San Diego Unified Port Dist. v. Superior Court

• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: WIENER
• Citation: San Diego Unified Port Dist. v. Superior Court, 243 Cal.Rptr. 163, 197 Cal.App.3d 843 (Cal. App. 1988)
• Decision Date: 13 January 1988
• Docket Number: No. D006725,D006725
• Parties: SAN DIEGO UNIFIED PORT DISTRICT, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT, etc., County of San Diego, Respondent; MARRIOTT CORPORATION et al., Real Parties in Interest.

Page 163

243 Cal.Rptr. 163

197 Cal.App.3d 843

SAN DIEGO UNIFIED PORT DISTRICT, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT, etc., County of San Diego, Respondent MARRIOTT CORPORATION et al., Real Parties in Interest.

No. D006725.

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 1, California.

Jan. 13, 1988.

Butz & Lucas and Douglas M. Butz, San Diego, for petitioner.

No appearance for respondent.

Hubka & Hubka and Verne R. Hubka and McCormick & Mitchell and Ralph J. Moreno, San Diego, for real parties in interest.

WIENER, Acting Presiding Justice.

The San Diego Unified Port District (District) seeks a writ of mandate after the Superior Court of San Diego County overruled its demurrer to Marriott Corporation's (Marriott) complaint attempting to intervene in the personal injury action below brought by plaintiff Joyce Campbell against the District. We issued an alternative writ to determine whether Marriott the workers' compensation insurance carrier for Campbell's employer, may use the claim filed by Campbell to satisfy its filing requirement under the government claims statutes. (GOV.CODE, §§ 911.2¹, 945.4.) We conclude Campbell's filing satisfies the filing requirement for Marriott. Accordingly, we deny the writ.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A large rat attacked and bit Campbell while she was working at the Marriott Host Cafeteria located in the West Terminal of the San Diego Airport. Campbell fell and hit her head. She is now paralyzed on her entire left side. Marriott was the workers' compensation insurance carrier for Campbell's employer at the time of the accident. As of January 1987 Marriott paid Campbell almost $118,000.00 in workers compensation benefits.

The District, a public entity, owns the San Diego Airport. Campbell filed a timely claim against the District pursuant to the Government Tort Claims Act (Act). (§§ 900 et seq.) The District rejected the claim and Campbell timely filed suit. Marriott, without having filed a separate claim against the District, attempted to intervene in Campbell's suit to recover compensation benefits.

The District successfully demurred to Marriott's complaint on the ground Marriott had failed to allege compliance with the filing requirements for claims against public entities set forth in sections 911.2 and 945.4, et seq. Marriott filed a first amended complaint alleging Campbell's uncontested compliance with the claims requirements. The amended complaint further alleged Campbell's compliance with the filing requirements excused Marriott "from the public entity claim requirements." The District unsuccessfully demurred on the ground Marriott failed to allege compliance with the claims filing requirements. This proceeding ensued.

DISCUSSION

I

The question in this case is whether Campbell's compliance with the Act's written claim requirements satisfied Marriott's filing requirement. We believe the answer to this question turns on the purposes served by the Act and the relevant provisions of the Labor Code which permit redress to employers who have paid workers' compensation benefits (Lab.Code, §§ 3850 et seq.). Any result we reach should maximize, to the extent possible, the purpose of both statutory schemes.

When an employee is injured by a third party's tortious act, an employer is indirectly injured to the extent the employer must pay out workers' compensation benefits. By statute the employer may recoup its damages from the third party through subrogation. (Ibid.) By definition a workers' compensation insurance carrier who has paid benefits has all the rights of an employer. ² (Lab.Code, § 3850.)

The carrier can recover its damages by (1) suing the third party in its own name (Lab.Code, § 3852), (2) intervening in an action filed by the employee (Lab.Code, § 3853), or (3) filing a lien claim in a suit filed by the employee (Lab.Code, § 3856, subd. (b)). Should the employee and carrier file independent suits, the suits must be consolidated under Labor Code section 3853.

The statutory scheme serves two purposes. It insures that the carrier and employee recover just compensation for the damages each suffered from the party ultimately responsible for the employee's injury. It further insures that the tortfeasor is confronted with only one action in which a totality of the claims against him can be determined. (See County of San Diego v. Sanfax Corp. (1977) 19 Cal.3d 862, 872-873, 140 Cal.Rptr. 638, 568 P.2d 363.)

The Act provides a statutory scheme for the presentation and determination of tort claims against public entities. Section 911.2 requires a party with a cause of action for personal injuries to file a written claim with the entity within 100 days after the accrual of the cause of action. Unless a written claim is filed, a party cannot sue a public entity. (§ 945.4.)

There are two purposes for the filing requirement: (1) to give notice to the public entity so it will have a timely opportunity to investigate the claim and determine the facts; and (2) to give the public entity an opportunity to settle meritorious claims thereby avoiding unnecessary lawsuits. (City of San Jose v. Superior Court (1974) 12 Cal.3d 447, 455, 115 Cal.Rptr. 797, 525 P.2d 701; Lacy v. City of Monrovia (1974) 44 Cal.App.3d 152, 155, 118 Cal.Rptr. 277.) By requiring advance knowledge of potential claims, the claims statute provides an opportunity to the public entity to quickly rectify a dangerous condition and further provides an opportunity for the entity to take the potential claim into account in its fiscal planning. (Roberts v. State of California (1974) 39 Cal.App.3d 844, 848, 114 Cal.Rptr. 518.)

Marriott's point is simple. The purposes of the claims filing statute were met by Campbell's claim since Marriott's claim is completely encompassed therein. Labor Code section 3852 provides that a carrier can recover for compensation and damages it paid or is obligated to pay the employee. The carrier may not recover any damages in excess of those recoverable by the employee. (Breese v. Price (1981) 29 Cal.3d 923, 928, 176 Cal.Rptr. 791, 633 P.2d 987.) "Substantively, as well as procedurally, employer and employee actions are interchangeable: regardless of who brings an action, it is essentially the same lawsuit." ( County of San Diego v. Sanfax Corp., supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 874, 140 Cal.Rptr. 638, 568 P.2d 363.)

Campbell's claim sets forth that she was employed by Marriott Host Cafeteria, that she was attacked and bitten by a rat at the cafeteria, and that as a result she fell, hit her head, and was paralyzed on her entire left side. She sought damages of $5,000,000.00 including loss of income. Thus, Campbell's claim gave the District a timely opportunity to investigate the claim and determine the facts. The claim advised the District of the dangerous condition and gave it an opportunity to take whatever action was necessary to rectify the problem. The claim also stated the nature of the injuries and the total amount of the claim thereby allowing orderly fiscal planning.

The District's decision not to settle with Campbell was not affected by Marriott's failure to file a claim. The fact that a workers' compensation carrier might be entitled to reimbursement of the benefits it paid does not affect the merits of the claim made by the injured party.

It is also clear that the District was not, and could not, be prejudiced by Marriott's failure to file a claim. As we have explained since Campbell's claim for damages was all-inclusive, a separate claim by Marriott was unnecessary to implement the purpose of the Act. In the circumstances of this case requiring Marriott to file a written claim would interfere with the purpose of the legislative scheme which was created to allow carriers to seek reimbursement for compensation benefits previously paid.

The District nonmeritoriously argues Marriott's intervention creates a greater potential for liability because in the future Campbell may abandon or dismiss her lawsuit. In effect, the District wants us to equate its increased exposure with its fortuitous good fortune when the injured party decides to abandon his or her lawsuit. Marriott ignores the fact that when the carrier pursues its claim, the District's liability exposure has not been increased. The exposure was there when the claimant, here Campbell, initially filed her claim. Once there has been compliance with the statute by the filing of an all-encompassing claim, the District cannot complain about the possibility that it will have to pay all sums which arise therefrom.

At oral argument the District's attorney explained the District's objection to Marriott's intervention was that it gave Marriott the right to participate in the trial against the District. In other words, if the case is tried the District wants to avoid facing two opposing lawyers in the court room. While we can appreciate the importance of this tactical concern there is nothing in the claims statutes that gives support to the District's position. The Act was in no way intended to prevent the diligent and effective pursuit of a claim once the governmental entity has been given notice of that claim.

II

In asserting that compliance by the carrier is essential in those cases where the injured employee has complied with the Act's written claim requirement, the District also ignores the settlement process in which many if not most of these cases are resolved.

In cases where a carrier has not filed a written claim, the carrier nonetheless can obtain a valid lien to secure payment of the benefits paid to the injured employee under Labor Code section 3856, subdivision (b). There is nothing in the Government Code which conditions the validity of this lien on the filing of a written claim. And when the case is settled, the claimant must relinquish part of the settlement proceeds to satisfy the lien. (Lab.Code, § 3860, subd. (b).) In this scenario the need for the carrier to have filed a written claim under the Act...