Samuel Ward, Claimant of the Bark Mopang, Appellant v. William Peck, Jacob Badger, Freeman Kingsley, and Humphrey Devereux, Libellants

• Decision Date: 01 December 1855
• Citation: 18 How. 267,59 U.S. 267,15 L.Ed. 383
• Parties: SAMUEL WARD, CLAIMANT OF THE BARK MOPANG, APPELLANT, v. WILLIAM M. PECK, JACOB BADGER, FREEMAN KINGSLEY, AND HUMPHREY DEVEREUX, LIBELLANTS. *
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

59 U.S. 267

18 How. 267

15 L.Ed. 383

SAMUEL WARD, CLAIMANT OF THE BARK MOPANG, APPELLANT, v. WILLIAM M. PECK, JACOB BADGER, FREEMAN KINGSLEY, AND HUMPHREY DEVEREUX, LIBELLANTS.^*

December Term, 1855

The abandonment of a ship by her owners to the underwriters does not operate to ratify the title of one who claims her under an unauthorized sale by the master.

THIS was an appeal from the circuit court of the United States for the eastern district of Louisiana.

The circumstances of the case are stated in the opinion of the court.

It was submitted on the record by Mr. Benjamin, for the appellant, and argued by Mr. Stanton, for the appellees.

Mr. Stanton contended that the offer to abandon did not constitute a ratification of the sale by the master, and cited Phillips on Ins. § 1576; Abbott on Shipping, 19; 18 Pickering, 83; Phillips on Ins. § 1497; 2 Peck, 249; 5 Pet. 604; 15 Mass. 341; 9 Johns. 21; 1 Caines, 573; 18 Peck, 83.

Mr. Justice GRIER delivered the opinion of the court.

The pleadings in this case present but the single question of the title or ownership of the Bark Mopang.

Originally, the court of admiralty in England entertained jurisdiction of petitory as well as mere possessory actions. Since the Restoration, that court, through the jealous interference of courts of law, had ceased to pronounce directly on questions of ownership or property. Petitory suits were silently abandoned, and, if in a possessory action a question of mere property arose, especially of a more complicated nature, it declined to interfere.

This 'submission to authority rather than reason' has continued till the statute of 3 and 4 Vict. c. 65, § 4, restored to the admiralty plenary jurisdiction of such questions. See case of The Aurora, 3 Rob. 133, 136, and the Warrior, 2 Dodson, 288, 2 Brown Civ. & Ad. 430.

In this country, where the courts of admiralty have not been subjected to such jealous restraints, the ancient jurisdiction over petitory suits or causes of property has been retained. In the case of The Tilton, (5 Mason, 465,) Mr. Justice Story has examined this question with his usual learning and ability. The authority of that case has never been questioned in our courts. See Taylor v. Royal Saxon, 1 Wall, 322. In the case of the New England Ins. Co. v. Brig Sarah Anne, 13 Pet. 387, in this court, the only question was the title or ownership of the brig, yet the cause was entertained without any expression of doubt as to jurisdiction.

The following agreed statement of facts presents the merits of this case:——

'That the libellants are the owners of the said Bark 'Mopang,' unless their title has been devested by the sale made by the master under the following circumstances: The bark sailed from New Orleans on or about the 29th November, 1846, for Tampico and other Mexican ports. That, on or about the 6th of December thereafter, she struck aground, was abandoned by her officers and crew on the north breakers off the bar of Tampico; that she floated over the bar, and was boarded by one Clifton, who refused to deliver her to the master; that a claim for salvage was made; that by agreement between the master and Clifton, the vessel was sold to the claimant, Ward, on the _____. It is admitted that the sale to Ward was unauthorized by the circumstances in which the master was placed.

'The libellants had a valued policy upon the vessel taken out at New Orleans. On the 9th day of January, 1847, they gave notice of abandonment to the underwriters as for a total loss, who refused to accept the same. They were sued for a total loss by libellants. Judgment found for defendant.'

This statement amounts to an admission of want of title in the claimant. The abandonment by her owners to the underwriters could not affect the title of the claimant, by way of ratification or estoppel. The insurance is but a wager between the parties to it, on the safety of the vessel. By the rule of the contract the ship may be abandoned, and the whole insurance claimed, when the damages exceed half the value.

Nothing but extreme necessity can justify the sale of the vessel by the master. The abandonment was based on the damage done to the vessel at the time of the accident. If accepted, the master became the agent of the insurer; and whether accepted or not, his act, without authority, can receive no ratification from allegations or admissions made by any party in a dispute on the contract of assurance, where the inquiry as to the act of the master was irrelevant. The defendant, having obtained possession unlawfully, was a trespasser, and can no more plead the abandonment as a confirmation of his title than if he had obtained it by theft or piracy; moreover, if the circumstances would have justified a sale by the master, no abandonment was necessary. It cannot, therefore, by any possible implication, amount to a confirmation of such sale.

The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

Mr. Justice DANIEL dissenting.

I dissent from the decision just pronounced: 1. On the ground that this case is not one regularly appertaining to a court of admiralty. 2. Because this decision professes to claim a power and jurisdiction admitted by the decision itself never to have been heretofore conceded to nor exerted by courts of admiralty in this country, whose power and jurisdiction in future, are to be traced for their origin to this cause alone.

With respect to the objection first stated; this cause presents no example of a maritime contract or of a marine tort. It is simply a contest as to the right of property in a subject situated within the ordinary and settled jurisdiction...