San Antonio Fire Fighters' Local Union No. 84 v. Bell

• Decision Date: 19 June 1920
• Docket Number: (No. 6435.)
• Parties: SAN ANTONIO FIRE FIGHTERS' LOCAL UNION NO. 84 v. BELL et al.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

223 S.W. 506

SAN ANTONIO FIRE FIGHTERS' LOCAL UNION NO. 84 v. BELL et al.

(No. 6435.)

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. San Antonio.

June 19, 1920.

Rehearing Denied June 26, 1920.

Appeal from District Court, Bexar County; S. G. Tayloe, Judge.

Suit by the San Antonio Fire Fighters' Local Union No. 84 against Sam C. Bell and others, as Mayor and Commissioners of the city of San Antonio. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Ryan & Matlock, of San Antonio, for appellant.

R. J. McMillan and J. D. Dodson, both of San Antonio, for appellees.

FLY, C. J.

Appellant, describing itself as "a local voluntary union labor organization, which subscribes to the principles, rules, and regulations promulgated, or prescribed, by the American Federation of Labor for the benefit and protection of its members, and has an office in the city of San Antonio, Bexar county, Tex., where it holds its meetings and transacts its business, and has a membership of about 190 members," instituted this suit against Sam C. Bell, mayor of the city of San Antonio, Phil Wright, commissioner of fire and police, Andres Coy, commissioner of taxation, L. Heuermann, commissioner of streets, Ray Lambert, commissioner of parks and sanitation, and A. J. Goetz, fire chief, alleging that—

"A large number of its members are now in the employ of the city fire department of the city of San Antonio, Tex., and that the defendants, and each of them, have unlawfully and illegally conspired together with each other, and other organizations and persons who are at the present time unknown to plaintiff, for the purpose of breaking up and disrupting and destroying the San Antonio Fire Fighters' Local Union No. 84, and are seeking and endeavoring to intimidate the members of the city fire department, who are members of the San Antonio Fire Fighters' Local Union No. 84, by threatening to discharge them from the employment of the city unless they withdraw their membership from plaintiff, the San Antonio Fire Fighters' Local Union No. 84."

It was further alleged that appellant was organized for a lawful purpose, and the threatened action of appellees, not only tends to destroy the organization, but to damage the members by depriving them of "the right and privilege to have and maintain employment in the fire department of the city of San Antonio, * * * unless they dissolve their connection with the said San Antonio Fire Fighters' Local Union No. 84."

It was alleged that about 187 members of appellant's union were members of the fire department of San Antonio, and that about January 22, 1919, and prior to the election of appellees to the respective offices held by them, they wrote, in their official capacity, to appellant, that—

"There was no disposition on the part of the mayor or any one of the commissioners to discriminate against any man because he belonged to the Fire Fighters' Union. And said fire fighters' union, then believing that the defendants and each of them were sincere in the statement with regard to making no discrimination against them, continued, and now continue, their affiliation with said San Antonio Fire Fighters' Union No. 84, believing that they had the right to do so under the laws of the land, and that in doing so they would have equal protection and equal right of employment in the city fire department with other parties who are not members of the San Antonio Fire Fighters' Local Union No. 84, as aforesaid."

It was also alleged that the suit was brought, not only for appellant, but in behalf of each member thereof, "and for the purpose of preventing the said defendants, and each of them and their coconspirators from disrupting and breaking up said organization, and from disqualifying the members of said organization for equal right to employment with others who are not members of said fire fighters' union, and to prevent their being discharged from said employment by the defendants, if such members see proper to refuse to give up their memberships in the San Antonio Fire Fighters' Local Union No. 84." Attached to and made a part of the petition were the affidavits of C. H. Muehl, Blaz M. Quintero, C. W. Felter, W. H. Schoub, P. C. Roche, O. P. Bernhardt, C. L. McRae, and T. R. Chew. The general tenor of the affidavits was that Fire Chief Goetz had asked each of the men to withdraw from the union, and in two or three of them it was stated that Goetz had said that the "mayor and the commissioners are going to bust up the union," or words to that effect. In the affidavit of T. R. Chew he stated that Goetz asked him, "If the firemen were to go on a strike, would you go with them?" to which affiant replied, "I would." An injunction was sought to prevent the discharge of members of the union.

Appellees filed a general demurrer and general denial and special answer. The court sustained the general demurrer to original petition and a trial amendment, which merely stated that appellant "is acting under a warrant or authority from the International Association of Fire Fighters, which is affiliated with the American Federation of Labor," and the cause was dismissed. An appeal was perfected by appellant, and the cause advanced and set down for a hearing by agreement of the parties.

No question arises in this case as to the right of citizens of Texas to organize themselves into trade unions. The laws of Texas recognize the validity of such organizations, and permit the incorporation of organizations of laboring men, working men, wage-earners, and farmers to protect themselves in their various pursuits. Article 1121, Rev. Stats. It follows that it is unnecessary and unprofitable to indulge in the discussion of the right of unions to exist under the laws of Texas, for it has been made "lawful for any and all persons engaged in any kind of work or labor, manual or mental, or both, to associate themselves together and form trades unions and other organizations for the purpose of protecting themselves in their personal work, personal labor, and personal service, in their respective pursuits and employments." Article 5244, Rev. Stats. Whether that would apply to persons in the public service as public officers is a very different question. Unlike the ordinary employé, the firemen in San Antonio are appointed by constituted city authorities for a specified term of two years, and they can be discharged or removed only by a majority vote of the commissioners, on charges preferred in writing and after a public hearing of such charges by said commissioners. It is questionable whether the statute had in view the officers or appointees of a state, county, or municipal government; but, as a decision of that question is not essentially necessary, we do not decide it.

This suit was brought by an unincorporated, joint-stock company or association, and under the provisions of article 6149, Revised Statutes of Texas, if it is doing business in this state, it may sue or be sued in any court of this state having jurisdiction of the subject-matter in its company or distinguishing name, and it is provided that it shall not be necessary to make the individual stockholders or members thereof parties to the suit. The statute had in view to place a joint-stock company or association upon the same footing as to suing and being sued as a partnership, and rules applying to suits by and against partnerships would, to some extent at least, apply to this case. The main object in permitting joint-stock companies or associations to sue was to prevent the necessity of making the individual stockholders or members thereof as parties to the suit. As in suits by partnerships, the individual rights of the members cannot be maintained and individual wrongs redressed through a suit by the association. It must be a joint right that is to be enforced, or a joint wrong that is to be redressed. Appellant sues to redress a wrong to the association which it claims arose by an anticipated wrong which may be inflicted on its members severally. It pleads that an attack will be made upon it, if its members should be dismissed from the service of the city by the mayor and commissioners.

Article 6149 is based upon convenience and economy, in permitting all the members of a joint-stock company or association to sue, in the name of the association in order to conserve a joint right, or redress a joint wrong, and it was never intended that the name of the association could be used to ascertain and protect the several rights of the members or redress their several wrongs. Mayhew Co. v. Valley Wells Ass'n, 216 S. W. 225.

We are of opinion, not only that appellant could not sustain a suit shown to be a several and not a joint one, but also that suits by or against a joint-stock company or association can be sustained only as to property rights in which the membership is jointly interested. The very language of the statute seems to imply that the company or association can sue or be sued only about property rights, for it limits the right to those companies "doing business in the state," showing an intent to confine such suits to matters of business. There is no allegation in the petition of any property right of the association that was threatened by the mayor and commissioners, but from the petition it clearly appears that no right is threatened, except that of the individual member, in which the company or association had no property right whatever. No contract between the association and the city of San Antonio was being threatened or invaded. It had no contract with the city, and no right belonging to it was about to be assailed. It had no right upon which to base an application for an injunction.

If appellant were authorized to sue to redress or prevent wrongs perpetrated or about to be committed upon its individual members, it has utterly failed to comply with the rules of equity in stating its cause of action. The ordinary rules of pleading are made more stringent in...