Sampson v. State, 31166

• Decision Date: 31 May 1968
• Docket Number: No. 31166,31166
• Citation: 237 N.E.2d 254,250 Ind. 625
• Parties: Willie SAMPSON v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Page 254

237 N.E.2d 254

250 Ind. 625

Willie SAMPSON v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee.

No. 31166.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

May 31, 1968.

Rehearing Denied July 9, 1968.

See 238 N.E.2d 458.

Bruce E. Bloom, Bruce R. Snyder, Fort Wayne, for appellant.

John J. Dillon, Atty. Gen., Douglas B. McFadden, Asst. Atty. Gen., Duejean C. Garrett, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

On December 28, 1966 appellant was tried before a jury which brought in a verdict of guilty of the offense of attempting to commit a robbery while armed, as charged in the affidavit. The appellant was sentenced to a term of ten (10) years in prison.

In appellant's assignment of errors he stated the court had erred in overruling appellant's motion for a new trial. His argument under proposition one was that the court had erred in the admission of a written statement read into evidence over appellant's objection in violation of his constitutional rights as guaranteed him under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments of the Constitution of the United States; his second argument was that the court erred in that the verdict of the jury was not sustained by sufficient evidence.

The facts briefly were these: On the evening of May 4, 1966 the manager and her husband, the owner, were in the East State Kwikie Market in Fort Wayne, Indiana. There was testimony that the wife was behind the counter near the cash register. Her husband, the owner, was outside the counter. There was a buzzer on the door entering into the store which sounded and a man came through the door with a rifle, put his arms around the husband, pointed the rifle at the wife and asked for 'Money, money'. The wife reached behind the counter, took a tear gas pistol and shot it. The pellet his her husband. The tear pistol was dropped and she took hold of the rifle held by the appellant. The hat and sunglasses were knocked off and the appellant ran out the front door leaving his glasses, hat and rifle behind.

The defendant took the stand in his own behalf, admitted that in 1964 he was convicted of a theft charge, and the same year of the trial he was found guilty of assault and battery with intent to commit a felony, rape, and that he is presently serving that term during the trial of this matter. There was likewise testimony by the defendant on direct examination that there were two confessions or statements given, the first of which he gave to involve an individual he admitted he was trying to implicate because he didn't like him; the second he gave because he thought since he was already in jail, he didn't have anything to lose by making the statement. On cross-examination the defendant admitted that the only difference between his first and second confession was that he eliminated the name of the individual mentioned in the first confession whom he desired to implicate. It was the second confession only which was offered into evidence, and admitted into evidence by the trial court.

From the record there was sufficient evidence presented at the trial to prove the identity of the appellant as the person who committed an attempted armed robbery at the East State Kwikie Market on the night of May 4, 1966 without the necessity of his challenged confession. The manager of the store and wife of the owner made a positive identification of the appellant as indicated by the following in the evidence:

'Q. Now, Mrs. Ostrander, let me, first of all, ask you to take a look at the defendant in this action, Mr. Sampson. Is this the gentleman that was in the store that night?

A. Yes, sir.'

In an appeal from a criminal conviction, it has been well settled that the state is entitled to the most favorable version of the evidence and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom and that the court will consider only that evidence most favorable to the state. Rice v. State (1967) Ind., 223 N.E.2d 579; Fisher v. State (1966) Ind., 219 N.E.2d 818; Greenwalt v. State (1965) Ind., 209 N.E.2d 254.

The main argument, however, and appellant's basic contention, is that the confession in which he set out in great detail the commission of this crime was erroneously admitted into evidence because he was not adequately advised of his various constitutional rights, citing the leading case of Miranda v. State of Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694. This case provides procedural safeguards requiring the police to advise a person of his rights under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments of the Constitution of the United States before making an incustody interrogation.

This court is aware that the protection of these rights is binding upon the state courts. In this case there was testimony that appellant's constitutional right was adequately explained to him before any statement whatsoever was taken. The testimony by Sgt. Cook of the Fort Wayne Police Department was as follows:

'Q. Sergeant, on May 12, prior to taking this particular statement of the defendant, was he advised of his constitutional rights?

A. He was.

Q. Will you please, Officer, tell the Court and the jury just exactly what you advised him at this particular time?

A. First of all, I would have to explain that we asked the defendant if he was willing to give us a...