Samples v. Davis

• Decision Date: 16 December 2004
• Docket Number: No. 2003-CA-00524-SCT.,2003-CA-00524-SCT.
• Citation: 904 So.2d 1061
• Parties: Clarence SAMPLES v. Sara DAVIS.
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

904 So.2d 1061

Clarence SAMPLES v. Sara DAVIS.

No. 2003-CA-00524-SCT.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

December 16, 2004.

Renee M. Porter, Columbia, attorney for appellant.

Nancy E. Steen, Hattiesburg, attorney for appellee.

Before SMITH, C.J., EASLEY and RANDOLPH, JJ.

RANDOLPH, Justice, for the Court.

¶ 1. On December 5, 1995, Clarence Samples ("Samples") and Sara Davis ("Davis") were divorced by a judgment of Covington County Chancery Court, thereby ending a fourteen year marriage. Two children were born to their union: Matthew Kyle Samples, born March 4, 1985, and Samuel Asa Samples, born November 2, 1989. Pursuant to the agreement for custody and maintenance of children and for settlement of property rights, which was ratified by and incorporated into the judgment of divorce, Davis retained physical custody of the children. Samples was awarded visitation and ordered to pay $300 per month in child support to Davis. In addition to his child support payments, Samples was ordered to pay $100 per month toward the medical insurance premiums on behalf of the children and one-half of all medical expenses not covered by insurance.

¶ 2. In June of 1997, Samples, citing Davis's move to Oxford, Mississippi, filed for a modification of the transportation provisions regarding visitation in the judgment of divorce. Davis filed a cross-complaint for modification wherein she asked the Court to increase child support from $300 to $700; Davis further asked the court to cite Samples for contempt and decrease his visitation privileges. On October 7, 1998, Samples filed a petition for modification of child custody and child support based on the older child's election; however, after the child withdrew his election, Samples withdrew his petition. The respective petitions of the parties came on for hearing at which time the parties reached the agreement set forth in the agreed judgment of modification entered in the general docket on October 23, 1998.¹

¶ 3. On October 7, 1999, Samples filed a motion for citation of contempt, to enforce visitation, and reduce child support, wherein he asked the court to cite Davis in contempt due to her failure to allow Samples visitation and telephone contact with the two children. Samples further requested a decrease in child support due to a decline in income. That motion was evidently never served, and a motion to amend those pleadings was filed on February 11, 2000.

¶ 4. On March 13, 2000, Samples filed an amended complaint incorporating his previous claims for relief, but also seeking a modification of physical custody of the children. On May 2, 2000, Davis answered the amended complaint denying that Samples was entitled to a modification of custody, and again counter-claimed to cite Samples in contempt. On November 10, 2000, a petition for contempt and other relief was filed against Samples on behalf of Davis by the Department of Human Services, based upon an alleged failure to pay child support. A guardian ad litem was appointed for the children on February 23, 2001.

¶ 5. On December 17, 2001, Samples filed an amended complaint seeking damages from Davis based on alienation of affection and interference of business. Davis answered Samples' complaint denying that he was entitled to the relief requested and countered to dismiss and for sanctions on March 26, 2002.

¶ 6. Subsequently, on May 7, 2002, the parties came before the court for a trial on the merits; however, no trial was held due to a possible settlement of the issues between the parties. Davis filed a motion for enforcement of settlement, or alternatively, for trial setting and sanctions² on July 3, 2002. On September 12, 2002, the chancellor signed the judgment, which was thereafter entered on the general docket on September 13, 2002. Although signature lines for both parties and their respective attorneys appear on the Judgment under the word "AGREED," the only signature on the judgment was that of the chancellor.

¶ 7. Samples timely filed a Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 59 motion on September 20, 2002, although mistakenly referred in the body of the motion "as per Rule 62," thereby asking the court to set aside the judgment and grant him a new trial because the agreement was not dictated into the record or memorialized in writing. The court denied the motion by order filed on February 20, 2003.

¶ 8. Following the denial of his post-trial motion, Samples appeals and raises the following issue on appeal:

I. Whether the lower court committed manifest error and thus reversible error by approving and signing a consent judgment which was not approved or signed by Samples or his attorney.

DISCUSSION

¶ 9. In domestic relations cases, this Court's scope of review is limited by the substantial evidence/manifest error rule. Jundoosing v. Jundoosing, 826 So.2d 85, 88 (Miss.2002) (collecting authorities). This Court may reverse a chancellor's finding only when it is manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous or the chancellor applied an erroneous legal standard. Johnson v. Johnson, 650 So.2d 1281, 1285 (Miss.1994). "In appeals from Chancery Court, our scope of review is limited. We will not reverse a Chancellor's findings of fact where they are supported by substantial credible evidence in the record." Hammett v. Woods, 602 So.2d 825, 827 (Miss.1992) (citing Clark v. Myrick, 523 So.2d 79, 80 (Miss.1988)) (emphasis added). "This Court will not disturb the chancellor's opinion when supported by substantial evidence unless the chancellor abused his discretion, was manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous, or an erroneous legal standard was applied." Holloman v. Holloman, 691 So.2d 897, 898 (Miss.1996) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). In order for this Court to say that the chancellor has abused his discretion, there must be insufficient evidence to support his conclusions. Tucker v. Tucker, 453 So.2d 1294, 1296-97 (Miss.1984).

¶ 10. According to Mississippi Uniform Chancery Court Rule 5.03, "Every consent Judgment must be approved and signed by counsel for all parties to the suit who may be represented by counsel and interested in or affected thereby before being presented to the Chancellor for his signature. The Court may also require the parties to sign." (Emphasis added). Furthermore, according to Mississippi Uniform Chancery Court Rule 3.09, "Oral agreements of counsel made in the presence of the Court must be recorded by the court reporter or an Order entered in accordance therewith approved by counsel. All other agreements should be reduced to writing and filed among the papers in the case."

¶ 11. Samples alleges that he was denied due process of law and a trial by the lower court. Samples further alleges that the chancery court entered a judgment — one disguised as an agreed judgment — that was not approved as to form or agreed to by either himself or his attorney and without any record or authority to support the same.

¶ 12. In Guilford County v. Eller, 146 N.C.App. 579, 553 S.E.2d 235 (2001), the North Carolina Court of Appeals was faced with a similar issue of whether it was error for the trial court to sign and enter a written judgment not consented to by all parties. In its opinion, the court stated:

A consent judgment is a contract of the parties entered upon the records of a court of competent jurisdiction with its sanction and approval. It is well-settled that "`[t]he power of the court to sign a consent judgment depends upon the unqualified consent of the parties thereto; and the judgment is void if such consent does not exist at the time the court sanctions or approves the agreement and promulgates it as a judgment.'" "[A] consent judgment is void if a party withdraws consent before the judgment is entered." If a consent judgment is set aside, it must be set aside in its entirety. The person who challenges the validity of a consent judgment, bears the burden of proof to show that it is invalid.

Id. at 581, 553 S.E.2d at 236 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).

¶ 13. In discussing a similar issue as in the present case, the Court of Appeals has stated:

¶ 24. The issue this raises is whether a party can through counsel first agree to a judgment and then, prior to the entry of the order reflecting that judgment, withdraw his consent. What caused the withdrawal of consent to become apparent here is that Mr. McDonald's signature on the order was sought. Had the special chancellor himself prepared the order and entered it without seeking the parties' signature, so long as it properly reflected the agreement stated in open court, Mr. McDonald would have been limited to

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