Sambs v. City of Brookfield

• Decision Date: 11 August 1980
• Docket Number: No. 78-599,78-599
• Citation: 293 N.W.2d 504,97 Wis.2d 356
• Parties: Raymond J. SAMBS, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. CITY OF BROOKFIELD, Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Page 504

293 N.W.2d 504

97 Wis.2d 356

Raymond J. SAMBS, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. CITY OF BROOKFIELD, Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.

No. 78-599.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

Argued May 5, 1980.

Decided June 27, 1980.

Reconsideration Denied Aug. 11, 1980. ^*

Joseph D. McDevitt (argued), Milwaukee, for defendant-appellant-petitioner; Michael J. Gross and Hippenmeyer, Reilly, Arenz & Molter, Waukesha, on brief; George Schmus, West Allis, Borgelt, Powell, Peterson & Frauen, S. C., Milwaukee, of counsel.

V. John Burggraf (argued), Wauwatosa, for plaintiff-respondent; Wickert & Fuhrman and Arron Belongia, Milwaukee, of counsel.

Burt P. Natkins, Madison, filed brief amicus curiae on behalf of the League of Wisconsin Municipalities.

ABRAHAMSON, Justice.

This is a review of a decision of the court of appeals, Sambs v. City of Brookfield, 95 Wis.2d 1, 289 N.W.2d 308 (Ct.App.1979), which affirmed a judgment of the circuit court for Waukesha county, Max Raskin, Circuit Judge. ¹ The judgment awarded damages in the amount of $949,645.66 to Sambs, the plaintiff, who suffered extensive personal injuries arising out of an automobile accident on February 21, 1965, for which the city of Brookfield was found 30 percent causally negligent in failing to properly maintain and repair a highway. ² The city of Brookfield asserted in the circuit court and in the court of appeals that the maximum amount the plaintiff may recover is $25,000, pursuant to sec. 81.15 ³ and sec. 895.43(2), ⁴ Stats.1965. The court of appeals affirmed the judgment, holding that the $25,000 limitation on the recovery of damages arising from highway defects in secs. 81.15 and 895.43(2), Stats.1965, violates the equal protection guarantees of the federal and state constitutions. ⁵ The court of appeals concluded that the legislature had created improper classifications within the class of "victims of public tort-feasors" by establishing limitations on the amount that a victim could recover depending on the nature of the tort-feasor's conduct causing the injury. We reverse the decision of the court of appeals. We conclude that secs. 81.15 and 895.43(2), Stats.1965, do not violate the constitutional guarantees of equal protection, and we therefore hold that plaintiff's recovery against Brookfield is limited by statute to $25,000.

The plaintiff asserts that the Wisconsin legislature has afforded victims of governmental torts different legal rights on the basis of the nature of the tort committed and that there is no rational basis for this differentiation. The plaintiff poses the following example: Two cars are traveling down the same highway. The first car is forced off the road due to a defect in the highway and the driver is paralyzed as a result of this accident. The second car misses the defect but a few seconds later collides with a municipal vehicle being operated negligently in the course of municipal business; the driver of the second car is paralyzed as a result of this accident. The driver of the first car may recover no more than $25,000, while the driver of the second car may recover his full claim for damages. The Wisconsin statutes limit the recovery of victims of highway defects to $25,000, sec. 81.15, Stats.1965, while the statutes apparently do not limit the amount recovered by victims of motor vehicle accidents, sec. 345.05, Stats.1965. ⁶ Although both the plaintiff and the court of appeals, 95 Wis.2d at 11, n. 14, 289 N.W.2d 308, compare sec. 81.15 and sec. 345.05 for illustrative purposes, their conclusion that the statutory limit in sec. 81.15 is unconstitutional is not based on this example only but on an examination of various statutory provisions classifying governmental torts.

The plaintiff points out that sec. 66.091, Stats., ⁷ renders a county or city liable for injury to person or property by a mob or riot and the section does not expressly limit the dollar amount that can be recovered. On the other hand, sec. 895.43(2), Stats.1965, generally limits the amount recoverable by a person for injuries or death in a tort suit against a municipal governmental unit or municipal public officer to $25,000, unless otherwise provided by statute. The amount recoverable against a state officer for a tort is presently limited to $100,000. Sec. 895.45(4), Stats. ⁸

The plaintiff demonstrates that because of the fortuity of the nature of the governmental tort-feasor and the conduct, i. e., whether the victim's claim falls within sec. 66.091, sec. 81.15, sec. 895.43(2), or sec. 895.45, victims whose injuries are the same will be entitled to different amounts of recovery. It is because of this statutory pattern of differentiating the amount the victim can recover on the basis of the type of tortious activity by the particular governmental unit involved or its officers or employees that the plaintiff argues that secs. 81.15 and 895 .43, Stats., which purport to limit recovery in the instant case, violate the constitutional guarantees of equal protection.

The question is whether the differences in the circumstances under which governmental units become potential tort defendants are sufficient to sustain the legislature's enactment of different limits on the amount of recovery by the victims of governmental torts.

The city of Brookfield maintains that the question plaintiff presents in the instant case was decided by this court in Stanhope v. Brown County, 90 Wis.2d 823, 280 N.W.2d 711 (1979). We think Stanhope is relevant but not controlling.

In Stanhope the plaintiff argued that the statutes established two classes of plaintiffs (victims of governmental negligence and victims of non-governmental negligence) and two classes of defendants (governmental tort-feasors and non-governmental tort-feasors). Stanhope argued that limiting the liability of governmental tort-feasors and limiting the recovery of the victims of governmental tort-feasors to $25,000 as provided by secs. 81.15 and 895.43 was unconstitutional under the equal protection guarantees of the state and federal constitutions and Art. I, sec. 9, of the Wisconsin Constitution, the "certain remedy" clause. ⁹

Analyzing the statutes under the rational basis test, this court found the statutes constitutional. The court concluded that the legislature had a reasonable basis in setting the $25,000 limit in sec. 81.15 to protect the public treasury. The court pointed out that the legislative classification Stanhope challenged expressed a legislative balancing of two purposes: "To compensate victims of government tortfeasors while at the same time protecting the public treasury." 90 Wis.2d at 842, 280 N.W.2d at 719. This court was unwilling to say that the legislature had no rational basis to fear that full monetary responsibility entailed the risk of insolvency of municipal governmental entities or intolerable tax burdens. The court said it was within the legitimate power of the legislature to take steps to preserve sufficient public funds to insure that the government would be able to continue to provide those services which it believes benefit the citizenry. The court concluded that "the legislature's specification of a dollar limitation on damages recoverable allows for fiscal planning and avoids the risk of devastatingly high judgments while permitting victims of public tortfeasors to recover their losses up to that limit." 90 Wis.2d at 842, 280 N.W.2d at 719. See also, Note, Damage Remedies Against Municipalities for Constitutional Violations, 89 Harv.L.Rev. 922, 958 (1978).

As to the specific monetary limitation on recovery the court said that the monetary limit is one which the legislature determines after balancing the ideal of equal justice and the need for fiscal security. Stanhope argued that the $25,000 figure was unreasonably low and that many states had not imposed any limit on recovery and had not experienced any fiscal difficulties. The court said it could not conclude on the basis of the record in Stanhope that the $25,000 ceiling adopted by the legislature was arbitrary or unreasonable or violated state and federal constitutional guarantees. This court recognized that whatever the monetary limitation on recovery, the amount will seem arbitrary because it is based on imponderables, and that the legislature, not the court, must select the figure. The limit enacted by the legislature " 'must be accepted unless we can say that it is very wide of any reasonable mark.' Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32, 41, 48 S.Ct. 423, 426, 72 L.Ed. 770 (1928)." Stanhope, 90 Wis.2d at 843, n. 11, 280 N.W.2d at 719.

We must acknowledge that the $25,000 statutory limitation appears low when considering this case which graphically illustrates the severity of physical injury which may be sustained by tort victims, the high costs of medical care, and the large amount of monetary damages awarded. The New Hampshire Supreme Court recently concluded "that a $50,000 statutory limitation on tort recoveries is precariously close to the boundary of acceptability" and urged the legislature, as we do, "to review periodically all statutory limitations of recovery, including the one at issue here, to insure that inflation and political considerations do not lead to inequitable disparities in treatment." Estate of Cargill v. City of Rochester, N.H., 406 A.2d 704, 708, 709 (1979). Nevertheless, on the basis of the record of this case, we conclude, for the reasons set forth in Stanhope, that a statutory limitation on recoverable damages in the amount of $25,000 does not per se violate the guarantees of equal protection.

The plaintiff in the instant case, however, raises an equal protection issue that was not raised or considered in the Stanhope case. Here the plaintiff contends that the legislature has created improper classifications within the classification of "victims of public tort-feasors." In Stanhope, this court compared the class of victims of nongovernmental tort-feasors to...