Samuels v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr.
| Decision Date | 13 August 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 8:17-cv-1458-T-60TGW |
| Parties | OLIVER SAMUELS, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
Oliver Samuels petitions under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for the writ of habeas corpus (Doc. 1) and challenges his conviction for first degree premeditated murder. Upon review of the petition, both the response and the exhibits in support of the response (Doc. 12; 13), and the reply (Doc. 22), the Court finds as follows:
Factual and Procedural Background1
Samuels was charged with the murder of Elfleter Bolden. Samuels and Bolden were dating. Bolden was also dating another man named Romando Stutz. Samuels learned that Stutz was dating Bolden. Samuels told Stutz that Stutz was seeing his woman, he did not like that, and it was not going to be pretty if Stutz did not stop. Stutz tried to break up with Bolden. Bolden wanted to continue to see Stutz and so they remained together for another two weeks.
During those two weeks Stutz saw Samuels. Samuels stared at Stutz, turned his head away from Stutz when he approached, and appeared angry with him. One evening around 12:00 A.M. Samuels called Stutz on the telephone. Samuels told Stutz that he was not going to stand for any foolishness again. Samuels threatened to kill Bolden and be done. Samuels then laughed and said that he was joking. Stutz told Samuels that he did not know about their serious relationship and did not want to be a part of it.
Bolden still wanted to see Stutz. At 2:00 A.M., Bolden picked up Stutz from work. The two went to his apartment and had sex. Bolden then received a text message, got dressed quickly, and rushed out of the apartment. Stutz was lying in bed when he heard screaming. After he heard a car skid away, Stutz went outside and saw Bolden lying on the ground.
Neighbors heard sounds like glass or metal hitting concrete. One neighbor saw Samuels standing over a woman striking her with a blunt object five or six times. The neighbor saw Samuels then drive over the woman's head with a car. The neighbor was 75 to 80 percent certain about her identification. Another neighbor saw a car drive over something and go back and forth several times before driving off. A third neighbor saw a man striking toward the ground. A police officer arrived at the scene and saw tire tracks across Bolden's body, which was surrounded by lots of blood. An autopsy showed that Bolden died from blunt trauma.
A detective arrested Samuels. After waiving his constitutional rights, Samuels admitted to hitting Bolden three times with a baseball bat after she kicked him.Samuels had suspected that Bolden was with Stutz. Samuels left town and got rid of the bat. Samuels denied running Bolden over with his car.
At trial the defense conceded that Samuels killed Bolden but claimed that he did so in the heat of passion — not with premeditation. The jury rejected the defense and found Samuels guilty as charged. The state appellate court affirmed the conviction and sentence. Samuels filed a motion for post-conviction relief in state court, which was denied the motion without an evidentiary hearing and affirmed on appeal. Samuels then filed his federal habeas petition in this case.
The Respondent correctly argues that Ground Eight and Ground Nine are procedurally barred from federal review because Samuels failed to exhaust Ground Eight and the state court denied Ground Nine on independent and adequate state procedural grounds. (Doc. 12 at 3-4, 20-21). A petitioner must exhaust the remedies available in state court before a federal court can grant relief on federal habeas. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). The petitioner must fairly present the federal claim to the state court to give the state court an opportunity to review and correct any alleged violation of federal rights. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004). The petitioner must alert the state court to the federal nature of his claim, Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 278 (1971), and also give the state court one full opportunity to resolve the federal claim by invoking one complete round of the state's established appellate review process, O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999).
A federal court may stay — or dismiss without prejudice — a habeas case to allow a petitioner to return to state court to exhaust a claim. Rhines v. Weber, 544U.S. 269 (2005); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982). The federal court need not do so and should deny the claim as procedurally defaulted if the state court would deny the claim as procedurally barred under state law. Snowden v. Singletary, 135 F.3d 732, 736 (11th Cir. 1998) (citing Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735 n.1 (1991)).
Also, a federal habeas court will not review a federal claim if the state court denied the claim on independent and adequate state procedural grounds. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-30 (1991). The last state court reviewing the federal claim must clearly and expressly state that its judgment rests on the state procedural bar. Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 263 (1989). If the last state court rejected the federal claim in an unexplained decision, the federal habeas court looks through the unexplained decision to the last reasoned order to rule on the claim. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991). If the last reasoned order imposed a state procedural bar, the federal court presumes that the later unexplained decision did not silently disregard the bar and consider the merits. Id.
A petitioner may excuse a procedural default on federal habeas by showing cause for the default and actual prejudice from the alleged violation of federal law. Maples v. Thomas, 565 U.S. 266, 280 (2012). A petitioner may also excuse the default by demonstrating a miscarriage of justice — or that he is actually innocent. House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 536-37 (2006). The burden is on the petitioner to show either. Maples, 565 U.S. at 280; House, 547 U.S. at 537.
Ground Eight:
Samuels asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to an "intentional manslaughter by act" instruction. (Doc. 1 at 17-18). Samuels raised thefederal claim in his amended post-conviction motion, (Respondent's Exhibit 11 at 21), but did not raise the claim in his brief on appeal, (Respondent's Exhibit 15).2 Because Samuels failed to invoke one complete round of the state's established appellate review process, Hunt v. Comm., Ala. Dep't Corrs., 666 F.3d 708, 730 (11th Cir. 2012), Ground Eight is unexhausted.
If Samuels returned to state court to exhaust the federal claim, the state court would dismiss a new post-conviction motion with the unexhausted claim as untimely. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(b). Returning to state court to exhaust the claim would be futile. The ground is procedurally defaulted. Jimenez v. Fla. Dep't Corrs., 481 F.3d 1337, 1342 (11th Cir. 2007). Because Samuels fails to show that either cause and prejudice or a miscarriage of justice excuses the procedural default, Maples, 565 U.S. at 280; House, 547 U.S. at 537, Ground Eight is procedurally barred from federal review.
Ground Nine, Sub-claim A:
Samuels raises two claims in Ground Nine. Samuels asserts that his conviction and sentence are illegal because police unlawfully obtained statements from him, ("Sub-claim A"); (Doc. 1 at 18-22), and because trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppress those statements ("Sub-claim B"); (Doc. 1 at 18-22).3
Both in his post-conviction motion and his brief on appeal, Samuels raised sub-claim A. (Respondent's Exhibit 11 at 21-22); (Respondent's Exhibit 15 at 19-20). Thestate appellate court affirmed the order denying sub-claim A in an unelaborated decision. (Respondent's Exhibit 16). Looking through that unelaborated decision to the trial court's order, the trial court denied the ground for the following reasons:
In his second ground, Defendant attacks his conviction by claiming it was obtained through the use of illegally obtained statements. Specifically, he argues that he was essentially tricked into confessing to a murder. Since this claim should have been raised on direct appeal, see Johnson v. State, 921 So. 2d 490, 505 (Fla. 2005) (), Defendant's second ground is dismissed. See Teffeteller v. Dugger, 734 So. 2d 1009, 1016 (Fla. 1999) ().
(Respondent's Exhibit 12 at 6).
The state court clearly and expressly denied sub-claim A on state procedural grounds. The state procedural bar is both independent and adequate. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(c) (); Waldrop v. Jones, 77 F.3d 1308, 1314 (11th Cir. 1996). The Court presumes that the state appellate court did not silently disregard the bar. Because Samuels again fails to show that either cause and prejudice or a miscarriage of justice excuses the procedural default, Maples, 565 U.S. at 280; House, 547 U.S. at 537, sub-claim A is procedurally barred from federal review.
Because Samuels filed his petition after the enactment of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), AEDPA governs the review of his remaining claims. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336-37 (1997). AEDPA created ahighly deferential standard for federal court review of a state court adjudication. AEDPA provides:
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