Samtani v. City of Laredo

• Decision Date: 16 August 2017
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:15–CV–00174
• Citation: 274 F.Supp.3d 695
• Parties: Manoj Ramchand SAMTANI, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF LAREDO, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas

274 F.Supp.3d 695

Manoj Ramchand SAMTANI, Plaintiff,

v.CITY OF LAREDO, et al., Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:15–CV–00174

United States District Court, S.D. Texas, Laredo Division.

Signed August 16, 2017

Manoj Ramchand Samtani, Laredo, TX, pro se.

Albert Lopez, Law Offices of Albert Lopez, San Antonio, TX, Hector Carlos Ramirez, United States Attorney's Office Southern District of Texas, Laredo, TX, Silverio A. Martinez, Jr., Law Office of Silverio Martinez, Laredo, TX, for Defendants.

CLAIM CONSTRUCTION MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

THE HONORABLE J. SCOTT HACKER, United States Magistrate Judge

Plaintiff Manoj Samtani ("Samtani"), a pro se litigant, filed his Complaint against City of Laredo ("the city"), Laredo Police Department ("LPD"), LPD Officer Juan Morales ("LPD Morales") (in his individual and official capacity), United States of America, United States Customs and Border Protection ("CBP"), CBP Officer #1 (in his individual and official capacity), CBP Officer #2 (in his individual and official capacity), CBP Officer #3 (in his individual and official capacity), CBP Officer #4 (in his individual and official capacity), and CBP Officer #5 (in his individual and official capacity). (Dkt. No. 1 ("Complaint")). Subsequently, the list of unknown¹ Defendants was replaced² by CBP Officer Franco Borreca (in his individual and official capacity), CBP Officer Juan Cortinas (in his individual and official capacity), CBP Officer Yoel De Angel (in his individual and official capacity), CBP Officer Alexiz Gonzalez (in his individual and official capacity), CBP Officer Jorge Ruiz (in his individual and official capacity), CBP Officer Oscar Zenteno (in his individual and official capacity), and Federal Armed Security Officer³ Rey Vasquez ("FAS Vasquez").

Samtani's pro se Complaint is now ripe for construction. Pro se complaints are to be liberally construed. Haines v. Kerner , 404 U.S. 519, 520 21, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972) ; Hernandez v. Maxwell , 905 F.2d 94, 96 (5th Cir. 1990). They are to be held to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Haines , 404 U.S. at 520, 92 S.Ct. 594. A court is expected to exercise "common sense" in interpreting these frequently diffuse pleadings, United States ex rel. Simmons v. Zibilich , 542 F.2d 259, 260 (5th Cir. 1976) (citation omitted), and is to accord them a "liberal yet realistic construction." Johnson v. Estelle , 625 F.2d 75, 77 (5th Cir. 1980). Although pro se pleadings are to be treated quite liberally, at least "some facts must be alleged that convince [the court] that the plaintiff has a colorable claim; conclusory allegations will not suffice." Mills v. Criminal Dist. Court # 3 , 837 F.2d 677, 678 (5th Cir. 1988). A court must scrutinize the pleadings of a non-lawyer appearing pro se with especial care to determine if, among the dabblings, some colorable claim exists. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 ; Haines , 404 U.S. at 520–21, 92 S.Ct. 594 ; Estelle v. Gamble , 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976) ; Slotnick v. Garfinkle , 632 F.2d 163, 165 (1st Cir. 1980) ; McDonald v. Hall , 610 F.2d 16, 17 (1st Cir. 1979) ; Guerro v. Mulhearn , 498 F.2d 1249, 1255–56 (1st Cir.1974). In performing this task, a court will accept as true all material factual allegations and will view the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Cooper v. Pate , 378 U.S. 546, 546, 84 S.Ct. 1733, 12 L.Ed.2d 1030 (1964) ; EEOC v. Simbaki, Ltd. , 767 F.3d 475, 484 (5th Cir. 2014) ; United States v. Trevino , 554 Fed.Appx. 289, 293 (5th Cir. 2014) ; Johnson v. Epps , 479 Fed.Appx. 583, 587 (5th Cir. 2012).

While much liberality is allowed in construing pro se complaints, a pro se litigant cannot simply dump a stack of exhibits on the court and expect the court to sift through them to determine if some nugget is buried somewhere in that mountain of papers, waiting to be unearthed and refined into a cognizable claim. See Carita v. Mon Cheri Bridals, LLC , No. 10 2517, 2012 WL 3638697, at *2 (D.N.J. Aug. 22, 2012) ("It is not the Court's duty to pore through hundreds of pages of evidentiary record in order to find one party's saving grace buried underneath"); Lacadie v. Town of Milford , Civ. No. 07-101, 2008 WL 1930410, at *6 n. 8 (D. Me. May 1, 2008) ("Courts are not required or even expected to independently sift through the record in search of evidence that might salvage a pro se plaintiff's case"). Likewise, the Court's construction process does not preclude a defendant from filing a subsequent Rule 12(b)(6) motion. See Teahan v. Wilhelm , 481 F.Supp.2d 1115, 1119 (S.D. Cal. 2007) (The "sua sponte [construction] process is cumulative of, not a substitute for" a Rule 12 motion.).

In light of these principles, the Court now construes Samtani's Complaint, holding that the Complaint states the following causes of action:⁴

I. Deprivation of Civil Rights by the City of Laredo : Samtani's Complaint states two claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the city for violating Samtani's federal rights under the Fourth Amendment.

First, Samtani claims that there is a "persistent, widespread practice of city ... employees namely police officers [ ]—that, although not authorized by officially adopted policy, is so common and well settled as to constitute a custom that fairly represents official municipal policy." (Dkt. No. 1 at 15). Specifically, Samtani alleges that "sufficiently numerous incidents of police officers using excessive force or tazing [sic] citizens establishes custom and accession to that custom by the City's policy makers." (Id. ). Samtani claims that the "City of Laredo has actual or constructive knowledge of this practice, custom, and/or policy or procedure" within the LPD. (Id. ). Samtani's Complaint states sufficient facts that give rise to a cognizable claim against the city for promoting the use of excessive force within the LPD. See, e.g., In re Foust , 310 F.3d 849, 861 (5th Cir. 2002) ("In suits against a municipality, a plaintiff must [allege] that a [city] policy was the moving force behind the constitutional violation.") (internal quotation omitted).

Second, Samtani claims that the "City of Laredo [is] liable for inadequate training of [its] respective officers under § 1983 [because] failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of the persons with whom the police ... come in contact." (Id. ). In particular, Samtani alleges that the LPD's "training program in relation to the tasks the particular officer[s] must perform is inadequate in the respect that the program fails to teach new police ... that using excessive force [against] citizens ... violates [their] constitutional rights." (Id. ). Samtani concludes that this "deficiency in training actually caused Officer Juan Eduardo Morales ... to violate Plaintiff's constitutional rights." (Id. at 15–16). Samtani's Complaint states sufficient facts that give rise to a cognizable claim under § 1983 against the city for inadequate training of the LPD with respect to the use of excessive force. See, e.g., City of Canton v. Harris , 489 U.S. 378, 390, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989) ( Section 1983 liability may arise if, "in light of the duties assigned to specific officers[,] the need for more or different training is so obvious and the inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights that the policy-makers can reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need."); Connick v. Thompson , 563 U.S. 51, 131 S.Ct. 1350, 1365, 179 L.Ed.2d 417 (2011). ("[Plaintiff] had to show that it was so predictable that failing to train the [officers] amounted to conscious disregard for [Plaintiff's] rights.").

II. Deprivation of Civil Rights by Laredo Police Department Officer Juan Morales (in his individual capacity⁵ ): Samtani's Complaint states a

claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against LPD Morales for illegal search and seizure (unlawful arrest or detention) in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Samtani claims that LPD Morales, among others, "ran towards the 300 block of Convent Avenue only to slam Plaintiff Luvi Samtani to the ground, using excessive force, emptied his pockets completely, emptied his wallet, took out all his credit cards, identification and cash, looked through his personal business information (business cards from his suppliers), snooped around, [and] tried to look through his cell phone records." (Id. at 10). Samtani further alleges that "it is clear that Plaintiff was just taking a video, [and] then [came] the assault, false arrest, [and] unlawful search [by] Officer Juan Eduardo Morales," who deprived Samtani of his civil rights. (Id. at 17). Samtani is correct that the "Fourth Amendment guarantees security from unreasonable search and seizure." (Id. at 14). "It includes ... the right to be free from arrests, without probable cause to believe the arrested person committed a crime." (Id. ). Samtani claims that "he was subjected to an unreasonable search and seizure ... and had his entire body searched unlawfully" at the hands of LPD Morales. (Id. ). For these reasons, Samtani alleges sufficient facts that give rise to a cognizable claim against LPD Morales under § 1983 in violation of the Fourth Amendment for unlawful search and seizure. See, e.g., United States v. Mendenhall , 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980) (The general rule is that "a person has been seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave."); Robertson v. Lucas , 753 F.3d 606, 614 (6th Cir. 2014) ("A plaintiff must prove two elements to prevail on [a § 1983 or Bivens claim]: (1) that he or she was deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States; and (2) that the deprivation was caused by a person acting under color of law."); Mangieri v. Clifton , 29 F.3d 1012, 1016 (5th Cir....