Sambrook v. Sierocki

• Decision Date: 10 July 2008
• Citation: Sambrook v. Sierocki, 53 A.D.3d 817, 861 N.Y.S.2d 483, 2008 NY Slip Op 6244 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008)
• Parties: FREDERICK W. SAMBROOK et al., Appellants, v. JOSEPH W. SIEROCKI et al., Respondents.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

53 A.D.3d 817

861 N.Y.S.2d 483

2008 NY Slip Op 6244

FREDERICK W. SAMBROOK et al., Appellants, v. JOSEPH W. SIEROCKI et al., Respondents.

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Third Department.

Decided July 10, 2008.

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Kramer, J.), entered June 27, 2007 in Schenectady County, which, among other things, partially granted defendants' motion for summary judgment.

Kavanagh, J.

In November 1988, John Laing applied for and received approval for a five-parcel residential subdivision located on Vley Road in the Town of Glenville, Schenectady County. Three of the owners executed a declaration of easement creating a common driveway. Subsequently, plaintiffs and defendants each acquired title to a lot; defendants' property was subject to the existing easement and plaintiffs' property included an easement granting them the "right to use with others, the common driveway, for ingress and egress."

In 2002, defendants constructed a stockade fence along the western side of the driveway, from the front of the lot to the end of the easement and, in front of the fence, planted trees and placed mulch and posted "No Parking" signs on the fence. Defendants also installed a chain link fence along the eastern side of the driveway. Plaintiffs commenced this action claiming that defendants' actions prevented plaintiffs from full enjoyment and use of the easement and sought an order requiring defendants to remove the fences and all permanent obstructions. After the parties reached a stipulation as to the facts of the case, Supreme Court ordered, among other things, that the chain link fence on the eastern side of the driveway be removed, however, it found that the fence on the western side, and the landscaping, could remain. Plaintiffs now appeal.

"`The extent and nature of an easement must be determined by the language contained in the grant, aided where necessary by any circumstances tending to manifest the intent of the parties'" (Raven Indus., Inc. v Irvine, 40 AD3d 1241, 1242 [2007], quoting Hopper v Friery, 260 AD2d 964, 966 [1999]). The easement here specifically granted plaintiffs the right of ingress and egress. While plaintiffs argue that the fence and landscaping on the western side of the driveway impede their ability to use the easement to the fullest extent because it prohibits parking along the side of the driveway, Supreme Court correctly determined that parking was not a proper use of the...