Samayoa by Samayoa v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 85-1313

Citation783 F.2d 102
Decision Date12 February 1986
Docket NumberNo. 85-1313,85-1313
Parties30 Ed. Law Rep. 42 Marco SAMAYOA, by his mother Estela SAMAYOA, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CHICAGO BOARD OF EDUCATION, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Yvon D. Roustan, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiffs-appellants.

Robert J. Shepard, Law Dept., Dept. of Educ. City of Chicago, Chicago, Ill., for defendants-appellees.

Before BAUER, WOOD, and FLAUM, Circuit Judges.

HARLINGTON WOOD, Jr., Circuit Judge.

The complaint was filed in August, 1981, alleging racial discrimination against Cubans, American Indians, and white students in the operation of the Walt Disney Magnet School, a Chicago public elementary school. Four amended complaints and four years later, a new set of plaintiffs, the original plaintiff children having outgrown this suit, filed a notice of appeal for interlocutory consideration of the district court's dismissal of Counts I and II, leaving the remaining Count III for trial. 1 Plaintiffs have since dismissed the appeal as to Count II.

Present plaintiffs are children whose parents or guardians received letters in June, 1981, advising that they were accepted for enrollment in the prekindergarten program at Disney school the following September. Plaintiffs who were then three- or four-years old have now also grown out of the kindergarten category and enrolled in other schools, public or private. Shortly after the receipt of the letters of acceptance, the plaintiffs received letters of apology from the school board withdrawing the previous enrollment offers. The explanation was that in accordance with a desegregation plan the racial/ethnic quotas applicable for admission to magnet schools, including Disney, were modified for the benefit of blacks, Mexicans, and Puerto Ricans.

Count I of the current amended complaint, at issue in this appeal, charges that the Chicago Board of Education and others violated the civil rights of the plaintiffs secured by the First, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution. Plaintiffs, as relief, sought a declaration that the acts of defendants were unconstitutional and that defendants be preliminarily and permanently enjoined from enforcing the desegregation plan quotas as applied to the Disney school. The district judge dismissed Count I by applying the rationale of United States v. Board of Education of Chicago (Johnson III), 567 F.Supp. 290 (N.D.Ill.1983). The approval of the desegregation plan for the entire school system having been approved, United States v. Board of Education of Chicago, 554 F.Supp. 912 (N.D.Ill.) aff'd, 717 F.2d 378 (7th Cir.1983), the district court held that collateral attack was precluded on separate aspects of the approved plan.

Count II, the appeal of which was withdrawn by plaintiffs, alleges that the terms and conditions of the deed conveying the Disney school property from the federal government to the City of Chicago which required compliance with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibiting racial discrimination in federally-funded programs had been violated. Plaintiffs sought specific performance of the covenants contained in the deed so as to entitle plaintiffs to reinstatement in Disney school. Count II was dismissed by the district judge on the basis that the defendants had neither violated Title VI nor any other federal antidiscrimination statute by their actions alleged in Count II and therefore Count II failed to state a claim.

Count III, which remains in the district court for trial, alleges both a due process and an equal protection violation of the rights of the children plaintiffs. Plaintiffs complain that the school board held a "purported hearing" to consider the enrollment revocations which did not meet the minimal standards of procedural due process. After the hearing the school board reconsidered its holding and allegedly admitted five- and six-year-old children who also had been originally rejected along with the younger plaintiffs in this suit. No reason for the difference in treatment was allegedly given. Among other things plaintiffs seek an order of reinstatement of plaintiffs as students at Disney school, and further ask that defendants be enjoined from attempting to reject plaintiffs as students in violation of their constitutional rights. The district court found no merit to the equal protection claim, but retained the count for trial on the due process issue.

We need not recount for these purposes a series of motions by plaintiffs under the various complaints and counts seeking temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions from none of which were interlocutory appeals attempted.

Plaintiffs relying on 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1292(a)(1) 2 base this interlocutory appeal merely on the dismissal of Count I which among other things sought the permanent injunction relief. It can be seen that the simple factual background of the change in school admission policy constitutes the basis for each of the three counts. Each count alleges constitutional and statutory civil rights violations and seeks to reverse the admission policy and restore the students' admissibility by injunction or other similar order. The appellate review sought of Count I is clearly interlocutory as Count III remains for trial in the district court. After the dismissal of the appeal of Count II, it also remains in the district court without final judgment having been entered.

Title 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1292 authorizes appeals of interlocutory orders on limited grounds, one of which is refusing an injunction. No distinction is made in the section between preliminary and permanent injunctions. Count I sought both a preliminary and permanent injunction. The latter was, in effect, denied by reason of the dismissal of Count I. Preliminary injunctions...

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11 cases
  • Woodard v. Sage Products, Inc.
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
    • May 4, 1987
    ...786 F.2d 298, 300-01 (7th Cir.1986), including whether there exists a "special need to appeal at this time," Samayoa v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 783 F.2d 102, 104 (7th Cir.1986), which is vaguely reminiscent of serious, perhaps irreparable, consequences and lack of effectual challenge except b......
  • Holmes v. Fisher
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit)
    • August 9, 1988
    ...requested an injunction) is appealable under Sec. 1292(a)(1) even though the principal suit remains pending. Samayoa v. Chicago Board of Education, 783 F.2d 102 (7th Cir.1986), in which we dismissed an appeal challenging the denial of an injunction on one count while another remained to be ......
  • Elliott v. Hinds
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit)
    • March 11, 1986
    ...injunction is sufficiently "definitive" to allow interlocutory appeal is far more subtle and complicated. See Samayoa v. Chicago Board of Education, 783 F.2d 102 (7th Cir.1986). Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b) the disposition of the claim for injunctive relief is subject to revision at any time pr......
  • Victaulic Co. v. Tieman
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (3rd Circuit)
    • August 23, 2007
    ...the case's urgency. See United States v. Wade, 713 F.2d 49, 53 (3d Cir.1983); Shirey, 663 F.2d at 476; see also Samayoa v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 783 F.2d 102, 104 (7th Cir.1986). In addition, we have denied one request for appellate review on the ground that while the appellant was sufferin......
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