San Diego Gas Electric Company v. City of San Diego, 79-678

• Decision Date: 24 March 1981
• Docket Number: No. 79-678,79-678
• Citation: San Diego Gas Electric Company v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 101 S.Ct. 1287, 67 L.Ed.2d 551 (1981)
• Parties: SAN DIEGO GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY, Appellant, v. CITY OF SAN DIEGO et al
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

450 U.S. 621

101 S.Ct. 1287

67 L.Ed.2d 551

SAN DIEGO GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY, Appellant,

v CITY OF SAN DIEGO et al.

No. 79-678.

Argued Dec. 1, 1980.

Decided March 24, 1981.

Syllabus

Appellant owns land in appellee city that when purchased as a possible site for a nuclear power plant was mostly zoned for industrial or agricultural use.The city rezoned parts of the property, reducing the acreage for industrial use, and also established an open-space plan that included appellant's property and proposed that the city acquire the property to preserve it as a parkland.A bond issue to provide funds for this acquisition was not approved by the voters, and the property remained in appellant's hands, subject to the new zoning ordinance and the open-space plan.Thereafter, appellant brought an action in California Superior Court, alleging that the city had taken its property without just compensation in violation of the Federal and State Constitutions on the theory that the city had deprived it of the beneficial use of the property through the rezoning and adoption of the open-space plan.Appellant sought damages for inverse condemnation, as well as mandamus and declaratory relief.The Superior Court awarded damages but dismissed the mandamus claim, and the California Court of Appeal affirmed.The California Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeal's judgment and retransferred the case to that court for reconsideration in light of the intervening holding in Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal.3d 266, 157 Cal.Rptr. 372, 598 P.2d 25, aff'd on other grounds, 447 U.S. 255, 100 S.Ct. 2138, 65 L.Ed.2d 106, that an owner deprived of the beneficial use of his land by a zoning regulation is not entitled to damages for inverse condemnation but that his exclusive remedy is invalidation of the regulation in an action for mandamus or declaratory relief.On reconsideration, the Court of Appeal then reversed the Superior Court's judgment, holding that appellant could not recover compensation through inverse condemnation and that, because the record presented factual disputes not covered by the trial court, mandamus and declaratory relief would be available if appellant desired to retry the case.The California Supreme Court denied further review.Appellant appealed to this Court, claiming that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments required that compensation be paid whenever private property is taken for public use.

Held : Since 28 U.S.C. § 1257 permits this Court to review only "[f]inal judgments or decrees" of a state court, the appeal must be dismissed because of the absence of a final judgment.While the Court of Appeal decided that monetary compensation is not an appropriate remedy, it did not decide whether any other remedy is available because it has not decided whether any taking, in fact, occurred but appeared to have contemplated further proceedings in the trial court on remand to resolve the disputed factual issues.Pp. 631-633.

Appeal dismissed.

Louis E. Goebel, San Diego, Cal., for appellant.

C. Alan Sumption, San Diego, Cal., for appellees.

Justice BLACKMUNdelivered the opinion of the Court.

AppellantSan Diego Gas & Electric Company, a California corporation, asks this Court to rule that a State must provide a monetary remedy to a landowner whose property allegedly has been "taken" by a regulatory ordinance claimed to violate the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment.¹ This question was left open last Term in Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 263, 100 S.Ct. 2138, 2142, 65 L.Ed.2d 106(1980).Because we conclude that we lack jurisdiction in this case, we again must leave the issue undecided.

I

Appellant owns a 412-acre parcel of land in Sorrento Valley, an area in the northwest part of the city of San Diego, Cal.It assembled and acquired the acreage in 1966, at a cost of about $1,770,000 as a possible site for a nuclear power plant to be constructed in the 1980's.Approximately 214 acres of the parcel lie within or near an estuary known as the Los Penasquitos Lagoon.² These acres are low-lying land which serves as a drainage basin for three river systems.About a third of the land is subject to tidal action from the nearby Pacific Ocean.The 214 acres are unimproved, except for sewer and utility lines.³

When appellant acquired the 214 acres, most of the land was zoned either for industrial use or in an agricultural "holding" category.⁴ The city's master plan, adopted in 1967, designated nearly all the area for industrial use.

Several events that occurred in 1973 gave rise to this litigation.First, the San Diego City Council rezoned parts of the property.It changed 39 acres from industrial to agricultural, and increased the minimum lot size in some of the agricultural areas from 1 acre to 10 acres.The Council recommended, however, that 50 acres of the agricultural land be considered for industrial development upon the submission of specific development plans.

Second, the city, pursuant to Cal.Gov't Code Ann. § 65563(West Supp.1981), established an open-space plan.This statute required each California city and county to adopt a plan "for the comprehensive and long-range preservation and conservation of open-space land within its jurisdiction."The plan adopted by the city of San Diego placed appellant's property among the city's open-space areas, which it defined as "any urban land or water surface that is essentially open or natural in character, and which has appreciable utility for park and recreation purposes, conservation of land, water or other natural resources or historic or scenic purposes."App. 159.The plan acknowledged appellant's intention to construct a nuclear power plant on the property, stating that such a plant would not necessarily be incompatible with the open-space designation.⁵ The plan proposed, however, that the city acquire the property to preserve it as parkland.

Third, the City Council proposed a bond issue in order to obtain funds to acquire open-space lands.The Council identified appellant's land as among those properties to be acquired with the proceeds of the bond issue.The proposition, however, failed to win the voters' approval.The open-space plan has remained in effect, but the city has made no attempt to acquire appellant's property.

On August 15, 1974, appellant instituted this action in the Superior Court for the County of San Diego against the city and a number of its officials.It alleged that the city had taken its property without just compensation, in violation of the Constitutions of the United States and California.Appellant's theory was that the city had deprived it of the entire beneficial use of the property through the rezoning and the adoption of the open-space plan.It alleged that the city followed a policy of refusing to approve any development that was inconsistent with the plan, and that the only beneficial use of the property was as an industrial park, a use that would be inconsistent with the open-space designation.⁶ The city disputed this allegation, arguing that appellant had never asked its approval for any development plan for the property.It also contended that, as a charter city, it was not bound by the open-space plan, even if appellant's proposed development would be inconsistent, with the plan, citing Cal.Gov't Code Ann. §§ 65700,65803(West 1966and Supp.1981).

Appellant sought damages of $6,150,000 in inverse condemnation, as well as mandamus and declaratory relief.Prior to trial, the court dismissed the mandamus claim, holding that "mandamus is not the proper remedy to challenge the validity of a legislative act."Clerk'sTr. 42.After a nonjury trial on the issue of liability, the court granted judgment for appellant, finding that:

"29.[Due to the] continuing course of conduct of the defendant City culminating in June of 1973, and, in particular, the designation of substantially all of the subject property as open space . . ., plaintiff has been deprived of all practical, beneficial or economic use of the property designated as open space, and has further suffered severance damage with respect to the balance of the subject property.

"30.No development could proceed on the property designated as open space unless it was consistent with open space.In light of the particular characteristics of the said property, there exists no practical, beneficial or economic use of the said property designated as open space which is consistent with open space.

"31.Since June 19, 1973, the property designated as

open space has been devoted to use by the public as open space.

"32.Following the actions of the defendant City in June

of 1973, it would have been totally impractical and futile for plaintiff to have applied to defendant City for the approval of any development of the property designated as open space or the remainder of the subject property.

"33.Since the actions of the defendant City in June of

1973, the property designated as open space and the remainder of the larger parcel is unmarketable in that no other person would be willing to purchase the property, and the property has at most a nominal fair market value."App. 41-42.

The court concluded that these findings established that the city had taken the property and that just compensation was required by the Constitutions of both the United States and California.A subsequent jury trial on the question of damages resulted in a judgment for appellant for over $3 million.

On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth District, affirmed.App. to Juris, Statement B-1;see146 Cal.Rptr. 103(1978).It held that neither a change in zoning nor the adoption of an open-space plan automatically entitled a property owner to compensation for any resulting diminution in the value of the property.In this case, however, the record revealed that the city followed the policy of enacting and enforcing zoning ordinances that were consistent with its open-space plan....