Sampson v. Sampson

• Decision Date: 09 February 1889
• Citation: 16 R.I. 456,16 A. 711
• Parties: SAMPSON v. SAMPSON.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

16 A. 711

16 R.I. 456

SAMPSON

v. SAMPSON.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

February 9, 1889.

Petition to modify decree.

Ida A. Sampson in March, 1885, obtained a decree of divorce a vinculo matrimonii from her husband, Charles E. Sampson, and a monthly allowance of $30 as alimony. The latter filed a petition seeking a reduction of the amount.

Stephen A. Cooke, Jr., for petitioner. Charles A. Wilson and Thomas A. Jenckes, for respondent.

PER CURIAM. The parties to this petition were formerly husband and wife, but at the March term of the court, A. D. 1885, the respondent, on her petition, was divorced from the petitioner, and decreed to have a separate support or alimony in the sum of $30 per month, payable in cash monthly by the petitioner. The petitioner prays for relief by having said order vacated or modified, as his circumstances require; alleging that since his divorce he has been married again, and has become subject to expenses which make it difficult, if not impossible, for him to obey the order. In Sammis v. Medbury, 14 R. I. 214, this court decided that a decree for alimony in case of divorce a vinculo, made without reserve, is final, and cannot be changed after the expiration of the term, or the time within which a new trial may be had. In that case the wife obtained the divorce, and the decree for alimony awarded to her one-half of the rents of her husband's realty for life, and one-half of his personalty; and the court decided, on his petition for a reduction, presented several years afterwards, that it had no jurisdiction to grant the petition. The decision is conclusive of the petition here, unless it can be distinguished in that the decree here is for monthly payments. The petitioner contends that the decree for alimony in such form is not authorized by the statute, (Pub. St. E. I. c. 167, § 9,) but that under said section the court can award alimony only out of the real and personal estate which the respondent has at the time the divorce is granted. The provision has been the same, at least since the Digest of 1798. It has long been the practice of the court to award alimony in the form in which it was awarded to the respondent. Several revisions of the statutes have been made since the practice has existed, and it must be presumed that the construction that has practically been given to the statute met the approval of the general assembly, or the statute would have been changed. It is too late now to question the correctness of...