San Bernardino County v. Simmons

• Court: California Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: SCHAUER; GIBSON
• Citation: San Bernardino County v. Simmons, 296 P.2d 329, 46 Cal.2d 394 (Cal. 1956)
• Decision Date: 27 April 1956
• Parties: COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Ruth SIMMONS, Defendant and Appellant. L. A. 23973.

Page 329

296 P.2d 329

46 Cal.2d 394

COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Ruth SIMMONS, Defendant and Appellant.

L. A. 23973.

Supreme Court of California, In Bank.

April 27, 1956.

Rehearing Denied May 23, 1956.

James E. Walker, Santa Ana, for appellant.

Albert E. Weller, County Counsel, and J. B. Lawrence, Deputy County Counsel, San Bernardino, for respondent.

SCHAUER, Justice.

Plaintiff county paid old age security to Henry Simmons. It brought this action against his adult daughter to recover a portion of the amount so paid. Its first cause of action is, as stated in section 2224 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, 'to recover for said county such portion of the aid granted as said relative is able to pay, and to secure an order requiring the payment of any sums which may become due in the future for which the relative may be liable.' Its second cause of action is based on the asserted subrogation of the county to the right of the parent under the provision of section 206 of the Civil Code that 'It is the duty of * * * the children of any poor person who is unable to maintain himself by work, to maintain such person to the extent of their ability.'

The trial court announced that it sustained an objection to the introduction of evidence as to the first cause of action. Judgment was for plaintiff for $140 upon the second cause of action. Defendant appeals; plaintiff does not.

Since the county does not complain of the ruling as to the firs cause of action ¹ there is no need to discuss defendant-appellant's arguments as to why she considers that the decision of the trial court as to that cause of action was correct. As to the second cause of action we have concluded that the trial court was mistaken in accepting the county's theory that it could recover derivatively under section 206 of the Civil Code.

The applicable Sections of the Civil Code and the Welfare and Institutions Code. Section 206 of the Civil Code provides, as it has since its enactment in 1872, that 'It is the duty of the father, the mother, and the children of any poor person who is unable to maintain himself by work, to maintain such person to the extent of their ability. The promise of an adult child to pay for necessaries previously furnished to such parent is binding.' This statute authorizes a 'general action addressed to the equitable powers of the court' by the poor person against the relative. (Tuller v. Superior Court (1932), 215 Cal. 352, 355, 10 P.2d 43.)

The Welfare and Institutions Code sets out what appears on the face of that code to be a complete procedure for recovery by the county, when it pays aid to a needy aged person, from a spouse or adult child ² who is able to support the aged person. At the time here material section 2181 of the Welfare and Institutions Code (as am. Stats. 1st Ex.Sess.1950, ch. 22, § 1, p. 463) provided in material part that on receipt of an application for old age security the board of supervisors shall 'determine the ability of responsible relatives to contribute to the support of applicant * * *. The maximum degree of liability of the responsible relative shall be determined by 'Relatives' Contribution Scale.' (The scale is set out in the section.) In determining ability to contribute, the financial circumstances of responsible relatives shall be given due consideration and, in unusual cases, contributions at less than the amount fixed by 'Relatives' Contribution Scale' may be made as the board of supervisors may deem justifiable. A married daughter of the applicant shall not be required to make contributions unless she has income constituting her separate property. * * *'

Section 2224 of the Welfare and Institutions Code (as am. Stats.1945, ch. 1319, § 2, p. 2474) provided, '* * * If the person receiving aid has within the State, a spouse or adult child found by the board of supervisors pecuniarily able to support said person, the board of supervisors shall request the district attorney * * * to proceed against such kindred * * *. (T)he district attorney * * * shall, on behalf of said county, maintain an action, in the superior court of the county granting such aid, against said relative * * * to recover for said county such portion of the aid granted as said relative is able to pay * * *.'

The Claim of Subrogation. The trial court found the following facts from which it concluded that defendant owed the county the duty to reimburse the county for $140 contributed to the father's support: From December 15, 1952, to July 15, 1953, defendant had property and earning ability sufficient to enable her to pay $20 a month for the support of her father. During this time the father was a poor person unable to maintain himself by work. The father during this time received from the county $80 a month as old age security.

Plaintiff's argument is as follows: The obligation of the child to support the poor parent under section 206 of the Civil Code is 'preexistent to and independent of the aid granted to the needy aged by public authorities' (quoting from Kelley v. State Board of Social Welfare (1947), 82 Cal.App.2d 627, 632, 186 P.2d 429, a case which contains statements upon which , as will appear, doubt was cast by County of Contra Costa v. Lasky (1954), 43 Cal.2d 506, 509, 275 P.2d 452); the county performed the child's duty under section 206; and the county is therefore subrogated to the parent's right against the child under section 206.

There is nothing in section 206 which suggests an intention to create a liability of the child of poor parents to public agencies which support the parents in accord with their law-imposed duty to pay aid to such parents; the only liability to third persons is in the case of the promise of an adult child expressly referred to in the last sentence of the section. On the other hand, the Welfare and Institutions Code (particularly applicable here are §§ 2181, 2224, hereinabove quoted; see also § 2011) not only purports to state the circumstances in which the named responsible relatives are liable to the county when it has supported or paid aid to indigents, aged, blind, etc., ³ but also states a procedure by which in proper cases the county can recover from the responsible relatives. It seems apparent, therefore, that the Legislature intended, by the Welfare and Institutions Code, to cover completely the subject of recovery by public agencies from responsible relatives, and that it did not intend to create, and that there is no proper basis for the courts to innovate, a right of recoupment derived from section 206 of the Civil Code.

On this subject it is said in County of Contra Costa v. Lasky (1954), supra, 43 Cal.2d 506, 509, 275 P.2d 453, 'There is a conflict in the cases as to whether the basic liability of responsible relatives is section 206 of the Civil Code or the provisions of the Welfare and Institutions Code. It has been held that the latter code provisions are complete in themselves and the liability of responsible relatives to the county is thereby established. (County of Lake v. Forbes (1941), 42 Cal.App.2d 744 (109 P.2d 972); County of Los Angeles v. Lane (1952), 113 Cal.App.2d 476 (248 P.2d 479); County of Los Angeles v. La Fuente (1942), 20 Cal.2d 870 (129 P.2d 378).) Seemingly to the contrary are Garcia v. Superior Court (1941), 45 Cal.App.2d 31 (113 P.2d 470), and Kelly v. State Board of Social Welfare (1947), 82 Cal.App.2d 627 (186 P.2d 429). Although it is not important in this case, ⁴ we believe the matter is adequately covered by the Welfare and Institutions Code and it is the measure of the extent of the responsible relative's liability to the county. It is to it we must look to ascertain whether the relative is required, in a particular case, to reimburse the county.' We reiterate the declaration of the last quoted sentence as a holding, and any inconsistent implications in the Garcia and the Kelly cases are disapproved.

Plaintiff points out that, as stated in Ashland County v. Directors of Richland County Infirmary (1857), 7 Ohio St. 65, 70 Am.Dec. 49, 51, there are decisions in other jurisdictions which 'proceed on the principle that the sufferings of paupers and of indigent persons shall be relieved by the townships where they may be found in their destitute conditions, and that advancements made for such purposes are justly chargeable in equity and conscience to the person * * * whose relation towards the pauper or indigent person creates a duty or imposes the necessity or furnishing aid, and that the obligation when neglected or disregarded by those who should perform it may be enforced in favor of whomsoever grants the relief as for money paid out and expended for another's benefit.' (County of Jaspar v. Osborn (1882), 59 Iowa 208, 13 N.W. 104; McCook County v. Kammoss (1895), 7 S.D. 558, 64 N.W. 1123, 31 L.R.A. 461; Tryon v. Town of Moyer (1915), 130 Minn. 198, 153 N.W. 307, L.R.A.1915E, 844; Bismarck Hospital v. Harris (1938), 68 N.D. 374, 280 N.W. 423, 116 A.L.R. 1274, 1277.) We do not find the theory of those cases persuasive here, for in none of them, so far as the reports show, was there a statutory system such as that of...