Sams v. Redevelopment Authority of City of New Kensington

• Decision Date: 15 August 1968
• Citation: 431 Pa. 240,244 A.2d 779
• Parties: William SAMS and Samuel Mannarino, Individually, and William Sams and Samuel Mannarino, Co-Partners, trading and doing business as Ken Iron and Steel Co., and New Kensington Sales and Rentals, Inc., Appellees, v. REDEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY OF the CITY OF NEW KENSINGTON, Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

244 A.2d 779

431 Pa. 240

William SAMS and Samuel Mannarino, Individually, and William Sams and Samuel Mannarino, Co-Partners, trading and doing business as Ken Iron and Steel Co., and New Kensington Sales and Rentals, Inc., Appellees, v. REDEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY OF the CITY OF NEW KENSINGTON, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

August 15, 1968.

Thomas W. Corbett, Pittsburgh, Aaron M. Kress, New Kensington, for appellant.

Scales & Shaw, John N. Scales, Greensburg, for appellees.

Before BELL, C.J., and MUSMANNO, JONES, COHEN, EAGEN O'BRIEN, and ROBERTS, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT

COHEN Justice.

In the exercise of its power of eminent domain, appellant Redevelopment Authority of the City of New Kensington adopted a resolution condemning a certain parcel of land situate in New Kensington. The parcel of land condemned was individually owned by appellees, William Sams and Samuel Mannarino and was situate on the west side of North Third Avenue. On February 17, 1964, the date of taking, the condemned parcel was being used as a yard for the receipt, salvaging, bailing and shipping of scrap metal.

At the time of the taking, the individual appellees owned another parcel of land located on the opposite or easterly side of North Third Avenue. This parcel was separated from the condemned parcel by both a public street and railroad. The uncondemned parcel at the time of the taking was being used as a foundry operated by New Kensington Sales and Rentals Corporation.

The Board of Viewers awarded damages in the amount of $350,000 to the appellees individually, and as copartners, trading and doing business as Ken Iron and Steel Company. The Board in assessing damages treated the two non-contiguous parcels as a unit.

Appellant appealed to the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County. The jury returned a verdict in favor of appellees in the amount of $200,000 and in accordance with instructions given by the trial judge answered 'yes' to the question, 'Have you allowed damages for Parcel B, the foundry building, in your verdict?'

Appellant filed its motion for a new trial on the grounds that it was error to admit evidence concerning the foundry property, and the unity to use between the scrap yard and the foundry, when as a matter of law there could be no unity of use. The court below denied the motion for a new trial and entered judgment for appellees. This appeal followed.

In order for damages to be assessed as if two or more non-contiguous tracts of land were one parcel, it is necessary to demonstrate that the non-contiguous tracts are owned by one owner and are used together for a unified purpose (unity of use). Eminent Domain Code, Act of June 22, 1964, P.L. 84, 26 P.S. § 1--605. ^[1]

Appellant argues that the doctrine of unity of use does not apply because the salvage yard property was operated as a partnership while the foundry property was operated as a corporation and hence since there was no single use of both properties, there cannot be as a matter of law any unity of use. We agree.

After thoroughly researching case authority in this Commonweath, we are firmly convinced that recovery has never been permitted under the unity of use doctrine absent joint identical users of both parcels of land. In fact, the very concept of unity of use, in our view, dictates that there be identical users as well as identical ownership of the properties involved. It is difficult to conceive that a unity of use can exist when there are two separate and distinct legal entities operating each parcel of land. It is a contradiction in terms to speak of a unity of use where there is more than a single user, since implicit in the definition of unity of use is the connotation that both parcels are so completely integrated, inseparable and interdependent so as to make the operation of one impossible without the operation of the other. Where there are separate users (completely different entities) of the parcels involved, the use of both cannot be said to be so inseparable in a condemnation proceeding. in a condemnation proceeding.

Here we have separate parcels of land being used by distinct legal entities, i.e., the condemned...