Samons v. Nat'l Mines Corp.

• Decision Date: 11 February 2022
• Docket Number: No. 20-3209,20-3209
• Parties: Mabel SAMONS, Petitioner, v. NATIONAL MINES CORPORATION; Old Republic Insurance Company ; Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, United States Department of Labor, Respondents.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

25 F.4th 455

Mabel SAMONS, Petitioner,

v.NATIONAL MINES CORPORATION; Old Republic Insurance Company ; Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, United States Department of Labor, Respondents.

No. 20-3209

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Decided and Filed: February 11, 2022

ON BRIEF: Evan B. Smith, APPALRED LEGAL AID, Prestonsburg, Kentucky, for Petitioner. Mark E. Solomons, Michael A. Pusateri, GREENBERG TRAURIG LLP, Washington, D.C., for Respondents National Mines Corp. and Old Republic Insurance. Sean G. Bajkowski, Anne Marie Scarpino, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, Washington, D.C., for federal Respondent.

Before: McKEAGUE, NALBANDIAN, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

OPINION

MURPHY, Circuit Judge.

After working underground in coal mines for three decades, Casey Samons developed pneumoconiosis

(commonly known as black-lung disease ). His widow, Mabel Samons, sought benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 901 – 44. It took the Department of Labor 17 years to decide (and ultimately deny) her claims. During this time, the claims bounced back and forth between an administrative law judge and the agency's appellate body, the Benefits Review Board. In the last appeal, the Board also rejected one of Samons's main arguments on what Samons likely views to be a legalistic ground ("law of the case") without ever reaching the merits. The Department of Labor then delayed things further by filing an incomplete and disorganized administrative record in our court. We thus understand Samons's frustrations with the agency's handling of her claims. But while its actions perhaps could be described as poor customer service, they do not show any reversible legal error in the agency proceedings. To the contrary, the Board could lawfully invoke the discretionary law-of-the-case doctrine to avoid reexamining an issue on which it had affirmed the administrative law judge years before. And the judge's credibility findings about the conflicting medical opinions pass muster under our deferential "substantial evidence" test. We thus affirm the Board's decision.

I

A

Extended work in coal mines has led many miners to develop the respiratory disease known as pneumoconiosis

. See

U.S. Dep't of Lab. v. Triplett , 494 U.S. 715, 717, 110 S.Ct. 1428, 108 L.Ed.2d 701 (1990). The Black Lung Benefits Act allows coal miners (and some of their surviving relatives after their death) to seek benefits if they develop this disease. See id. The Secretary of Labor has issued many regulations to implement the Act. See Island Creek Coal Co. v. Bryan , 937 F.3d 738, 743 (6th Cir. 2019). To obtain benefits under these regulations, miners must prove four things: they have pneumoconiosis; this disease resulted from their coal-mine work; they are totally disabled; and the disease contributes to their total disability. 20 C.F.R. § 725.202(d)(2).

This case centers on the third element: total disability. Regulations treat a miner as "totally disabled" if the miner "has a pulmonary or respiratory impairment which, standing alone, prevents or prevented" the miner both "[f]rom performing his or her usual coal mine work" and "[f]rom engaging" in other "gainful employment" near the miner's home that requires similar skills and abilities. Id. § 718.204(b)(1). A miner's "usual coal mine work" has been interpreted to mean "the most recent job the miner performed regularly and over a substantial period of time." Shortridge v. Beatrice Pocahontas Coal Co. , 4 Black Lung Rep. (MB) 1-534, 1-539 (Ben. Rev. Bd. 1982); U.S. Steel Mining Co. v. Dir., OWCP , 386 F.3d 977, 981 (11th Cir. 2004) ; see also Walker v. Dir., Off. of Workers’ Comp. Programs , 927 F.2d 181, 183 (4th Cir. 1991).

Miners can prove their total disability in two general ways (apart from using various legal presumptions that are not at issue in this case). They can rely on objective evidence, including, as relevant here, pulmonary-function tests

. 20 C.F.R. § 718.204(b)(2)(i). To establish a miner's total disability, the results of a test must fall within specified ranges listed in the regulations. Id. ; see id. pt. 718, app. B. Alternatively, miners can rely on a physician's medical opinion that their impairment has rendered them totally disabled within the meaning of the regulatory definition. Id. § 718.204(b)(2)(iv). Physicians must exercise "reasoned medical judgment" and base their opinions on "medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques." Id. And evidence supporting a miner's total disability must be weighed against any "contrary probative evidence[.]" Id. § 718.204(b)(2) ; Peabody Coal Co. v. Hill , 123 F.3d 412, 416 (6th Cir. 1997).

A miner's total disability also affects survivor's claims. If a miner is awarded benefits, eligible relatives can receive survivor's benefits upon the miner's death without additional proof. 30 U.S.C. § 932(l) ; Consolidation Coal Co. v. Maynes , 739 F.3d 323, 326 (6th Cir. 2014). Otherwise, survivors must prove three elements, including that the "miner's death was due to pneumoconiosis[.]" 20 C.F.R. § 718.205(a)(3). But the miner's death is presumed to be due to the disease if survivors prove, among other things, that the miner was totally disabled. Id. § 718.305(b)–(c).

The coal-mine operator for whom the miner last worked generally must pay these benefits. See id. §§ 725.494–.495. To resolve benefits-eligibility disputes between operators and miners, the Act incorporates the claims-processing rules of the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901 – 50. 30 U.S.C. § 932(a). After an administrator issues a proposed eligibility decision, a miner or operator may request a hearing before an administrative law judge. 33 U.S.C. § 919(d) ; 20 C.F.R. §§ 725.418, 725.451. A losing party may then appeal that judge's decision to the Benefits Review Board. 33 U.S.C. § 921(b)(3). Although the Board reviews legal issues de novo, it must accept all of the judge's factual findings as long as they are "supported by substantial evidence in the record considered as a whole." Id. If the Board finds that the judge erred, it may remand the case to the judge. Id. § 921(b)(4). If it issues "a final order," a party may seek review in a federal circuit court. Id. § 921(c) ; see Bryan , 937 F.3d at 744.

B

Born in 1920, Casey Samons (whom we will refer to as Casey to distinguish him from his wife) began working in the coal mines in 1940. Casey put in two years at this coal job before leaving in June 1942 to serve his country during World War II. He returned to the mines in Kentucky in 1946 and took various coal-related jobs from that year until his health forced him to retire in 1976. All told, he worked underground in the coal mines for over 30 years. He married Mabel Samons in 1942 and they remained married for over 60 years until his death. Samons thus qualifies as an eligible survivor. See 20 C.F.R. § 720.212.

Casey filed a claim for benefits in 2003 when he was 82 years old, but he sadly passed away two years later with his claim still pending. Samons took over Casey's claim on behalf of his estate and filed her own claim for survivor's benefits starting on the date of his death. Over the next 15 years, this case took four trips between an administrative law judge and the Board.

Round One . A federal administrator initially awarded Samons benefits on both Casey's claim and her survivor's claim. Casey's former employer, National Mines Corporation, asked for a hearing before an administrative law judge.

At the hearing, the parties introduced the typical evidence used to prove or disprove a miner's total disability, including pulmonary-function tests

(under 20 C.F.R. § 718.204(b)(2)(i) ) and physician opinions (under 20 C.F.R. § 718.204(b)(2)(iv) ). Before his death, Casey had taken four pulmonary-function tests. Some of these tests produced qualifying scores; others did not. Two doctors who reviewed the tests also opined that some qualifying scores were invalid due to Casey's lack of effort.

In addition to the tests, five doctors opined on Casey's health. Samons introduced the opinions of Dr. Roger Jurich, Casey's treating physician, and Dr. Glen Baker. Both doctors opined that Casey met the regulatory definition for "total disability." National Mines introduced the opinions of Dr. Abdul Dahhan (for Casey's direct claim and Samons's survivor's claim) and Dr. Gregory Fino (for Casey's direct claim only). (Parties may introduce only two opinions per claim, 20 C.F.R. § 725.414(a)(2)(i), and National Mines used a different opinion for the survivor's claim.) These two doctors opined that Casey did not meet the total-disability definition. The administrative law judge lastly obtained the report of Dr. Valentino Simpao. Simpao opined that Casey had a "moderate impairment," but did not state whether Casey was totally disabled.

In his first decision, the administrative law judge denied benefits on the ground that Samons failed to prove Casey's total disability. The judge held that Casey's pulmonary-function tests

did not establish his total disability under § 718.204(b)(2)(i) because of the mix of qualifying and nonqualifying scores. Turning to the medical opinions, the judge rejected those of Drs. Baker and Simpao for various reasons. He next credited the views of Drs. Dahhan and Fino (that Casey was not totally disabled) over those of Dr. Jurich (that he was) because of their superior qualifications. The judge lastly denied Samons's claim for survivor's benefits because he found that Casey had died from a staph infection, not pneumoconiosis.

Samons appealed. The Board affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded to the administrative law judge. Samons v. Nat'l Mines Corp. , 2012 WL 423892, at *6 (Ben. Rev. Bd. Jan. 27, 2012) (per curiam). It noted that the judge's conclusion that the pulmonary-function tests

did not prove Casey's total disability under § 718.204(b)(2)(i) was "unchallenged on appeal" and so "affirmed." Id. at *2...