San Diego Police Officers' v. Civil Service

• Decision Date: 11 December 2002
• Docket Number: No. D038685.,D038685.
• Citation: 128 Cal.Rptr.2d 248,104 Cal.App.4th 275
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: SAN DIEGO POLICE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. CITY OF SAN DIEGO CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION et al., Defendants and Respondents.

128 Cal.Rptr.2d 248

104 Cal.App.4th 275

SAN DIEGO POLICE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. CITY OF SAN DIEGO CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION et al., Defendants and Respondents.

No. D038685.

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 1.

December 11, 2002.

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing January 9, 2003.

Law Offices of Everett L. Bobbitt, Everett L. Bobbitt, San Diego, Sanford A. Toyen; Bobbitt & Pinckard, Everett L. Bobbitt, San Diego, and Bradley Fields, for Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Casey Gwinn, City Attorney, Anita M. Noone, Assistant City Attorney, James M. Chapin, Deputy City Attorney, for Defendants and Respondents City of San Diego and City of San Diego Civil Service Commission.

John J. Sansone, County Counsel and William Songer, Deputy County Counsel, for Defendants and Respondents County of San Diego and County of San Diego Civil Service Commission.

HALLER, J.

Two local law enforcement employee associations (Associations)¹ filed an action against the City of San Diego (City) and County of San Diego (County) (collectively Public Entities), alleging the Public Entities' practice of routinely disclosing personnel records at public disciplinary appeal hearings violates Penal Code section 832.7 and the law enforcement officers' constitutional rights to privacy. Associations sought declaratory relief ordering Public Entities to end this practice. The trial court sustained Public Entities' demurrer without leave to amend, and entered judgment in the Public Entities' favor. We conclude Associations alleged a viable cause of action for declaratory relief under Penal Code section 832.7. We therefore reverse.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY

Associations' complaint alleged the following: Associations represent City and County peace officers who have a right to challenge disciplinary personnel actions at an administrative hearing. (Gov.Code, § 3303, subd. (b>.) Public Entities' civil service commissions require these administrative appeals to be conducted at public hearings. During these public hearings, each civil service commission "allow[s] for the disclosure of personnel records," as defined in Penal Code section 832.8, despite the objections of the involved peace officer. Penal Code section 832.8 defines "personnel records" to include employment-related information contained in the officer's file, complaints and investigations of complaints concerning the involved officer, and "[a]ny other information the disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy."²

Associations alleged that by permitting public disclosure of these personnel records, Public Entities violated section 832.7 and the peace officers' constitutional rights. Associations sought (1) "[a] writ of mandamus ... commanding [Public Entities] to prevent public disclosure of confidential peace officer personnel records as described in Penal Code § 832.8 ..."; and (2) "[a] judicial declaration that Petitioners' membership is entitled to have confidential peace officer personnel records protected from public disclosure ..." at disciplinary appeal hearings.

Public Entities filed a demurrer contending that section 832.7 does not prevent disclosure of personnel records in an administrative proceeding, relying on Bradshaw v. City of Los Angeles (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 908, 921, 270 Cal.Rptr. 711. The Public Entities further argued that "[t]o the extent the petitioners are challenging the introduction of particular evidence at some past or future Commission hearing, such a challenge is not appropriate for review" by a declaratory relief action.

The trial court sustained the demurrer, finding that section 832.7 does not preclude the introduction of evidence at an administrative disciplinary appeal hearing. The court alternatively found the complaint "lack[ed] controversy on its face" because Associations were not challenging a specific ruling permitting the admission of confidential personnel records at an administrative hearing, and that the proper avenue to challenge a prior ruling was through a Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 action.

Associations thereafter moved for reconsideration, requesting leave to amend the complaint based on new facts that arose after the court's ruling showing that a deputy sheriff (who was not identified for asserted confidentiality concerns) was denied a closed hearing on his appeal of a disciplinary action. The trial court denied the reconsideration motion, finding the proposed new facts "do not properly address the issues raised."

Associations appeal.

DISCUSSION

I. Preliminary Matters

Before reaching the merits of Associations' contentions, we reject Public Entities' arguments that the judgment may be affirmed on a nonsubstantive basis.

City argues—for the first time on appeal—that the action is barred by the res judicata doctrine based on a previous lawsuit in which the city police officers association unsuccessfully raised the identical issue regarding the confidentiality of personnel files presented at disciplinary review hearings. However, the deputy sheriffs' association was not a party to this prior action and therefore this association is not necessarily barred from asserting its claims. Moreover, relitigation is not foreclosed because this case falls within the public interest exception to the res judicata doctrine. (See Arcadia Unified School Dist. v. State Dept. of Education (1992) 2 Cal.4th 251, 257-259, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 545, 825 P.2d 438.) Under the public interest exception, courts may permit relitigation of an issue of law concerning a public entity's ongoing statutory obligations that affect individuals and members of the public not specifically before the court in the first litigation. (Ibid.; see Kopp v. Fair Pol. Practices Com. (1995) 11 Cal.4th 607, 622, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 108, 905 P.2d 1248; City of Sacramento v. State of California (1990) 50 Cal.3d 51, 64-65, 266 Cal.Rptr. 139, 785 P.2d 522.) The circumstances here fall within that exception.

We further reject the County's argument—made in a footnote without citation to any authority—that the demurrer may be sustained because (Associations failed to allege an actual controversy. Associations have presented a real and substantial controversy because they are seeking declaratory relief regarding a public entity's ongoing interpretation of a statute affecting Associations' membership. (See Code Civ. Proc, § 1060.)

II. Propriety of Demurrer

As the central thrust of their appeal, Associations contend their complaint stated a cause of action under section 832.7. Specifically, Associations maintain: (1) their complaint adequately alleged Public Entities routinely present personnel records at public hearings conducted pursuant to the Public Safety Officers' Procedural Bill of Rights Act; (2) section 832.7 prohibits Public Entities from disclosing personnel records to the public without the involved officer's consent; and (3) Associations are therefore entitled to declaratory relief to prevent Public Entities from continuing to engage in this practice.

In examining these contentions, we first briefly describe the statutory scheme regarding administrative hearings under the Public Safety Officers' Procedural Bill of Rights Act, and Public Entities' alleged practices of disclosing personnel records at these public hearings. We then examine whether section 832.7 supports Associations' allegation that personnel records cannot be presented at these public hearings without the affected officer's consent.

A. Public Safety Officers' Procedural Bill of Rights Act

Government Code section 3300 et seq. is known as the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act. (Gov.Code, § 3300; see San Diego Police Officers Assn. v. City of San Diego (2002) 98 Cal. App.4th 779, 781, 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 609.) Under this act, "[n]o punitive action" may be taken against a public safety officer unless the officer is provided an opportunity for an administrative appeal (referred to as a disciplinary appeal hearing). (Gov. Code, § 3304, subd. (b); Giuffre v. Sparks (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 1322, 1328, 91 Cal. Rptr.2d 171.) The Legislature enacted this code section to ensure a peace officer subjected to punitive action has the "opportunity `to establish a formal record of the circumstance surrounding his termination' [citation] and `to attempt to convince the employing agency to reverse its decision, either by demonstrating the falsity of charges which led to punitive action, or through proof of mitigating circumstances.' " (Binkley v. City of Long Beach (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 1795, 1806, 20 Cal. Rptr.2d 903.)

Beyond mandating that this opportunity be provided, the Legislature did not specify how the appeal process was to be implemented. The Legislature instead left the details of the administrative appeal "to be formulated by the local agency." (Binkley v. City of Long Beach, supra, 16 Cal.App.4th at p. 1806, 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 903.) Thus, Government Code section 3304 was not intended to "interfere with a charter city's right to regulate peace officers' qualifications for employment, or the causes for which they may be removed. [Citation.] Nor was the Act intended to abrogate the powers granted charter cities by article XI, section 5 of the California Constitution...." (Binkley v. City of Long Beach, supra, 16 Cal.App.4th at p. 1806, 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 903.) But the hearings must be conducted consistent with due process. (Id. at p. 1807, 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 903.) Thus, the hearings must be conducted by a neutral factfinder, and the hearings must be open to the public if the affected peace officer requests a public hearing. (See Caloca v. County of San Diego (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 433, 446, 126 Cal.Rptr.2d 3; Giuffre v. Sparks, supra, 76 Cal.App.4th at p. 1329, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 171.)

Associations allege that Public Entities have rules, policies and/or practices that require administrative disciplinary appeals to be held at public...