis of the substantiality of the evidence must also include that which detracts from its weight." Williams on behalf of Williams v. Bowen, 859F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir. 1988). However, a reviewing court may not substitute its interpretation of the administrative record for that of the Commissioner, if the record contains substantial support for the ALJ's decision. Id. See also Rutherford v. Schweiker, 685 F.2d 60, 62 (2d Cir. 1982).
An ALJ is not required to explicitly analyze every piece of conflicting evidence in the record. See, e.g., Mongeur v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 1033, 1040 (2d Cir. 1983); Miles v. Harris, 645 F.2d 122, 124 (2d Cir. 1981) ( ). However, the ALJ cannot "'pick and choose' evidence in the record that supports his conclusions." Cruz v. Barnhart, 343 F. Supp. 2d 218, 224 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); Fuller v. Astrue, No. 09-CV-6279, 2010 WL 5072112, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 2010).
Plaintiff was born on December 25, 1965, making her 52 years old on the date of the administrative hearing. (T. 41). She lived in a mobile home with her husband. (T. 42). In addition to a GED, plaintiff held a degree in nursing. (T. 42-43). Although she had a driver's license, plaintiff did not drive. (T. 63). In the 15 years prior to applying for disability, plaintiff worked as a nurse and a payroll clerk. (T. 46-54).
Plaintiff testified that her diagnoses of fibromyalgia, lupus, kidney disease, Reynaud's disease, degenerative disc disease, and COPD prevented her from working full-time during the alleged disability period. (T. 56-59). Plaintiff also had "some issues" with depression and anxiety. (T. 60). She took a number of different medications that made her "very tired." (T. 61). The diuretics she took caused her legs to swell. (T. 66). She used a nebulizer twice a day, for twenty minutes at a time. (T.67). When she was sick, she required the nebulizer every couple hours. (Id.). Despite her physicians' orders, she smoked approximately half a pack of cigarettes every day. (T. 57). She struggled with memory issues and "brain fog." (T. 68-69). In 2015, she experienced a migraine approximately two times per month. (T. 71).
Plaintiff's husband was responsible for household tasks, including cooking, cleaning and laundry. (T. 63). Plaintiff spent most of the day in bed; she would get up for approximately one hour when her husband came home from work. (T. 63-64). She required her husband's assistance getting dressed. (T. 68). Plaintiff estimated that, during the alleged period of disability, she could walk for two to three minutes, stand for five minutes, and sit for ten minutes at a time. (T. 64). She found a gallon of milk to be heavy. (Id.). At the hearing, plaintiff used a medically prescribed cane to walk. (T. 70). She suffered from hand tremors. (T. 70-71).
After reviewing the procedural history of the plaintiff's application and stating the applicable law, the ALJ found that plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity ("SGA") during the time period between plaintiff's amended onset date of June 24, 2015 and the date last insured of December 31, 2015. (T. 20). At step two of the sequential evaluation, the ALJ found that plaintiff had the following severe impairments: lupus, fibromyalgia, degenerative disc disease, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, asthma, kidney disease, chronic pain syndrome, depression, and generalized anxiety disorder. (Id.). At step three, the ALJ found that plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled theseverity of a Listed Impairment.1 (T. 20-22).
(T. 23-24).
At step five the...
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