Sampson v. City of Xenia

• Decision Date: 19 March 1999
• Docket Number: No. C-3-97-437.,C-3-97-437.
• Citation: 108 F.Supp.2d 821
• Parties: Phillip L. SAMPSON, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF XENIA, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio

108 F.Supp.2d 821

Phillip L. SAMPSON, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF XENIA, et al., Defendants.

No. C-3-97-437.

United States District Court, S.D. Ohio, Western Division.

March 19, 1999.

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COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Timothy S. Chappars, Xenia, OH, for Plaintiff.

Jane M. Lynch, Green & Green, Dayton, OH, for Defendants.

DECISION AND ENTRY SUSTAINING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DOC. # 21), INSOFAR AS IT IS DIRECTED TOWARD PLAINTIFF'S FEDERAL-LAW CLAIMS; PLAINTIFF'S STATE-LAW CLAIMS REMANDED TO THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS FOR GREENE COUNTY, OHIO; DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE (DOC. # 30) OVERRULED; FURTHER PROCEDURES ORDERED OF THE DEFENDANTS; TERMINATION ENTRY.

HERBERT, Chief Judge.

This matter comes before the Court upon a Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 21) and a Motion to Strike (Doc. # 30) filed by Defendants City of Xenia, Danny O'Malley, Scott Anger, and Becky Grundy. The Defendants seek summary judgment on Plaintiff Phillip L. Sampson's eight-count Complaint (attached to Notice of Removal, Doc. # 1), which alleges a variety of Ohio common law and statutory claims, as well as a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against each Defendant. The Complaint further alleges that the Defendants are liable individually and in their official capacities. The Plaintiff's Complaint stems from his mistaken confinement for more than three months after the dismissal of all charges against him.

I. Factual and Procedural Background¹

In the course of investigating a series of breaking and enterings at area businesses, Xenia Police Detective Scott Anger learned that Phillip Sampson had been seen near the businesses on two nights. (Anger depo. at 28). After receiving this information, Anger spoke with Sampson, who voluntarily agreed to accompany the detective to the Xenia Police station for questioning. (Id. at 34). Prior to conducting the interview, which was videotaped, Anger informed Sampson of his Miranda rights. (Doc. # 27, videotape).² During the two-hour interview, Sampson at times responded to Anger's questions by denying any involvement in illegal breaking and entering activity. He admitted three times, however, that he "probably" would "fail" if Anger asked him the same questions while administering a polygraph test. Sampson also recalled that an alarm sounded when he kicked the door at one area business. He told Anger that this incident occurred between 1:30 a.m. and 2:00 a.m. Additionally, Sampson admitted to Anger that sockets, screwdrivers, and wrenches were stolen from Xenia Transmission, an area business. Sampson denied personally removing the tools, but he admitted being present and told Anger that Xenia Transmission was the only place he ever "did" with his friends. Although Sampson appeared nervous during the interview, Anger did not abuse or physically threaten him. (Id.). Anger reminded Sampson that he was not under arrest, offered to take him home, and asked him, on several occasions, if he wanted to end the interview. (Id.).

Shortly after the interview, Anger returned to Sampson's home, where he reinterviewed Sampson and searched for stolen property. (Anger depo. at 41). Sampson voluntarily spoke with Anger, but he made no additional confessions, and Anger discovered no stolen property. (Id. at 41, 46). Thereafter, Anger discussed Sampson's case with a Greene County prosecuting attorney, who concluded that probable cause existed to arrest Sampson, based solely upon his statement. (Id. at 42). Anger subsequently signed a document captioned "Complaint and Affidavit," setting forth Sampson's alleged criminal activity. (Id. at Exh. 1). The document also was signed as "seen and approved" by the Green County prosecuting attorney and the Deputy Clerk of the Xenia Municipal Court. (Id.).

Sampson was arrested on September 13, 1996, and incarcerated in the Greene County jail. (Id. at 59-60). Anger interviewed Sampson again on September 16, 1996, hoping to obtain additional incriminating statements. (Id. at 60-62). During that interview, Anger began to question Sampson's involvement in the breaking and enterings and his mental capacity. (Id. at 66, 68). Anger promptly expressed his concerns to the Greene County prosecuting attorney, who agreed to seek the dismissal of Sampson's case. (Id. at 27, 70). The Xenia Municipal Court judge did dismiss Sampson's case on September 19, 1996, and Anger had no further involvement with Sampson. (Id. at 74, Exh. 2).

Xenia Municipal Court Clerk Becky Grundy received the signed order dismissing Sampson's case, entered the information into the court's computer system, and placed the order in a tray. (Grundy depo. at 9-10, 15-16). One of the Municipal Court's three bailiffs was then responsible for hand delivering the signed entry to the Greene County jail. (Id. at 9-10, 16). At the time of Sampson's incarceration, the Xenia Municipal Court lacked any policy or procedure to ensure that jail officials actually received the dismissal entry and released Sampson. (Id. at 16, 23). Consequently, although his case had been dismissed, Sampson remained incarcerated in the Greene County jail. He later was transferred to the Dayton Mental Health Center, and then returned to the jail in December, 1996. Sampson was not released until January 8, 1997, some three and one-half months after the dismissal of his case, after a jail psychologist called the Xenia Municipal Court to inquire about his continued confinement.

Following his release, Sampson filed an eight-count Complaint in state court, asserting various state-law claims and a cause of action under § 1983 against the City of Xenia, Xenia Police Chief Danny O'Malley, Greene County Sheriff Jerry Erwin, Anger, Grundy, and various John, Jane, and Joe Doe Defendants. (Complaint, attached to Doc. # 1). Sampson's Complaint named the individual Defendants in both their individual and official capacities.³ (Id. at ¶ 10). The City of Xenia, O'Malley, Anger, and Grundy subsequently removed the lawsuit to this Court on October 2, 1997.⁴ (Doc. # 1). In a June 12, 1998, Entry and Order, this Court dismissed the action with prejudice, upon Sampson's Motion, as to Defendants Jerry Erwin, the Sheriff of Greene County, Ohio, and Joe Doe(s), Assistant Jailers/Deputies of the Greene County Sheriff's Department. (Doc. # 19). Pending before the Court are two Motions: (1) a Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 21) filed by Defendants O'Malley, Anger, Grundy, and the City of Xenia; and (2) a Motion to Strike (Doc. # 30) filed by the same Defendants. The Court will first address the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.

II. Summary Judgment Standard⁵

The Court first will set forth the parties' relative burdens once a motion for summary judgment is made. Summary judgment must be entered "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

Of course, [the moving party] always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any," which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.

Id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. See also Boretti v. Wiscomb, 930 F.2d 1150, 1156 (6th Cir. 1991) (The moving party has the "burden of showing that the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions and affidavits in the record, construed favorably to the non-moving party, do not raise a genuine issue of material fact for trial[,]" quoting Gutierrez v. Lynch, 826 F.2d 1534, 1536 [6th Cir.1987]). The burden then shifts to the non-moving party who "must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)). Thus, "[o]nce the moving party has met its initial burden, the nonmoving party must present evidence that creates a genuine issue of material fact making it necessary to resolve the difference at trial." Talley v. Bravo Pitino Restaurant, Ltd., 61 F.3d 1241, 1245 (6th Cir.1995). Read together, Liberty Lobby and Celotex stand for the proposition that a party may move for summary judgment by demonstrating that the opposing party will not be able to produce sufficient evidence at trial to withstand a motion for judgment as a matter of law under Fed.R.Civ.P. 50. Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1478 (6th Cir.1989).

Once the burden of production has shifted, the party opposing summary judgment cannot rest on its pleadings or merely reassert its previous allegations. It is not sufficient to "simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). See also Michigan Protection and Advocacy Service, Inc. v. Babin, 18 F.3d 337, 341 (6th Cir.1994) ("The plaintiff must present more than a scintilla of evidence in support of his position; the evidence must be such that a jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff'). Rather, Rule 56(e) "requires the non-moving party to go beyond the [unverified] pleadings" and present some type of evidentiary material in support of its position. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Summary judgment shall be denied "[i]f there are ... 'genuine factual issues that properly can be...