Samayamanthula v. Patchipulusu

Decision Date07 May 2021
Docket Number2190712
Citation338 So.3d 787
Parties Suresh Kumar SAMAYAMANTHULA v. Swathi PATCHIPULUSU
CourtAlabama Court of Civil Appeals

S. Phillip Bahakel and Donna J. Beaulieu of S. Phillip Bahakel & Associates, Pelham, for appellant.

Matthew Griffin of Shockley, Ransom & Sparks, Pelham, for appellee.

EDWARDS, Judge.

Suresh Kumar Samayamanthula ("the husband") appeals from the April 18, 2020, judgment, as amended, entered by the Jefferson Circuit Court ("the trial court") divorcing him from Swathi Patchipulusu ("the wife"). The husband challenges those parts of the judgment awarding sole physical custody of the parties’ children to the wife, purportedly restricting him from traveling to India with the parties’ children, dividing the marital property, and awarding attorney fees to the wife. We affirm the trial court's judgment.

The parties are from India, and, based on the testimony at trial, neither party is a United States citizen.1 The husband has resided in the United States since approximately 2005, and, at one point, he was purportedly a student in Chicago. The parties married in India on November 13, 2011, in what they described as an arranged marriage, and, thereafter, the wife moved to Alabama on a dependent visa and resided with the husband, who had an H-1B visa. A few years later, the wife also obtained an H-1B visa; she began working outside the home in approximately 2015. The parties have two children, a son who was born in December 2012 and a daughter who was born in August 2016; the children are United States citizens.

At the time of trial, the wife was approximately 33 years old and the husband was approximately 37 years old. The wife had been employed as a software engineer for approximately five years, and the husband, who is an electrical engineer, was employed in Birmingham by an out-of-state company that provides third-party consulting services. Based on a loan application submitted into evidence at trial, the husband had been employed by four separate employers since August 2010, except for a four-month period when he was unemployed from January 2017 through April 2017.2 He began working for his present employer in March 2018. According to the wife, she and the husband can remain in the United States indefinitely, as long as they continue to work, and both parties indicated their intention to remain in the United States, with no definite plan to return to and to reside in India.

The parties separated in early October 2017, either shortly before or after the wife obtained an ex parte protection-from-abuse ("PFA") order against the husband.3 That PFA order remained in effect until April 29, 2019, when the PFA case was dismissed based upon an agreement of the parties. In the interim, on November 3, 2017, the wife filed a complaint for a divorce in the trial court. She alleged that the parties were of incompatible temperament and that the marriage was irretrievably broken; she also alleged that the husband had assaulted and battered her on numerous occasions. The wife sought "sole custody" of the children, child support, alimony, a division of the marital property, and an award of attorney fees for her divorce counsel.

At the parties’ request, the trial court appointed a guardian ad litem to represent the interests of the children. The husband, who was opposed to a divorce, filed an answer denying the material allegations of the divorce complaint; he eventually filed a counterclaim for a divorce, purportedly to protect his rights. Based on the husband's testimony at trial, the husband wanted sole physical custody and sole legal custody of the children or, in the alternative, joint physical custody and joint legal custody of the children. He also stated that the wife should receive no marital property and no alimony.4

After ore tenus proceedings on January 29, 2020, and March 4, 2020, the trial court entered the divorce judgment. The divorce judgment divided the marital property and required the husband to pay the wife $17,050 for her attorney fees; neither party was awarded alimony. The divorce judgment also awarded the wife sole physical custody of the children and awarded the parties joint legal custody of the children. The husband was awarded visitation during the school year from Thursday at 3:00 p.m. until Monday at 8:00 a.m. on the first and third weekends of each month and from Wednesday at 3:00 p.m. until Thursday at 8:00 a.m. during the second and fourth weeks of each month. The husband was also awarded visitation every other week during the summer when school is not in session and on certain holidays. The divorce judgment expressly stated that the wife was permitted to travel with the children to India and required the husband to cooperate with her regarding the children's passports and travel documentation. The husband was ordered to pay child support;5 the parties were to equally divide the costs for the children's extracurricular expenses, school expenses, and noncovered medical expenses; and the wife was required to maintain medical insurance on the children. The divorce judgment also restrained the husband from "harassing, threatening, or contacting the [wife] in any way, except as to comply with" the divorce judgment, and denied all other requests for relief.

Each party filed a postjudgment motion. In part, the husband requested that the divorce judgment be amended to clarify that "both parties are allowed to take the minor children to India during the summer months," that "both parties be awarded video chat when either party is out of the country with the minor children," and that both parties be required to comply with the consent provisions regarding the childrens’ passports and travel documentation. He also requested that he essentially be awarded joint physical custody of the children or additional visitation. Further, the husband requested that the trial court revisit the marital-property division and make a purportedly more equitable division, particularly in light of his claim that he could not pay the amounts ordered to be paid to the wife. The husband also requested that he be allowed to obtain additional personal property from the marital home -- in addition to the personal property he had already requested and had received pursuant to a pendente lite order and the six suitcases of property that the wife testified he had removed from the home when he moved out in October 2017 -- and that certain clarifications be made regarding the return of the wife's jewelry, which the husband claimed he did not have. The husband stated that the value of the jewelry "equates to $1,951.22" and that, if the trial court did not believe the husband's claim that he did not have the jewelry and, thus, could not comply with the provision in the divorce judgment requiring that he give it to the wife, "he be allowed to pay [her] the cash value of $1,951.22 so that he is not in violation of [that] order." The husband also alleged that the attorney-fee award to the wife was excessive based on the parties’ respective incomes and resources, although he admitted that he had been in contempt for failing to comply with certain discovery orders.

After a hearing on the postjudgment motions, the trial court, on June 15, 2020, entered an order amending the divorce judgment. That order stated that the parties would each "have the right to video chat" with the children when the children were out of the country and that the parties must cooperate with one another regarding the children's passports and travel documentation, including providing consents and scheduling information. That order also capped the husband's obligation to pay child-care expenses not covered by child support at $1,000 per year and provided that he must pay the wife $1,951.22 for her jewelry that had been in the parties’ safe-deposit box unless he delivered the jewelry to her within 10 days of the entry of the order

On June 23, 2020, the husband filed a notice of appeal to this court. On appeal, questions of law and the trial court's application of the law to the facts are subject to de novo review. Holly v. Huntsville Hosp., 925 So. 2d 160, 162 (Ala. 2005). As to questions of fact,

" [w]hen a trial court hears ore tenus testimony, its findings on disputed facts are presumed correct and its judgment based on those findings will not be reversed unless the judgment is palpably erroneous or manifestly unjust.’ Philpot v. State, 843 So. 2d 122, 125 (Ala. 2002). "The presumption of correctness, however, is rebuttable and may be overcome where there is insufficient evidence presented to the trial court to sustain its judgment." Waltman v. Rowell, 913 So. 2d 1083, 1086 (Ala. 2005) (quoting Dennis v. Dobbs, 474 So. 2d 77, 79 (Ala. 1985) )."

Fadalla v. Fadalla, 929 So. 2d 429, 433 (Ala. 2005). Moreover,

"an appellate court reviewing a circuit court's judgment in a divorce action is not to substitute its judgment of the facts for that of the circuit court. ... Instead, the appellate court is ‘simply to determine if there was sufficient evidence before the circuit court to support its decision against a charge of arbitrariness and abuse of discretion.’ [ Ex parte Smith, 673 So. 2d 420, 422 (Ala.1995) ]."

Ex parte Elliott, 782 So. 2d 308, 311 (Ala. 2000).

"[I]t is the duty of the trial court, which had the opportunity to observe the witnesses and their demeanors, and not the appellate court, to make credibility determinations and to weigh the evidence presented. Blackman v. Gray Rider Truck Lines, Inc., 716 So. 2d 698, 700 (Ala. Civ. App. 1998). The role of the appellate court is not to reweigh the evidence ...."

Ex parte Hayes, 70 So. 3d 1211, 1215 (Ala. 2011) ; see also, e.g., Pate v. Pate, 849 So. 2d 972, 976 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002) (noting "the trial court's unique position of being able to observe the witnesses and evaluate their demeanor and credibility"). " ‘It is also well established that in the absence of specific findings of fact, appellate courts will...

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