Samuels v. State, 677S439
| Decision Date | 03 March 1978 |
| Docket Number | No. 677S439,677S439 |
| Parties | Willie SAMUELS, Appellant (Defendant below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below). |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., Dennis K. McKinney, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.
Defendant (Appellant) was convicted, in a trial by jury, of Committing a Felony (Robbery) While Armed and was sentenced to twenty years imprisonment. His appeal presents two issues:
(1) Did the trial court err in admitting into evidence a written statement given to the police by the witness, shortly after the defendant's arrest?
(2) Was the court's failure to declare a mistrial, sua sponte, following a disclosure that the defendant had been involved in prior criminal activity unrelated to the The evidence disclosed that a man answering the general description of the defendant, in company with others, committed an armed robbery, by driving an automobile against the automobile of the victims and then accosting them with a gun. Two hours later, the defendant, his sixteen year old brother, and two young women were arrested at a roadblock, after having fled from the police officer who had signaled them to stop. They were in the same vehicle that had been used to effect the crime. One of the women was armed with a pistol which was identified as looking like the one used in the robbery.
crime charged, fundamental error, which the defendant can raise for the first time on appeal?
The defendant's brother, while in police custody, gave a written statement to the police which incriminated the defendant. At trial, while testifying as a State's witness, he surprised the prosecutor by being uncooperative and evasive in response to questions concerning the robbery. He admitted having been with the defendant at the time the robbery occurred but said that he was asleep, which was in direct conflict with the written statement. The court permitted the prosecutor to cross examine the witness, and the foundation for his impeachment followed.
When the prosecutor offered the impeaching prior written statement, the defendant objected upon the grounds that it was hearsay. In this appeal, however, he charges that the trial court erred in admitting the prior written statement as substantive evidence, a charge which the record does not bear out. Hearsay has been defined as an out-of-court statement repeated in court to establish the truth of the matter contained therein. Madison v. State, (1971) 256 Ind. 353, 269 N.E.2d 164; Jethroe v. State, (1974) 262 Ind. 505, 319 N.E.2d 133. The out-of-court statements in this case, however, were offered as impeaching evidence, i. e. for the purpose of showing that the witness had previously made statements inconsistent with his testimony and thus to discredit him.
The defendant here attempts to put the question in the context of Patterson v. State, (1975) Ind., 324 N.E.2d 482; and he asked us to overrule that case. The Patterson decision has been both praised and condemned by knowledgeable lawyers, judges and writers. (See Seidman, The Law of Evidence in Indiana, p. 35 supporting new rule and, to the contrary, the unpublished notes to the lecture of Dean William F. Harvey, entitled "New Developments in Civil Procedure and Evidence,") presented at the 1977 Indiana Judicial Conference.
It appears that the rule drawn from Patterson may well be in need of reconsideration. To the extent that it has, on some occasions, been used to support the admission of out-of-court statements as a mere substitute for available in-court testimony, it has been misapplied. That, however, is not the question before us. It is clear that the prior written statements of the defendant's brother were admissible for impeachment purposes and were, in fact, admitted for that purpose. Whether or not the jury was entitled to consider them as substantive evidence, is another question a question the defendant...
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...the danger of unwarranted extension of the Patterson rule, and have attempted to define the limits of the rule. In Samuels v. State, (1978) 267 Ind. 676, 372 N.E.2d 1186, 1187, Justice Prentice writing for our Supreme Court "It appears that the rule drawn from Patterson may well be in need ......
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