Samuel Bevard Manuro Products Co., Inc. v. Baughman

Decision Date11 June 1934
Docket Number11,12.
PartiesSAMUEL BEVARD MANURO PRODUCTS CO., INC., v. BAUGHMAN, COMMISSIONER OF MOTOR VEHICLES. TRADERS' DELIVERY CO. v. BAUGHMAN, COMMISSIONER OF MOTOR VEHICLES.
CourtMaryland Court of Appeals

Appeals from Circuit Court No. 2 of Baltimore City; Eugene O'Dunne, Judge.

Bills in equity by the Samuel Bevard Manuro Products Company Incorporated, and by the Traders' Delivery Company, a body corporate, against E. Austin Baughman, Commissioner of Motor Vehicles. From orders dismissing the bills of complaint, complainants appeal.

Orders affirmed.

Argued before BOND, C.J., and PATTISON, URNER, ADKINS, OFFUTT DIGGES, PARKE, and SLOAN, JJ.

Foster H. Fanseen, of Baltimore (Abram C. Joseph, of Baltimore, on the brief), for appellant Samuel Bevard Manuro Products Co Inc.

Edward L. Putzel, of Baltimore (Julius H. Wyman, of Baltimore, on the brief), for appellant Traders' Delivery Co.

G. C. A. Anderson, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Wm. Preston Lane, Jr., Atty. Gen., on the brief), for appellee.

DIGGES Judge.

Nos. 11 and 12 were argued together and raise substantially the same question, namely, the constitutionality of chapter 281 of the Acts of 1933. The question was presented by a bill in equity filed by the appellants, wherein they sought to restrain and enjoin the commissioner of motor vehicles, temporarily and permanently, from instituting proceedings for the prosecution of the appellants for operating or permitting the operation during the year 1933 within the state of Maryland of certain motor vehicles described in the bill, without the payment of any registration or license fees therefor other than or in addition to those theretofore paid; that the commissioner of motor vehicles be commanded either to revoke the cancellation of the licenses issued as aforesaid to the complainants, or to renew the same for the balance of the year 1933 without the payment of any registration or license fees therefor other than or in addition to those theretofore paid; that the right of the complainants to operate within the state of Maryland during the year 1933 without the payment of any registration or license fees therefor, other than or in addition to those theretofore paid, may be established; and that chapter 281 of the Acts of 1933 may be construed and be declared to be an invalid and unconstitutional exercise of legislative powers upon the part of the General Assembly of Maryland as being in conflict with both the Maryland Bill of Rights and the Constitution of the United States. The appeal in each case is from an order of circuit court No. 2 of Baltimore City, wherein it was ordered and directed that the preliminary injunction theretofore issued be dissolved, the permanent injunction refused, and the bill of complaint dismissed.

For the purposes of decision in these cases, chapter 281 may be thus summarized: (1) It segregates commercial motor vehicles operating without a Public Service Commission permit in the transportation of freight or merchandise for hire, into separate classes; (2) it levies a tax upon each vehicle in a class, the tax being graduated according to the shipping weight of the chassis of each vehicle in pounds.

The title of chapter 281 of the Acts of 1933 is: "An Act to repeal and re-enact, with amendments, Section 182 of Article 56 of the Code of Public General Laws of Maryland, 1929 Edition, title 'Licenses,' sub-title 'Fees for Registration of Motor Vehicles'; to repeal and re-enact, with amendments, Section 194 of Article 56 of the Code of Public General Laws of Maryland, 1929 Edition, title 'Licenses,' sub-title 'Speed, Size, Weight, Construction and Equipment of Motor Vehicles,' for the purpose of dividing commercial motor vehicles operating for hire and driven by motor fuel or electricity equipped with pneumatic tires, and solid tires, into various classes, and taxing such vehicles according to classes; and for the purpose of dividing trailers and semi-trailers equipped with rubber tires into various classes and taxing according to class, and defining the gross weight which can be carried by each such class of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers."

Section 182 provides: "The following fees shall be paid per annum to the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles for the markers and certificates of registration issued by him in accordance with the provisions of this sub-title." The act then provides for classifications designated from A to K, inclusive. Class A designates the license fees for motor vehicles with pneumatic tires with the exception of those operating without a Public Service Commission permit in the transportation of freight or merchandise for hire, and fixes the fee at 32 cents per horsepower per annum. (Prior to the effective date of chapter 281 the license fee for all motor vehicles equipped with pneumatic tires operating without a Public Service Commission permit was fixed at 32 cents per horsepower per annum.) Motor vehicles equipped with pneumatic tires and used commercially, that is, when engaged in the transportation of freight or merchandise for hire, are further subdivided according to whether or not they have two or three axles, and whether or not they are operated electrically or by internal combustion engines. In each of these classes the fee is fixed by the weight of the chassis of the motor vehicles in their respective classes. General class B, as defined by the act, provides for license fees for solid tire vehicles, and provides a different license fee for such vehicles dependent upon whether they are propelled by internal combustion engines or by power other than that generated by internal combustion engines.

Section 194 regulates the speed, size, weight, construction, and equipment of motor vehicles.

The record discloses that the appellants in No. 11 are the owners of pneumatic tired motortrucks in which they haul the goods of others for compensation.

The complaint of the appellants in both cases is based upon what they allege to be an improper, arbitrary, and unreasonable classification in two respects: First, that a distinction is made between commercial motor vehicles with pneumatic tires operated for hire, and the same kind of vehicles not operated for hire; and, second, that a distinction is made in favor of solid tired vehicles as against pneumatic tired vehicles operated for hire.

The real question to be determined, therefore, is whether or not the Legislature, in making a classification which results in a larger fee being exacted from the owner of an automobile engaged in transporting freight or merchandise for hire, than from the owner of the same automobile not engaged in carrying freight or merchandise for hire, and the further classification of commercial vehicles, that is, those operating for hire, into those equipped with pneumatic tires and those equipped in part or in whole with solid tires, has acted arbitrarily and unreasonably. In other words, the complainants in the first case, in effect, say two things: First, that "I own an automobile truck equipped with pneumatic tires, with which I haul my own produce or merchandise, and I have identically the same automobile truck which I use in the transportation of freight and merchandise, belonging to others, for hire; and the action of the State in requiring a larger fee for the one which I use in transportation for hire than for the one which I use for pleasure or transporting my own products or merchandise, has no reasonable basis, and therefore is arbitrary and invalid"; and, second, that "I have an automobile truck engaged in transportation for hire, equipped with pneumatic tires, and I have another truck, of exactly the same model, size and weight, the only difference being that it is equipped wholly or in part with solid tires; and the action of the State in imposing and collecting a larger license fee for the truck equipped with pneumatic tires than for the one equipped with solid tires, is also unreasonable, arbitrary and illegal."

The action of the state in classifying and fixing the fees to be paid for the operation of motor vehicles in Maryland beginning with the original act in 1906, has been a growth, culminating in the Act of 1933, chapter 281, which is now being attacked. Chapter 449, section 131, of the Acts of 1906, provided that the owner of a motor vehicle should pay a flat fee of $3 per vehicle. By the Act of 1910, c. 207, § 136, this blanket form of fee was changed to a graduated fee, depending upon the horsepower of the vehicle, that act providing for a fee of $6 per annum for each motor vehicle with a rating of 20 horsepower or less, $12 per annum for one with a rating of more than 20 horsepower and less than 40 horsepower, and $18 per annum for one with a rating of more than 40 horsepower. The Act of 1912, c. 133, continued this graduated horsepower rating system, and made a slight modification in the rate per horsepower. That method of taxing motor vehicles on a horsepower rating basis has continued without interruption from its inception in 1912 to the present time, in so far as pleasure cars are concerned. See chapter 281, class A, Acts of 1933. By the Act of 1916, c. 687, § 141, there was created a class of "for hire" vehicles, and provided a separate tax against this class, the fee for hire vehicles being 50 cents per horsepower or fraction thereof in the case of all motor vehicles having pneumatic tires, with a minimum charge of $5 for any motor vehicles, and $1 per horsepower or fraction thereof in the case of all motor vehicles operating for the purpose of transporting persons for hire. In addition to the above, there was passed at this same session of the Legislature chapters 610 and 714 of the Acts of 1916. Chapter 714 segregated into a...

To continue reading

Request your trial
3 cases
  • Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Perrin
    • United States
    • Maryland Court of Appeals
    • April 4, 1940
    ...cases as Board of Education v. Wheat, 174 Md. 314, 199 A. 628, Home for Incurables v. Bruff, 160 Md. 156, 153 A. 403, and Bevard v. Baughman, 167 Md. 55, 173 A. 40. If principle or rule for the interpretation and construction of that constitutional provision can be said to be established by......
  • Hitchins v. Mayor and City Council of Cumberland
    • United States
    • Maryland Court of Appeals
    • October 12, 1939
    ... ... being from George M. Farris & Company, Inc., of Washington, ...          According ... United Railways & Electric Co., 109 Md. 377, 72 A. 542; ... Baltimore v ... Banks, 80 Md ... 310, 316, 30 A. 655; Bevard v. Baughman, 167 Md. 55, ... 173 A. 40 ... ...
  • Mylander v. Connor
    • United States
    • Maryland Court of Appeals
    • April 9, 1937
    ... ... still later case of Bevard v. Baughman, 167 Md. 55, ... 173 A. 40, the ... ...

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT