Sampay v. Am. Univ.
| Citation | 294 A.3d 106 |
| Docket Number | 20-CV-0366 |
| Decision Date | 18 May 2023 |
| Parties | Vanessa SAMPAY, Appellant, v. AMERICAN UNIVERSITY, Appellee. |
| Court | D.C. Court of Appeals |
Jeremy Greenberg, with whom Denise M. Clark, Washington, DC, was on the brief, for appellant.
John M. Remy, Reston, VA, for appellee.
Before Blackburne-Rigsby, Chief Judge, McLeese, Associate Judge, and Fisher, Senior Judge.
Appellant Vanessa Sampay filed a four-count complaint alleging various violations of the District of Columbia Human Rights Act ("DCHRA"), D.C. Code § 2-1401.01 et seq. , by her employer, appellee American University ("AU"). AU filed a motion for summary judgment on all counts, and appellant filed a motion for partial summary judgment as to Count IV, which alleged impermissible retaliation. The trial court granted AU's motion and denied appellant's motion. Appellant appeals the trial court's grant of summary judgment for AU as to the retaliation claim only. We limit our review of the trial court's decision accordingly and affirm.
In 1999, appellant was hired by AU to work as a "HelpDesk Specialist" before being promoted in 2001 to a "LAN Analyst II" in its Office of Information Technology ("OIT"). In 2014, Hosein Nahidian, a former peer, became her direct supervisor. Appellant's performance reviews were generally positive for years 2014-2015 and 2015-2016, although appellant was characterized as "partially meet[ing]" some expectations.
However, in April 2016 following multiple performance concerns, Mr. Nahidian issued appellant a formal written warning. Appellant challenged the warning by filing a grievance memorandum with Mr. Nahidian and human resources.1 However, Mohammad Mirzabeigy, Mr. Nahidian's direct supervisor, ultimately upheld the warning in June 2016. According to his responsive memorandum, Mr. Mirzabeigy concluded that the conduct underlying the warning was consistent with performance concerns previously raised by Mr. Nahidian and reflected in her past performance reviews.2 Mr. Mirzabeigy also concluded that her need to provide care for her sick child during the relevant time period did not provide an adequate excuse for not completing her project on time. Kamalika Sandell, Associate Chief Information Officer, thereafter issued appellant a "Communication of Expectations" memorandum outlining the expectations for how appellant was expected to improve her job performance.
Appellant responded to the Communications of Expectations memorandum by reporting to Ms. Sandell that there were "errors" in the position description for her role as a "LAN Analyst II." In response, in October 2016, appellant received a change of title and position description, transferring her within OIT to the role of "Systems Engineer." Per AU's policy for employees who transfer positions, appellant was placed on probation by AU's Employee Relations Office for a period of four months. Consequently, the probationary period was set to expire on March 1, 2017. Mr. Nahidian remained her direct supervisor.
On January 3, 2017, appellant received a subpoena by the District Court of Maryland for Prince George's County to testify on January 25, 2017 at a criminal trial that involved an intra-family dispute. She did not inform Mr. Nahidian or human resources of her need to take leave at that time. After normal business hours on January 24, 2017, appellant sent an e-mail to Mr. Nahidian and other colleagues notifying them that she would not be at work the following day. Her message read: "I will be out of the office tomorrow to attend[ ] to a personal matter, but will try to be online later in the afternoon." The next day, appellant did not show up to work.
Mr. Nahidian replied directly to appellant that morning:
On January 26, 2017, appellant returned to work. Appellant responded to Mr. Nahidian's e-mail stating: Shortly after receiving her e-mail, Mr. Nahidian requested a private meeting with appellant in his office. After the meeting, appellant e-mailed Mr. Mirzabeigy, and Ms. Sandell, to express concern that, inter alia , Mr. Nahidian yelled at her during the meeting.3 Appellant requested a meeting with the two of them to address her concerns. The following day, appellant also sent an e-mail to two individuals in the Employee Relations Office concerning the incident (the "January 27, 2017 e-mail"), adding that, when she mentioned she was not at work because she had to appear as a witness, Mr. Nahidian yelled at her to get out.
Appellant then met with Mr. Mirzabeigy and Ms. Sandell to discuss the incident involving Mr. Nahidian. During this meeting, Mr. Mirzabeigy suggested that appellant file a formal complaint with human resources. Appellant did so on February 7, 2017, and filed a complaint titled "EEO Complaint of Discriminatory Harassment." Appellant did not allege the nature of the discrimination, she only stated that she experienced "discriminatory harassment" and was "verbally assaulted" by Mr. Nahidian.
On or around February 27, 2017, appellant was informed that Mr. Nahidian and Mr. Mirzabeigy extended her probation for an additional four months based on continuing concerns that they had about appellant's job performance. This decision to extend probation was one of three options available to supervisors at the end of a probation period, in addition to placing an employee in regular employment status or terminating the employee. Shortly thereafter, appellant complained to human resources that the extension of probation was in retaliation for her complaint of discrimination.
On March 6, 2017, human resources sent appellant a memorandum concluding that AU "could not find sufficient evidence of discrimination" motivating the January 26, 2017, incident, and that they "could not find sufficient evidence of any retaliatory motive behind the decision to extend [appellant's] probation" which "was completed in line with University policy and practice." Human resources acknowledged that submitting a complaint is a legally protected activity, and retaliation against someone who files a complaint is prohibited.
On April 6, 2017, Mr. Mirzabeigy instituted a Performance Improvement Plan ("PIP") for appellant based on concerns with appellant's ability to: perform her systems administration duties; timely communicate status updates; respond to general inquiries; problem solve; properly escalate issues; and implement feedback. Mr. Mirzabeigy communicated that the PIP would allow him to "independently evaluate [appellant's] work and determine which, if any, performance issues exist." During the PIP, Mr. Mirzabeigy and appellant were to meet weekly about the goals outlined in the PIP and the progress made. Appellant was informed that "[f]ailure to achieve all of the goals and demonstrate the competencies consistently ... will result in termination." After fifteen weeks, nine more weeks than contemplated by the PIP, Mr. Nahidian and Mr. Mirzabeigy determined that appellant did not show sufficient improvement toward the performance goals and competencies set out in the PIP. On July 21, 2017, appellant received a termination memorandum based on her "failure to meet the requirements of a [PIP]."
On December 14, 2017, appellant filed a four-count employment discrimination complaint in Superior Court, alleging (I) a hostile work environment because of family responsibilities; (II) a retaliatory hostile work environment; (III) disparate treatment because of family responsibilities; and (IV) disparate treatment due to retaliation for filing her EEO Complaint. AU moved for summary judgment on all counts, and appellant moved for partial summary judgment solely on Count IV. The trial court granted AU's motion and denied appellant's motion. As to Count IV, the trial court's ultimate conclusion rested on the determination that appellant failed to create a genuine dispute of material fact on the question of whether AU's legitimate business reasons for its various employment-related actions were merely a pretext for a retaliatory act. Appellant's appeal of the adverse judgment on her retaliation claim timely followed.
We review the grant of a motion for summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard used by the trial court. Propp v. Counterpart Int'l , 39 A.3d 856, 871 (D.C. 2012). We affirm if we conclude that "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id. (internal quotations omitted). "Although we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, conclusory allegations by the nonmoving party are insufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact or to defeat the entry of summary judgment." Furline v. Morrison , 953 A.2d 344, 352 (D.C. 2008) (internal quotations omitted).
The DCHRA makes it "an unlawful discriminatory practice for an employer to take adverse action against an employee ... for a [prohibited] discriminatory reason ...." Furline , 953 A.2d at 352 (internal quotations omitted).4 Further, the DCHRA "makes it unlawful for an employer to retaliate against an employee for opposing an employment practice that is prohibited by the Act[,]" such as discrimination. Vogel v. D.C. Off. of Plan. , 944 A.2d 456, 463 (D.C. 2008).
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