Samson v. Saginaw Professional Bldg., Inc.

• Decision Date: 01 March 1974
• Docket Number: No. 15,15
• Citation: 224 N.W.2d 843,393 Mich. 393
• Parties: Carol SAMSON and Wendell Samson, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. SAGINAW PROFESSIONAL BUILDING, INC., a Michigan Corporation, Defendant-Appellant, and Donald Butzin, Defendant. ,
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 843

224 N.W.2d 843

Carol SAMSON and Wendell Samson, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. SAGINAW PROFESSIONAL BUILDING, INC., a Michigan Corporation Defendant-Appellant and Donald Butzin, Defendant.

No. 15, March Term, 1974.

393 Mich. 393, 224 N.W.2d 843

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Jan. 21, 1975.

Cicinelli, Mossner, Majoros, Harrigan & Alexander, Saginaw, for plaintiffs-appellees; Eugene D. Mossner, Saginaw, on the brief; John F. Harrigan, Peter F. Cicinelli, Saginaw, Trial Attys.

Plunkett, Cooney, Rutt & Peacock by Jeannette A. Paskin, Detroit, for defendant-appellant.

Before the Entire Bench.

T. M. KAVANAGH, Justice.

The Court of Appeals, 44 Mich.App. 658, 205 N.W.2d 833 (1973) upheld a jury verdict in favor of plaintiffs based on the defendant's alleged negligence in renting its premises to a state mental clinic and not, thereafter, taking appropriate steps to protect its other tenants and patrons from foreseeable criminal actions committed by patients-visitors to that clinic. We granted leave to appeal and now affirm.

FACTS:

In December of 1964, the representatives of the Saginaw Professional Building negotiated with Mr. George Eckes, the Director of the Mental Health Clinic in Saginaw, for location of that clinic within the building. Negotiations were completed and the clinic initiated occupancy in that building on the fourth floor from that date. The Mental Clinic was designated on the building directory as the 'Saginaw Valley Consultation Center', as was the sign on the door. The Clinic would see approximately ten to twenty-five patients a day, and these included patients from Traverse City State Hospital and from Ionia State Prison.

Mrs. Samson was employed as a secretary to an attorney who maintained offices on the fifth floor of the Saginaw Professional Building. At approximately 10 a.m. on March 30, 1966, she left her office to go to the coffee shop located on the first floor. As she entered the elevator, Donald Butzin (this defendant did not appeal to either the Court of Appeals or this Court) also got on. When the elevator started down, Butzin pushed the emergency stop button, produced a knife and demanded money. After taking her wallet, Butzin began stabbing her with a knife. He restarted the elevator, and when it reached the ground floor, ran away, and was later apprehended.

At the time of the attack, Butzin was a patient of the Saginaw Valley Consultation Center. In January of 1963, Butzin had previously attacked Mrs. Ann Weigold at her home, and slashed her with a knife. He was sent to the Juvenile Home, and then committed to the Traverse City Hospital on July 1, 1963, where he stayed for about a year. He then spent about two years at Ionia State Prison and returned for another year to the Traverse City Hospital. He was then placed on 'convalescent leave' under the provisions of M.C.L.A. § 330.36; M.S.A. § 14.826, but was not permanently discharged. He was to receive out-patient treatment with the Saginaw Valley Consultation Center approximately once a week. He was at the building on the day of the incident for such treatment.

ISSUES:

Appellant raises two issues here and in the Court of Appeals. They are:

1. Does a landlord and owner of a building who leases space to the State Mental Health Clinic owe any duty to an employee of a co-tenant to protect such an employee from attack from a patient of the clinic?

2. Did the Trial Court err in admitting into evidence against the appellant the probate records of the co-defendant, Donald Butzin, and the testimony of the former stabbing victim of the co-defendant, Donald Butzin?

TESTIMONY AND PROCEEDINGS:

The Trial Court denied motions for summary judgment, directed verdict, and judgment n.o.v. The jury returned a verdict of $60,492 in favor of the plaintiffs.

In affirming the trial court, the Court of Appeals stated, Supra, p. 663, 205 N.W.2d p. 836:

'Defendant challenges the existence of its duty upon such facts, claiming that it possessed no actual knowledge that the patients on convalescent leave possessed a propensity for violence, had no means available to discover such knowledge, and had a right to rely upon the decision by the Michigan State Department of Public Health to place the patients on convalescent leave status.'

The Court of Appeals then stated that the building's owners did know that mental patients would visit the Saginaw Consultation Center, and that they had received some complaints from other tenants regarding the poor dress of the mental patients and they had also expressed their fear and apprehension regarding the patients' use of the stairs and elevators to reach the fourth floor where the Center was located. The Court then stated, pp. 663--664, 205 N.W.2d p. 836:

'These concerns should have at least placed defendant upon notice that a possible dangerous condition may exist. The common knowledge available to defendant's officers and agents that assaults and homicides are committed by mental patients while on convalescent leave would have provided similar notice.'

The gist of the Court's holding was stated as: 664--665, 205 N.W.2d 836--837:

'The fact that the consultation center would be treating mental patients and the fact that those patients with a propensity to be violent present a risk created sufficient knowledge to require defendant to inquire further to determine the type of patients that would visit its building with regularity. After evaluating the competing considerations, we do not find that such inquiry created and undue burden upon defendant. The present record indicates that defendant absolutely failed to make such further inquiry and this failure may well be sufficient to support a finding of negligence. Had defendant conducted such inquiry, the risk would have become sufficiently foreseeable to reveal defendant's duty to adequately protect the employees of other tenants on the premises.'

In his dissent, Judge Danhof points out that even had the corporation made inquiries of the Consultation Center regarding the Center's patients, any information they might have received would be very limited. He points out that the mental records of these patients were highly privileged information under our state laws. He further states that (pp. 673--674, 205 N.W.2d pp. 840--841):

'. . . the State was maintaining supervision over the patients and had the power to recommit them if they manifested antisocial propensities. Does not the public have the right to rely on the State to do its duty?

'As an additional ground I do not believe that it is fair to say that the defendant corporation placed Butzin in a position where he could injure others. Granting that the location of the Clinic in the building made it more likely that the plaintiff would come in contract with a mental patient, I do not think that the doctrine should be carried to this extent. The possible remifications of finding liability in this case are tremendous. It is not only State-operated clinics that attact individuals like defendant Butzin. Consider the case of a private psychiatrist, an attorney, or a bail bondsman. Is it the policy of this State to make landlords reluctant to rent to these people?

'* * * If the landlord is liable it seems to be an A fortiori proposition that the tenant would be liable. After all, the tenant is in a far better position to know of his patients', clients', or customers' propensities for viciousness. Is it the policy of this State to encourage psychiatrists to treat only those patients that he is absolutely sure are nonviolent? In this age of a greatly expanded right to counsel, is it the policy of this State to encourage attorneys not to represent criminal defendants?'

OPINION OF THE COURT:

As noted by the parties, this case essentially asks the Court to revisit its recent decision in Johnson v. Harris, 387 Mich. 569, 198 N.W.2d 409 (1972). In that case this Court stated, p. 573, 198 N.W.2d 409, that §§ 302 B, 448 and 449 of Restatement of Torts, 2d, set forth the general rules of law applicable to the situation wherein an injured tenant attempts to hold his landlord liable for assaults upon him by a third party upon the landlord's premises. § 302 B of the Restatement provides:

'An act or an omission may be negligent if the actor realizes or should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to another through the conduct of the other or a third person which is intended to cause harm, even though such conduct is criminal.'

The authors of the Restatement, 2d have also furnished their comments on the applicability of this section to given fact situations, and the general concept of law which it was meant to express.

Comment d, p. 89, states:

'Normally the actor has much less reason to anticipate intentional misconduct than he has to anticipate negligence. In the ordinary case he may reasonably proceed upon the assumption that others will not interfere in a manner intended to cause harm to anyone. This is true particularly where the intentional conduct is a crime, since under ordinary circumstances it may reasonably be assumed that on one will violate the criminal law. Even where there is a recognizable possibility of the intentional interference, the possibility may be so slight, or there may be so slight a risk of foreseeable harm to another as a result of the interference, that a reasonable man in the position of the actor would disregard it.'

This essentially was the position taken by Judge Danhof when he applied § 302 B to the present case. However, the majority on the Court of Appeals preferred to base their opinion on Comment 3, pp. 90--91 which states:

'There are, however, situations in which the actor, as a reasonable man, is required to anticipate and guard against the intentional, or even criminal, misconduct of others. In general, these situations arise where the actor is under a special responsibility toward the one who suffers the harm, which includes the duty to protect him...