Samuel v. Barnhart
Decision Date | 23 December 2003 |
Docket Number | No. 02-C-0569.,02-C-0569. |
Citation | 295 F.Supp.2d 926 |
Parties | Steven A. SAMUEL, Plaintiff, v. Jo Anne BARNHART, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Wisconsin |
Nora Sheehan Barry, Penelope C Fleming, U.S. Dept. of Justice (ED-WI), Office of the U.S. Atty., Milwaukee, WI, for Commissioner Soc. Sec. Admin.
Frederick J. Daley, Jr., Daley DeBofsky & bryant, Chicago, IL, for Steven A. Samuel, Plaintiff.
DECISION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Steven Samuel applied for social security disability benefits, claiming that he was unable to work due to low back and neck pain, shoulder and elbow injuries, and depression. His application was denied initially and on reconsideration. Plaintiff sought and obtained a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"), but the ALJ also concluded that he was not disabled. The Appeals Council denied plaintiff's request for review, and the ALJ's decision thus became the final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration.
Plaintiff then brought the present action for judicial review of the ALJ's decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The action was assigned to a magistrate judge for pretrial proceedings. However, the parties did not consent to the exercise of jurisdiction by the magistrate so he could only make a recommendation on plaintiff's appeal.
On October 14, 2003, the magistrate judge recommended that the ALJ's decision be affirmed. Plaintiff objects to the recommendation, and the matter is now before me for decision.
In order to obtain benefits under the Social Security Act, the claimant must be disabled, that is, he must be unable "to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The claimant must show that his "impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A).
The Social Security Administration has adopted a sequential five-step test for determining whether a claimant is disabled. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520; 416.920. Under this test, the Commissioner must determine (1) whether the claimant is presently unemployed; (2) if so, whether the claimant has a severe impairment or combination of impairments; (3) if so, whether any of the claimant's impairments are listed by the Administration as being so severe as to preclude substantial gainful activity;1 (4) if not, whether the claimant possesses the residual functional capacity ("RFC") to perform his past work; and (5) if not, whether the claimant is able to perform any other work in the national economy in light of his age, education and work experience. E.g., Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 868 (7th Cir.2000); Rucker v. Chater, 92 F.3d 492, 494 (7th Cir.1996).
The claimant will automatically be found disabled if he makes the requisite showing at steps one through three. See Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Apfel, 179 F.3d 507, 512 n. 3 (7th Cir.1999). If the claimant is unable to satisfy step three, he must then demonstrate that he lacks the RFC to perform his past work. Id. If he makes this showing, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to establish that the claimant can engage in some other type of substantial gainful employment. Id. The Commissioner may carry this burden either by relying on the testimony of a vocational expert ("VE"), who evaluates the claimant's ability to perform work in the national economy in light of his limitations, or through the use of the "Medical-Vocational Guidelines," (a.k.a. "the Grid"), 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 2. See Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 461, 103 S.Ct. 1952, 76 L.Ed.2d 66 (1983). The Grid is a chart that classifies a person as disabled or not disabled based on his exertional ability, age, education and work experience. See Walker v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 635, 640 (7th Cir.1987); see also Heckler, 461 U.S. at 461-62, 103 S.Ct. 1952; Caldarulo v. Bowen, 857 F.2d 410, 413 (7th Cir.1988).
However, the Commissioner may not rely on the Grid if the person's attributes do not correspond precisely to a particular rule, see Caldarulo, 857 F.2d at 413, or if non-exertional limitations (e.g., pain, or mental, sensory or skin impairments) might substantially reduce the claimant's range of work, see Zurawski v. Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 889 (7th Cir.2001) (citing Luna v. Shalala, 22 F.3d 687, 691 (7th Cir.1994)). In such a case, the Commissioner must solicit the testimony of a VE, Herron v. Shalala, 19 F.3d 329, 337 (7th Cir.1994), although she may use the Grid as a "framework" for making a decision, see 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpt. P, App. 2, § 200.00(e)(2).
Where a party timely objects to a magistrate judge's recommendation, I conduct a de novo review of the objected-to portions, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 673-76, 100 S.Ct. 2406, 65 L.Ed.2d 424 (1980), and may review de novo any other aspects as I see fit, see Delgado v. Bowen, 782 F.2d 79, 81-82 (7th Cir.1986). Based on plaintiff's objection, I will conduct a de novo review.
Under § 405(g), a district court may affirm, modify or reverse an ALJ's decision, with or without remanding the case for a rehearing. However, the court's review of the ALJ's the decision is limited, and the ALJ's factual findings must be upheld if supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Diaz v. Chater, 55 F.3d 300, 305 (7th Cir.1995). Substantial evidence is such evidence as a reasonable mind would accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971); Cannon v. Apfel, 213 F.3d 970, 974 (7th Cir.2000). In determining whether substantial evidence exists, the district court must take into account both evidence in support of a conclusion and anything that fairly detracts from its weight. Young v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 957 F.2d 386, 388-89 (7th Cir.1992). The court must review all the evidence in the record, and such review "`must be more than an uncritical rubber stamp.'" Delgado, 782 F.2d at 82 (quoting Garfield v. Schweiker, 732 F.2d 605, 610 (7th Cir.1984)).
Nevertheless, it is the ALJ who has the duty to weigh the evidence, resolve material conflicts, make independent findings of fact and determine the case accordingly. See Richardson, 402 U.S. at 399-400, 91 S.Ct. 1420. A reviewing federal court may not decide the facts anew, re-weigh the evidence or substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ. Powers v. Apfel, 207 F.3d 431, 434 (7th Cir.2000); Binion on Behalf of Binion v. Chater, 108 F.3d 780, 782 (7th Cir.1997). Where conflicting evidence would allow reasonable minds to differ as to whether a claimant is entitled to benefits, the responsibility for that decision falls on the ALJ. Binion, 108 F.3d at 782.
If the ALJ commits an error of law, however, reversal is required without regard to the volume of evidence in support of the factual findings. Id.; see also Pugh v. Bowen, 870 F.2d 1271, 1274 (7th Cir. 1989). The ALJ's decision must also demonstrate the path of his reasoning, and the evidence must lead logically to his conclusion. Rohan v. Chater, 98 F.3d 966, 971 (7th Cir.1996). While the ALJ need not discuss every piece of evidence in the record, he must provide at least a glimpse into his reasoning. Zurawski, 245 F.3d at 889. "Even if enough evidence exists in the record to support the decision, [the court] cannot uphold it if `the reasons given by the trier of fact do not build an accurate and logical bridge between the evidence and the result.'" Hodes v. Apfel, 61 F.Supp.2d 798, 806 (N.D.Ill.1999) (quoting Sarchet v. Chater, 78 F.3d 305, 307 (1996)). Finally, ALJs "must not succumb to the temptation to play doctor and make their own independent medical findings." Rohan, 98 F.3d at 970.
Plaintiff applied for benefits on June 3, 1997,2 claiming that he was disabled by back, neck and arm pain, a rotator cuff injury, and depression. (Tr. at 65-82.) He alleged a disability onset date of August 14, 1996. (Tr. at 89.) Plaintiff stated that he tried working part-time in January 1997 but had to leave due to his disability. (Tr. at 89.)
The Administration denied the application (Tr. at 44), concluding that while plaintiff's physical problems would preclude heavy labor they did not prevent him from working, and that he had no severe psychological impairment (Tr. at 47). Plaintiff filed a request for reconsideration (Tr. at 51), but the Administration again denied his claim (Tr. at 45), stating that plaintiff was able to perform light and medium work (Tr. at 56). Plaintiff then requested a hearing (Tr. at 60), and on February 10, 1999 he appeared before ALJ John H. Pleuss.
Plaintiff and VE Leslie Goldsmith were the only witnesses at the hearing. Plaintiff was represented by counsel.
Plaintiff testified that he was 45 years old, had completed the eleventh grade in high school, and had not obtained a GED. (Tr. at 446.) However, he indicated that he had taken a course in diesel mechanics and automobile transmission repair at MATC in 1972 and 1973. (Tr. at 447.) He testified that he was married and had two children, ages four and thirteen. He stated that he was five feet eleven inches tall and weighed 200 pounds. (Tr. at 448.)
Plaintiff indicated that he had worked at Oshkosh Truck Corporation from 1984...
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Issue topics
...“[m] ost unskilled sedentary jobs require good use of the hands and fingers for repetitive hand-finger actions.” Samuel v. Barnhart , 295 F. Supp.2d 926, 945 n.9 (E.D. Wis. 2003). In Scott v. Callahan , 977 F. Supp. 856 (N.D. Ill. 1997), the court relied on Social Security Rulings 96-9p and......
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Issue Topics
...“[m]ost unskilled sedentary jobs require good use of the hands and fingers for repetitive hand-finger actions.” Samuel v. Barnhart , 295 F. Supp.2d 926, 945 n.9 (E.D. Wis. 2003). In Scott v. Callahan , 977 F. Supp. 856 (N.D. Ill. 1997), the court relied on Social Security Rulings 96-9p and ......