Samuel Lee and Barbara Lee, Plaintiffs In Error v. Elizabeth Lee

• Decision Date: 01 January 1834
• Citation: 8 L.Ed. 860,33 U.S. 44,8 Pet. 44
• Parties: SAMUEL LEE AND BARBARA LEE, PLAINTIFFS IN ERROR v. ELIZABETH LEE
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

33 U.S. 44

8 Pet. 44

8 L.Ed. 860

SAMUEL LEE AND BARBARA LEE, PLAINTIFFS IN ERROR v. ELIZABETH LEE.

January Term, 1834

IN error to the circuit court of the United States for the county of Washington.

This case was argued by Mr Coxe, for the plaintiffs in error; and by Mr Lee and Mr Jones, for the defendant.

In the opinion of the court the facts are fully stated.

Mr Coxe cited, Davis's Collection of the Laws of the District of Columbia 155, act of Congress of May 3, 1802; Davis's Collect. 123, act of Congress of 1801; Davis's Collect. 265, act of June 1812, sect. 12. These citations referred to the question of slavery. As to the question of intention being exclusively for the jury, Mr Coxe cited, 6 Peters 466; 2 Cranch 258, 390; 1 Wheat. 151, 121, 3 Cond. Rep. 462; 2 Wheat. 149, 153.

Mr Lee and Mr Jones referred to the same provisions of the laws of Maryland and of the United States, as were cited by the counsel for the plaintiffs in error.

Mr Justice THOMPSON delivered the opinion of the Court.

The plaintiffs in error presented their petition to the circuit court of the United States for the county of Washington in the district of Columbia, setting forth, that they are persons of colour who are entitled to their freedom, and are now held in a state of slavery by the defendant in error, in the said county of Washington, contrary to law, and praying process, &c.

The defendant in the court below appeared and pleaded, that the petitioners are not entitled to their freedom as they have alleged, and issue being thereupon joined, the cause was tried by a jury.

Upon the trial, the petitioners proved that they were born in the state of Virginia, as slaves of Richard B. Lee, now deceased, who moved with his family into the county of Washington in the district of Columbia about the year 1816, leaving the petitioners residing in Virginia as his slaves, until the year 1820, when the petitioner Barbara was removed to the county of Alexandria in the district of Columbia, where she was hired to Mrs Muir, and continued with her thus hired for the period of one year. That the petitioner Sam was in like manner removed to the county of Alexandria, and was hired to general Walter Jones for a period of about five or six months. That after the expiration of the said periods of hiring, the petitioners were removed to the said county of Washington, where they continued to reside as the slaves of the said Richard B. Lee until his death, and since as the slaves of his widow, the defendant.

Upon which evidence the petitioners' counsel prayed the court to give to the jury the following instructions.

1. If the jury shall believe from the evidence aforesaid that the said petitioners, or either of them, were slaves born in Virginia, and that Mr Lee, their master, removed from Virginia in 1817 with his family to the county of Washington, and left said petitioners residing in Virginia; and subsequently to the year 1820 the petitioners, or either of them, were removed from Virginia directly to the county of Washington, they would be entitled to their freedom in the present suit.

2. If the jury shall believe from the said evidence that the petitioners, or either of them, were originally brought by their master, an inhabitant, and citizen of Washington county in this district, from Virginia to Alexandria county, and thence to Washington county; they are also entitled to their, his, or her freedom, unless the jury shall also believe from the evidence aforesaid, that the residence in Alexandria county, was not merely transitory, but was bona fide and permanent.

The court gave the first instruction as prayed, but refused to give the second in the form asked, and in lieu thereof gave the following.

3. That if the petitioners were bona fide hired to persons residing in Alexandria, and served their regular terms of hire there, the petitioner Barbara for a year or more, and the petitioner Sam from three to six months, and upon the expiration of their respective terms of hire, were brought from Alexandria to Washington; such hiring and residence in Alexandria constituted a residence sufficiently permanent to authorise such removal. That such removal from Alexandria to Washington, upon the expiration of such terms of hire, does not infer such preconceived intent to bring them from Virginia to Washington, as to render their intermediate residence in Alexandria merely transitory and mala fide, and their subsequent removal thence to Washington equivalent to a removal direct from Virginia to Washington.

The petitioners' counsel then prayed the court to instruct the jury,

4. That if they shall believe from the evidence aforesaid, that the bringing the petitioners from Virginia to Alexandria, by their owner, and hiring them there, was merely colourable, with intent to evade the law, that then the petitioners are entitled to their freedom.

The court refused to give this instruction, being of opinion, that there was no evidence in the case tending to prove, that the bringing of the petitioners from Virginia to Alexandria and hiring them there, was merely colourable, and with intent to evade the law. A further instruction was prayed by the petitioners' counsel, and refused by the court, but which it is unnecessary here particularly to notice.

To these several refusals a bill of exceptions was duly taken. A verdict and judgment were thereupon rendered for the defendant; and the cause comes here upon a writ of error.

On the part of the defendant in error a preliminary objection has been made to the jurisdiction of this court, growing out of the act of congress of the 2d of April 1816 (Davis's Col. 305) which declares that no cause shall be removed from the circuit court for the district of Columbia to the supreme court, by appeal or writ of error; unless the matter in dispute shall be of the value of one thousand dollars, or upwards.

The matter in dispute in this case, is the freedom of the petitioners. The judgment of the court below is against their claims to freedom; the matter in dispute is, therefore, to the plaintiff in error, the value of their freedom, and this is not susceptible of a pecuniary valuation. Had the judgment been in favour of the petitioners, and the writ of error brought by the party claiming to be the owner, the value of the slaves as property, would have been the matter in...