Sammons v. McCarty
| Decision Date | 29 March 2022 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ELH-20-3010 |
| Parties | VINCENT S. SAMMONS Plaintiff, v. ALAN J. MCCARTHY, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
In this free speech case, plaintiff Vincent Sammons claims that various municipal officials in Cecil County, Maryland violated his rights under the First Amendment to the Constitution as well as Article 40 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. In an Amended Complaint (ECF 15, the “Complaint”), Sammons has sued Cecil County Maryland (the “County”), as well as seven individuals who served as County officials at the relevant time: Alan McCarthy, the County Executive;[1] Alfred Wein, Jr. the Director of Administration; Jennifer Lyall, Public Information Officer; Maggie Tome, Unified Communications Specialist; Robert Meffley, President of the County Council Brian Miller, the Director of Information Technology; and Jason Allison, County Attorney (collectively, the “Individual Defendants”).[2] The Individual Defendants have been sued in their individual and official capacities. And, plaintiff has appended numerous exhibits to the suit. See ECF 15-1 through ECF 15-16.
The Complaint contains seven counts and pertains to three incidents that, in plaintiff's view, amounted to unlawful viewpoint discrimination.[3] As to each occurrence, the Complaint asserts a claim under the First Amendment (Counts I through III) as well as Article 40 (Counts IV through VI). And, in Count VII, Sammons asks the Court to issue a declaratory judgment holding that certain provisions of the “Cecil County Government Communication Plan” (the “Communication Plan”) are unconstitutional. Moreover, plaintiff seeks both compensatory and punitive damages as to Counts I through VI.
In particular, Sammons claims that Lyall, Allison, and McCarthy engaged in unlawful viewpoint discrimination when they deleted comments that plaintiff made on a Facebook page entitled “Dr. Alan McCarthy Cecil County Executive” (the “County Executive Page” or the “Page”), and blocked Sammons from making further posts on the Page (Counts I and IV). Plaintiff also contends that McCarthy, Wein, Tome, and Meffley impermissibly precluded plaintiff from participating in a public budget meeting (Counts II and V). And, Sammons alleges that McCarthy, Allison, and Miller unlawfully blocked plaintiff from accessing “county agency email systems” (Counts III and VI). With respect to each of plaintiff's claims arising under Article 40, Sammons also names the County as a defendant. See Id. at 32, 34, 37.
Defendants have moved to dismiss the Complaint or, in the alternative for summary judgment (ECF 26), which is supported by a memorandum of law (ECF 26-1) (collectively, the “Motion”) and four exhibits. ECF 26-3; ECF 26-4; ECF 26-5; ECF 26-6. Plaintiff opposes the Motion (ECF 33, the “Opposition”), which is supported by a Rule 56(d) affidavit of Ray Shepard, who serves as plaintiff's counsel in this case (ECF 33-1) and one exhibit. ECF 33-2. Defendants have replied. ECF 41 (the “Reply”).[4]
In addition, non-party George McDermott, who is self-represented, has filed a “Motion And Or Petition For A Reconsideration/Rehearing By The Full Court”. ECF 50 (the “Reconsideration Motion”). He seeks, inter alia, reconsideration of the Court's Memorandum (ECF 47) and Order (ECF 48) of October 12, 2021, denying his request (ECF 14) to intervene in this suit. Additionally, McDermott has submitted several other motions, asserting a wide range of allegations, including a challenge to the Court's authority. ECF 49; ECF 51; ECF 52.[5] Defendants oppose the Reconsideration Motion (ECF 53), but Sammons has not responded. See Docket. And, McDermott has replied. ECF 54.
No hearing is necessary. See Local Rule 105.2(a). For the reasons that follow, I shall grant the Motion in part and deny it in part. And, I shall deny the Reconsideration Motion, as well as Mr. McDermott's additional motions.
I. Reconsideration Motion
George McDermott, who is not a party to the case, has asked the Court to reconsider its earlier decision, denying his request to intervene in the case. See ECF 50. As noted, he has also filed several other motions. See ECF 49; ECF 51; ECF 52. I previously denied McDermott's earlier motion to intervene (ECF 14), as well as other motions that he filed, by Memorandum (ECF 47) and Order (ECF 48) of October 12, 2021. Principally, I determined that McDermott had failed to show any common interest with the parties to this case, and thus he was not entitled to intervene as a matter of right. I also declined to permit intervention in the exercise of my discretion. ECF 47 at 9-10.
The Order of October 12, 2021 (ECF 48) adjudicated “fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b). Therefore, it is an interlocutory order that “may be revised at any time” before the entry of final judgment. Id.; see Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 12 (1983); Nadendla v. WakeMed, 24 F.4th 299, 304 (4th Cir. 2022); Carlson v. Boston Sci. Corp., 856 F.3d 320, 325 (4th Cir. 2017). However, the Fourth Circuit has said that a court should only revise an interlocutory order in limited circumstances, in order to promote efficiency, judicial economy, and finality. See, e.g., Am. Canoe Ass'n v. Murphy Farms, Inc., 326 F.3d 505, 515 (4th Cir. 2003); Sejman v. Warner-Lambert Co, Inc., 845 F.2d 66, 68-69 (4th Cir. 1988); see also Christianson v. Colt Indus. Oper. Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 816 (1988). Indeed, “allowing litigants a ‘second bite at the apple' via a motion to reconsider is disfavored.” Nadendla, 24 F.4th at 305.
In particular, a court should revise an interlocutory order only to account for “‘(1) a subsequent trial producing substantially different evidence; (2) a change in applicable law; or (3) clear error causing manifest injustice.'” U.S. Tobacco Coop. Inc. v. Big S. Wholesale of Virginia, LLC, 899 F.3d 236, 256 (4th Cir. 2018) (quoting Carlson, 856 F.3d at 325).
The only possible basis for McDermott's request is the third category-a clear error causing manifest injustice. In this regard, the Fourth Circuit has colorfully reiterated: U.S. Tobacco Coop., 899 F.3d at 258 (quoting TFWS, Inc. v. Franchot, 572 F.3d 186, 194 (4th Cir. 2009)) (alteration in U.S. Tobacco Coop.).
In his various filings, McDermott has failed to identify any basis from which the Court could discern that he shares a common question of fact or law with the parties to the instant suit, so as to warrant his intervention. Nor has McDermott shown that the Court's prior decision was made in error. Consequently, I shall deny the Reconsideration Motion. ECF 50. And, because I decline to allow McDermott to intervene in the suit, I need not consider his remaining motions See ECF 49; ECF 51; ECF 52. II. Motion to Dismiss
The allegations underlying this suit- pertain to three discrete but interrelated incidents: (1) McCarthy, Allison, and/or Lyall deleted comments posted by Sammons to the County Executive Page, and thereafter blocked Sammons from accessing the Page; (2) McCarthy, Wein, Tome, and Meffley allegedly refused to provide Sammons with an opportunity to speak and display his video feed during a virtual town hall meeting; and (3) Allison, McCarthy, and Miller precluded Sammons from emailing County officials for a one-month period.
The events culminating in this suit began in 2015, when “McCarthy was campaigning to be elected as the Cecil County Executive.” ECF 15, ¶ 13. The Cecil County Executive (the “County Executive”) is “the chief executive officer of the County” and is empowered to “faithfully execute the laws” and to assure “that the affairs of the executive branch are administered properly and efficiently, and that employees of the executive branch faithfully perform their duties.” Cecil County Charter, Art. 4, § 402.[7]
The Cecil County Charter (the “Charter”) provides for a five-member County Council (the “Council”). Id., Art. 2, § 201. It is vested with “[a]ll legislative powers which may be exercised by the County under the Maryland Constitution and laws of the state.” Cecil County Charter, Art. 2, § 202. And, the County Executive has the “duties and responsibilities” to prepare and submit “to the Council the annual County Budget” and to recommend to “the Council such measures for legislative action that the Executive may consider to be in the best interests of the County.” Id. §§ 402(b), (e).
Prior to McCarthy's launch of his campaign, McCarthy maintained only a “personal Facebook profile.” ECF 15, ¶ 13; see ECF 15-1 ().[8] But, in his effort to obtain public office, “McCarthy created a second Facebook page on November 2, 2015, which he called the ‘Dr. McCarthy for Cecil County Executive' Facebook Page.” ECF 15, ¶ 13[9]; see ECF 15-2 at 5 (). Two weeks later, on November 16, 2015, McCarthy changed the name of the Page to include his first name. ECF 15, ¶ 13; see ECF 15-2 at 5.[10]
In November 2016, McCarthy was elected as the Cecil County Executive. ECF 15, ¶ 14. Accordingly, on November 17, 2016 McCarthy “changed the name” of the Page to “‘Dr. Alan McCarthy Cecil County Executive-Elect.'” Id. ¶ 13; see ECF 15-2 at 5. Then, on December 4, 2016, after McCarthy assumed office as the County Executive, he “again changed the name” of the Page to “‘Dr. Alan McCarthy Cecil County...
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