Sample v. State

• Decision Date: 30 June 1903
• Citation: 36 So. 367,138 Ala. 259
• Parties: SAMPLE v. STATE. [a1]
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

36 So. 367

138 Ala. 259

SAMPLE v. STATE. ^[a1]

Supreme Court of Alabama

June 30, 1903

Appeal from Circuit Court, Hall County; John Moore, Judge.

Habeas corpus by William Sample to obtain his discharge from custody under an indictment for murder on the ground that he has been denied a speedy trial. From an order denying the petition relator appeals. Affirmed.

It was averred in the petition and shown in the evidence that the petitioner was originally arrested under a warrant issued by a justice of the peace in July, 1902, charging him with murder; that subsequently an indictment was preferred by the grand jury of Hale county against him. The other facts of the case as to why he was not tried at the term of the court at which the indictment was preferred are set forth in the opinion. Upon the hearing of the petition there was evidence in behalf of the petitioner tending to show that on the day the petitioner's codefendant was arraigned and the day was fixed for their trial, the solicitor stated that he expected to enter a nol. pros. as to the petitioner, while the evidence for the state tended to show that the solicitor's statement was that he could not make out a case for the state against the petitioner, and that he would not proceed with it unless the people of the community in which the crime occurred insisted on the petitioner being put to trial. The other facts of the case are shown in the opinion.

De Graffenried & Evins, for appellant.

Massey Wilson, Atty. Gen., for the State.

TYSON J.

This appeal is from an order denying a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The theory of the petition is that the accused has been denied his constitutional right of a a speedy trial. "A speedy trial means a trial regulated and conducted by fixed rules of law, and any delay created by the operation of those rules does not work prejudice to any constitutional right of the defendant." Church on Habeas Corpus, § 254; Nixon v. The State, 41 Am. Dec. 604, and note; 6 Am & Eng. Ency. Law (2d Ed.) 992, 993. In Tate's Case, 76 Ala. 484, this court, speaking to this point, said: "By the Declaration of Rights, the accused, in all prosecutions by indictment, has a right to 'a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense was committed.' The constitutional provision contemplates legislative enactments, and may be regarded as mandatory on the Legislature, enjoining the duty to organize competent courts, to establish suitable modes of judicial proceedings, and provide adequate machinery for the administration of the criminal law, so that there shall be no unreasonable or unnecessary delay in bringing on a trial. Much must be left to the sound discretion and judgment of the lawmaker to make such provisions as will guard, on the one hand, against undue haste to the detriment of the public interests and safety, and on the other against improper unjust, and unwarranted procrastination to the denial of the rights of the accused. When there have been legislative enactments reasonably adapted to secure a speedy trial, the constitutional guaranty cannot operate to discharge the accused because of mistaken legislation, or because of a failure to foresee and provide for every contingency which may occasion delay. Continuances in the discretion of the presiding judge, or delay occasioned by want of time to try,...