Samuel C. Johnson 1988 Trust v. Bayfield County
| Citation | 634 F.Supp.2d 956 |
| Decision Date | 26 June 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. 06-cv-348-bbc.,06-cv-348-bbc. |
| Parties | SAMUEL C. JOHNSON 1988 TRUST, Imogene P. Johnson, John Hawksford, Kay Hawksford, Dean Johnson, and Kathryn Johnson, Plaintiffs, v. BAYFIELD COUNTY, WISCONSIN, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Wisconsin |
Carl A. Sinderbrand, Axley Brynelson, LLP, Madison, WI, Cecilia Fex, Washington, DC, Thomas M. Hruz, Dennis Fisher, Meissner, Tierney, Fisher & Nichols, Milwaukee, WI, for Plaintiffs.
Richard K. Nordeng, Stafford Rosenbaum LLP, Leslie K. Herje, U.S. Attorney's Office, Madison, WI, for Defendants.
From the late 1800s until the late 1970s, railroad tracks ran across land now owned by plaintiffs Samuel C. Johnson 1988 Trust, Imogene Johnson, John and Kay Hawksford and Dean and Kathryn Johnson in the Town of Drummond, Bayfield County, Wisconsin. The tracks are long gone but the title to the railroad's right-of-way remains in dispute.
Plaintiffs Samuel C. Johnson Trust and Imogene Johnson claim title to their lands on the ground that they purchased the right-of-way from the Chicago & North Western Transportation Company in 1980; the remaining plaintiffs say that ownership of the right-of-way over their properties traces back to the first settler, Amos Jefferson, who obtained a certificate of entry in 1882, received a land patent in 1884 and thereafter sold some of his land to the Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha Railway Company. For its part, defendant Bayfield County contends that the right-of-way in plaintiffs' properties was granted originally to the railroad upon a condition of reverter to the United States that has never been extinguished, giving defendant the right to establish a public highway on the right-of-way under federal law.
Although defendant Bayfield County's claim to an interest in the right-of-way depends not only on a finding that the railroad is found to have a present interest in the strip of land, but on subsequent extinguishment of that interest, plaintiffs seem satisfied that they have named the proper defendant in the case and the county does not object to the designation. Jurisdiction is present under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because the interpretation of federal law is central to the parties' dispute.
Plaintiffs filed this suit to quiet title in June 2006, in an effort to stop the county from converting certain portions of the disputed right-of-way into snowmobile trails. They sought a declaratory judgment against both the United States and Bayfield County. On November 21, 2006, the United States filed a disclaimer of interest in the property, dkt. #27, and was later dismissed from the case. On January 1, 2007, Judge Shabaz granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment after finding that the disclaimer of interest extinguished defendant Bayfield County's right to the property.
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit vacated the district court judgment, holding that "the United States's Disclaimer did not serve to extinguish any interest the County holds in the railway line," and was therefore not dispositive of the case. Samuel C. Johnson 1988 Trust v. Bayfield County, 520 F.3d 822, 833 (7th Cir.2008). The court remanded the case with instructions to this court to determine "whether the United States did in fact retain a reversionary interest in the land at issue and, if so, whether the railroad's right-of-way has been abandoned according to the terms of [43 U.S.C] § 912 and [16 U.S.C] § 1248(c)." Id.
Upon remand, plaintiffs renewed their motion for summary judgment. Although defendant has not filed its own separate motion for summary judgment, it argues that the undisputed facts show it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In an interesting turnaround, the United States has filed a statement of interest under 28 U.S.C. § 517. Dkt. # 80. Although it disclaimed any interest in the property when the case was first before the court, it contends now that it retains a right of reverter in the disputed real property because the property is a federally granted right-of-way that has not been "abandoned" under § 912. Plaintiffs cry foul; they want the United States judicially estopped from asserting a position contrary to the one it took when this case was first before this court. I agree with plaintiffs that the United States' change of positions is odd, but disagree that the change warrants estoppel. "The doctrine of judicial estoppel provides that `when a party prevails on one legal or factual ground in a lawsuit, that party cannot later repudiate that ground in subsequent litigation based on the underlying facts.'" Pakovich v. Broadspire Services, Inc. 535 F.3d 601, 606 (7th Cir.2008) (quoting Urbania v. Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund, 421 F.3d 580, 589 (7th Cir.2005)). The critical word is "prevail." If the party to be estopped did not prevail upon its original position, the doctrine does not apply and it may take a different tack in renewed proceedings. Id.
Although the United States has not moved to intervene on remand, its stake in the outcome of this case is significant, affecting the government's interests in rights-of-way throughout the country. Accordingly, I will treat its arguments as those of an amici curiae.
I conclude that the United States retains a reversionary interest in the right-of-way over plaintiffs' properties. Acting through the State of Wisconsin, the federal government conveyed the right-of-way to a railroad either explicitly under the Right of Way Act of 1852 or implicitly under the Land Grant Acts of 1856 and 1864. The interest conveyed was for the purpose of constructing a rail line and for none other, making the interest conveyed subject to a right of reverter to the United States. The state conveyed the land to the railroad; the right-of-way has never been formally declared or decreed abandoned in conformance with federal law. The Chicago & North Western Transportation Company retains its interest in the right-of-way as successor to the railroads that built the line. This does not mean, however, that it was free to convey any portion of the right-of-way in section 21 to the Samuel Johnson plaintiffs. Its interest was always subject to the United States' right of reverter.
The railroad acquired its interest in the right-of-way in section 32 before homesteader Amos Jefferson entered onto the land. Whatever land Jefferson acquired by entry certificate and later patent did not include the right-of-way.
Finally, I conclude that neither the United States nor Bayfield County is equitably estopped from asserting any reversionary rights in the right-of-way by any actions it has taken with respect to the line or to plaintiffs.
From the findings of fact properly proposed by the parties and from the record, I find the following facts to be both material and undisputed.
Plaintiffs Samuel C. Johnson Trust 1988 and Imogene Johnson (whom I will refer to as plaintiff Trust for convenience) own land in Bayfield County, Wisconsin in Township 44 North, Range 7 West, in Section 21. Samuel and Imogene Johnson purchased title to this property from the Chicago and North Western Transportation Company, which was the last railroad company to use and own the railroad tracks on the disputed property. The company quit claimed all of its interest in Township 44 North to the Johnsons on March 14, 1980.
Plaintiffs John and Kay Hawksford and Dean and Kathryn Johnson own land in an even-numbered section, 32, in Township 44 North, Range 7 West in Bayfield County. Plaintiff John Hawksford and his previous wife purchased their property in 1986; plaintiffs Dean and Kathryn Johnson purchased theirs in 1992. The former right-of-way runs through the middle of the Hawksford property and bisects the property owned by Dean and Kathryn Johnson.
In the mid and late 1800s, the United States Congress engaged in two separate programs to spur the laying of tracks across the country: granting railroad companies rights-of-way across public lands and making grants of land to the companies. In some instances, these grants were made directly to a particular company; in others, the grants were to the states to be used for the construction of railroad lines.
The Right of Way Act of 1852 gave to any railroad companies or builders of plank roads and Macadamized turnpikes chartered by the state within ten years, a right-of-way 100 feet in width over and through any public lands of the United States, "over which any rail or plank road or Macadamized turnpikes are or may be authorized by an act of the legislature of the respective States in which public lands may be situated." Ch. 80, 10 Stat. 28 (Aug. 4, 1852). The grants were conditioned on the companies' transmitting a correct plat of the survey of the road to the Commissioner of the General Land-Office and beginning construction within ten years. The Act provided that "if any road, at any time after its completion, be discontinued or abandoned by said company or companies, the grants hereby made shall cease and determine, and said lands hereby, granted, revert back to the general government." Id. In 1855, Congress extended the provisions of the Act to "all of the public lands of the United States,...
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...Corp. Inc, 549 F.3d at 1249. At least one other district court has confronted this same question. Samuel C. Johnson 1988 Tr. v. Bayfield Cty., Wis., 634 F. Supp. 2d 956, 974 (W.D. Wis. 2009), rev'd on other grounds, 649 F.3d 799 (7th Cir. 2011). In Samuel C. Johnston 1988 Trust, the plainti......