Sammons v. City of Beaufort
| Decision Date | 21 July 1954 |
| Docket Number | No. 16894,16894 |
| Citation | 83 S.E.2d 153,225 S.C. 490 |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
| Parties | SAMMONS v. CITY OF BEAUFORT et al. |
W. Brantley Harvey, Beaufort, for appellant.
William N. Levin, Beaufort, and Huger Sinkler, Charleston, for respondents.
The Court is asked in this action to render a declaratory judgment with respect to the constitutionality of a 1954 act of the General Assembly approved by the Governor on March 26, 1954, 48 St. at L., p. 1771, known as the 'Off-Street Parking Facilities Act,' and the validity of certain covenants and pledges made thereunder by the governing body of the City of Beaufort in connection with a proposed issue of revenue bonds to defray the cost of providing off-street public parking facilities.
Parking lots and buildings are among the projects which a municipality may establish and finance under the Revenue Bond Act, Sections 59-361 to 59-415, inclusive, of the 1952 Code. The purpose of the challenged legislation enacted in 1954 was to facilitate the financing of off-street parking facilities by authorizing the issuance of revenue bonds secured by a pledge not only of the revenue derived from the project undertaken, but also that derived from on-street parking facilities. To accomplish this purpose, municipalities were further authorized to make certain covenants which will be hereinafter discussed.
There are now on the streets of Beaufort 140 curb-line parking meters from which it receives annually approximately $6,500. The City Council desires to provide additional parking facilities by filling in and improving a low, waterfront lot adjoining the business area of Beaufort, and converting same into a parking lot. The estimated cost of the project is around $100,000. It seems to be conceded that the revenue to be derived from the meters on said lot will probably be insufficient to service bonds in the above amount. Following the passage of the 1954 statute, the City Council decided to finance said project by the issuance of bonds secured by a pledge of the revenue derived from the meters located on the parking lot, and also from those on the streets. The proposed bonds will mature serially over a period of twenty years and will be issued pursuant to the provisions of the Revenue Bond Act as implemented by the Off-Street Parking Facilities Act.
An appropriate ordinance has been passed by the City of Beaufort whereby said municipality has covenanted and agreed to put into effect, and keep in force during the life of the bonds, charges for both off-street and on-street parking sufficient to produce revenues necessary to service the bonds, to provide a cushion fund therefor, to operate and maintain all of its parking facilities, and to provide appropriate sums for depreciation and contingencies. The City has further convenanted to enact and keep in force during the life of the bonds an ordinance making it a criminal offense for anyone to use its parking facilities without paying the proper charges, or to disobey the regulations imposed with respect to the use of such facilities.
It seems to be conceded that the legislation heretofore mentioned authorizes a municipality to make covenants of the foregoing nature.
The ordinance authorizing the issuance of said bonds also contains a covenant, conventional in revenue bond proceedings and authorized by the Revenue Bond Act, imposing a statutory lien upon both the on-street and off-street parking facilities, and providing that should the City of Beaufort default in the payment of the principal or interest on said bonds, the Court may appoint a receiver to administer and operate the facilities, with power to fix rates and charges, and to collect revenues sufficient to provide for the payment of the bonds and the expenses of operating and maintaining the facilities.
The Court below sustained the constitutionality of the 'Off-Street Parking Facilities Act', and upheld the validity of all the covenants just discussed.
The first question we are asked to determine is whether a municipal off-street parking facility may be properly classified as an undertaking for a public or municipal purpose. It was held in Cathcart v. City of Columbia, 170 S.C. 362, 170 S.E. 435, that the various projects then enumerated in the Revenue Bond Act were within the scope of the powers of a municipality. Subsequently in 1949, Act March 21, 1949, 46 St. at L. 103, parking lots and various other undertakings were added. A parking lot serves a public purpose to as great, if not greater, degree than many of the purposes upheld by the Court in the Cathcart case. We have no hesitancy in concluding that the proposed undertaking is for a public purpose. This view is sustained by the overwhelming weight of authority, as shown by annotation found in 8 A.L.R.2d beginning on page 373.
The challenged legislation contemplates that a municipality may establish off-street parking facilities whenever traffic conditions create a need therefor. It has been suggested that there is no showing in the instant case of any such need for the City of Beaufort. However, it will be presumed that local conditions are such as to justify the project. Owens v. Owens, Mayor, 193 S.C. 260, 8 S.E.2d 339. There is nothing here to rebut such a presumption.
It is next contended that 'the entire plan is discriminatory, lacking in uniformity, and favoring those who use the facilities and pay the fees against those who do not.' While some language of the Court in Britt v. City of Wilmington, 236 N.C. 446, 73 S.E.2d 289, tends to sustain this contention, we fail to see any basis for the claim of discrimination. A uniform schedule of rates and charges is to be put into effect by the City of Beaufort which will apply equally to all persons using the parking lot. It will be open to the public and anyone who violates the regulations will be subject to the penalties provided for by the ordinance.
The third question is whether a municipality may finance the construction of off-street parking facilities by revenue derived in part from curb-line meters. It is argued that Owens v. Owens, Mayor, supra, 193 S.C. 260, 8 S.E.2d 339, 341, limits the charges for on-street parking to those necessary to pay the cost of purchasing, maintaining and operating the parking meters, and prohibits a municipality from using such facilities for the purpose of raising revenue. Accordingly, it is contended that since the proposed parking lot will not be self-sustaining, the City of Beaufort may not use a profit from the operation of its on-street meters to make up the deficiency. Attention is also called to the fact that the ordinance authorizing these bonds provides for a 'cushion fund' and also for contingencies, thereby clearly indicating that the entire parking facilities of Beaufort are to be operated for profit.
In the Owens case, we sustained an ordinance of the City of Columbia providing for the installation and maintenance of parking meters on its streets. It was there held that a municipality may in the exercise of the police power regulate the use of its streets by designating individual parking spaces thereon and making a charge for such facilities through the use of parking meters, but may not, under the guise of regulation. lay a license or privilege tax upon the use of its streets, and that the police power could not be exercised for the purpose of raising revenue. The Court stated: 'We think that it is clearly the law that a regulatory measure of this kind may produce only such revenue as is reasonably necessary to defray the expense connected with its operation, and that an ordinance passed for the real purpose of raising revenue, under the guise of obtaining funds for the enforcement of a police regulation, is invalid.'
But we do not think it follows that a municipality may not use the revenue from on-street parking facilities to defray in part the cost of establishing and maintaining a parking lot. Both facilities are interrelated and constitute a uniform parking system. The right to establish a parking lot is a necessary adjunct to the right to regulate traffic. No good reason appears why both on-street and off-street parking may not be combined to accomplish the general objective of regulating the use of the streets. So long as the total revenue received from both on-street and off-street meters does not substantially exceed that necessary to defray the expenses incident to the regulation of parking, including the acquisition and improvement of off-street parking facilities, we do...
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