Samuels v. Meriwether

• Decision Date: 30 August 1996
• Docket Number: No. 95-3647,95-3647
• Citation: 94 F.3d 1163
• Parties: John D. SAMUELS; Mary Samuels, Appellees, v. David MERIWETHER, Individually and as City Manager of the City of Hope, Arkansas, Appellant, Dennis Ramsey, Individually and as Mayor of the City of Hope, Arkansas; David Johnson, Individually and Vice Mayor of the City of Hope, Arkansas; J.C. Winemiller, Individually and as a Member of the Board of Directors of the City of Hope, Arkansas; Don Still, Individually and as a Member of the Board of Directors of the City of Hope, Arkansas; Bucky Sharp, Individually and as a Member of the Board of Directors of the City of Hope, Arkansas; Willie Walker, Individually and as a Member of the Board of Directors of the City of Hope, Arkansas; Doodle Franklin, Individually and as a Member of the Board of Directors of the City of Hope, Arkansas, Defendants, Dale Garrett, Individually and as an employee of the City of Hope, Arkansas; City of Hope, Arkansas, Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Page 1163

94 F.3d 1163

John D. SAMUELS; Mary Samuels, Appellees, v. David MERIWETHER, Individually and as City Manager of the City of Hope, Arkansas, Appellant Dennis Ramsey, Individually and as Mayor of the City of Hope, Arkansas; David Johnson, Individually and Vice Mayor of the City of Hope, Arkansas; J.C. Winemiller, Individually and as a Member of the Board of Directors of the City of Hope, Arkansas; Don Still, Individually and as a Member of the Board of Directors of the City of Hope, Arkansas; Bucky Sharp, Individually and as a Member of the Board of Directors of the City of Hope, Arkansas; Willie Walker Individually and as a Member of the Board of Directors of the City of Hope, Arkansas; Doodle Franklin, Individually and as a Member of the Board of Directors of the City of Hope, Arkansas, Defendants Dale Garrett, Individually and as an employee of the City of Hope, Arkansas; City of Hope, Arkansas, Appellants.

No. 95-3647.

United States Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit.

Submitted April 12, 1996.

Decided Aug. 30, 1996.

Beni Shane Perry, North Little Rock, AR, argued (David C. Schoen, on the brief), for appellant.

Quincy Byrum Hurst, Jr., Hot Springs, AR, argued (Sherry L. Davis, on the brief), for appellees.

Before MAGILL and LOKEN, Circuit Judges, and GOLDBERG, ^* Judge.

GOLDBERG, Judge.

Dale Garrett, Code Enforcement Officer for the City of Hope, Arkansas, and David Meriwether, City Manager, appeal from the district court's denial of a motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The City appeals on the merits of the denial of summary judgment. Garrett, Meriwether and the City, among others not mentioned here, were named as defendants in a lawsuit filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by John D. Samuels and Mary Samuels. The Samuels alleged that the destruction of their building by the City violated both the Procedural Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the "reasonableness" requirement of the Fourth Amendment. Construing all facts in favor of the Samuels, we find that the City and its officials acted reasonably and that no violation of federal law occurred. Accordingly, no liability attaches to the City and City employees Garrett and Meriwether are entitled to qualified immunity. We reverse.

I. Background

On November 2, 1993, a fire destroyed one of three apartments in a building owned by the Samuels. Garrett, acting under the direction of City Manager Meriwether, inspected the building and posted a sign declaring the structure unsafe for human occupancy. The electricity and water company discontinued service.

An exchange of correspondence ensued between the Samuels and the City. On November 12, the City sent a letter outlining twenty conditions found to be in violation of City ordinances. Three days later, the City sent another letter listing additional violations including rubbish and burnt furniture on the property. Finally, three weeks later, on December 6, the City notified the Samuels by letter that the property was in violation of City Ordinance No. 1203, which provides for condemnation and removal of nuisance structures. A copy of the ordinance was included with the letter. The letter notified the Samuels that a hearing was set for January 18, 1994 to consider condemnation of their property. The letter was sent certified mail; the signature card shows that Mary Samuels received the letter.

The Samuels attended this hearing, at which time the Board of Directors of the City of Hope adopted a resolution directing the Samuels to clean and repair the exterior of the building and to start work on the interior within thirty days and no later than February 18. If the building was not brought into compliance with City regulations by that date, the City would destroy the structure at the property owner's expense. There was a discussion regarding an extension of the February 18th deadline if steps were taken to repair the buildings. However, the minutes proved that the Board did not grant an extension, and found that the building constituted a nuisance under City Ordinance No. 1203. A copy of that resolution was mailed to the Samuels indicating that if the nuisance was not abated within 30 days, the City would destroy the structure at the Samuels' expense.

During the month after the hearing, Code Enforcement Officer Garrett conducted numerous drive-by inspections and determined that the Samuels had not complied with the Board's resolution. Accordingly, City Manager Meriwether ordered Garrett to proceed with demolition, which was performed on February 22, 1994.

The Samuels filed suit in district court. They claim that they never received notice of the Board's decision, that they had substantially complied with the resolution, and that there was no communication between the City and the Samuels until after the building had been destroyed. The City sought summary judgment, claiming that the City did not violate the Samuels' Fourth Amendment or procedural due process rights and that City employees Meriwether and Garrett were entitled to qualified immunity. The district court denied the motion.

II. Appellate Jurisdiction

There is an exception to the final decision rule of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 where a district court denies immunity to a government official. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2817, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985). Government officials performing discretionary functions are shielded from liability for civil damages and are entitled to qualified immunity unless their conduct violates "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982).

We have jurisdiction over the present case under the emerging standard governing the appealability of qualified immunity cases. In Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. ----, ----, 115 S.Ct. 2151, 2158, 132 L.Ed.2d 238 (1995), the Supreme Court held that to be appealable, the denial of summary judgment issues must involve application of established legal principles. A summary judgment motion denied on the basis of disputes of "evidence sufficiency," concerning facts that may or may not be able to be proven at trial, are not immediately appealable and must await final judgment. Id. at ----, 115 S.Ct. at 2156. Johnson involved an appeal by three police officers from the denial of their summary judgment motion seeking qualified immunity from plaintiff's claim that they beat him during arrest. The officers conceded that they were present at the arrest, but they denied that they had beaten the plaintiff or that they had been present when others beat him. The officers claimed qualified immunity based on their contention that the beating never occurred. The Supreme Court affirmed the Seventh Circuit's holding that it lacked appellate jurisdiction because of the factual dispute concerning the conduct of the officers. In Behrens v. Pelletier, --- U.S. ----, ----, 116 S.Ct. 834, 842, 133 L.Ed.2d 773 (1996), the Supreme Court clarified that Johnson permits immediate review of qualified immunity cases in which all the facts "which the District Court deemed sufficiently supported for purposes of summary judgment met the Harlow standard of 'objective legal reasonableness.' "

Unlike Johnson, the present case involves application of the law and does not turn on the sufficiency of the evidence. The actions of the City and its employees are not in dispute. We only need to apply legal standards to the facts as construed in favor of the non-moving party.

In qualified immunity cases, we also have limited jurisdiction to reach the merits. Drake v. Scott, 812 F.2d 395, 399 (8th Cir.1987); Dawkins v. Graham, 50 F.3d 532, 534 (8th Cir.1995). We may decide claims that are "inextricably intertwined" with the district court's denial of the summary judgment motion. Swint v. Chambers County Com'n, --- U.S. ----, ---- - ----, 115 S.Ct. 1203, 1211-2, 131 L.Ed.2d 60 (1995); Kincade v. City of Blue Springs, Mo., 64 F.3d 389, 394-95 (8th Cir.1995). In the present case, both the qualified immunity claim and the Procedural Due Process and Fourth Amendment claims require application of the same constitutional tests. Thus, the analyses of the underlying constitutional claims are subsumed in the qualified immunity issue.

III. Procedural Due Process

In general, procedural due process requires that a hearing before an impartial decision maker be provided at a meaningful time, and in a meaningful manner, prior to a governmental decision which deprives individuals of a liberty or property interest. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332-3, 96 S.Ct. 893, 901-2, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). We have held that where a property owner is given written notice to abate a hazard on his or her property and has been given an opportunity to appear before the proper municipal body considering condemnation of the property, no due process violation occurs when the municipality abates the nuisance pursuant to the condemnation notice. Hagen v. Traill County, 708 F.2d 347, 348 (8th Cir.1983) (per curiam) (upheld legality of destruction of building for failure to abate nuisance after notice and hearing).

The City destroyed the Samuels' building after a hearing at which the Samuels presented their position to the Board, and after the Samuels were given a 30 day period...