San Francisco Fire Fighters v. Board of Supervisors, AFL-CI

• Decision Date: 30 August 1979
• Docket Number: AFL-CI,P
• Citation: 158 Cal.Rptr. 145,94 Cal.App.3d 842
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Previously published at 94 Cal.App.3d 842 94 Cal.App.3d 842, 96 Cal.App.3d 538, 103 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2118 SAN FRANCISCO FIRE FIGHTERS, LOCAL 798, INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FIRE FIGHTERS,laintiff and Appellant, v. BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF the CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO et al., Defendants and Respondents. The PEOPLE ex rel. George EVANKOVICH et al., Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, Defendant and Respondent. Civ. 38823, Civ. 40705.

Page 145

158 Cal.Rptr. 145

Previously published at 94 Cal.App.3d 842

94 Cal.App.3d 842, 96 Cal.App.3d 538, 103 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2118

SAN FRANCISCO FIRE FIGHTERS, LOCAL 798, INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FIRE FIGHTERS, AFL-CIO, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF the CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO et al., Defendants and Respondents.

The PEOPLE ex rel. George EVANKOVICH et al., Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, Defendant and Respondent.

Civ. 38823, Civ. 40705.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 1, California.

Aug. 30, 1979.

Hearing Denied Nov. 8, 1979.

Davis, Cowell & Bowe, Philip Paul Bowe, Duane W. Reno, San Francisco, for plaintiff-appellant S. F. Fire Fighters etc.

Evelle J. Younger, George Deukmejian, Attys. Gen., Clayton P. Roche, Deputy Atty. Gen., Neyhart & Anderson, Neyhart, Anderson & Nussbaum, John L. Anderson, Jerome M. Garchik, Peter D. Nussbaum, San Francisco, Brundage, Beeson & Pappy, Stephen H. Naiman, Los Angeles, for plaintiff-appellant The People etc.

Van Bourg, Allen, Weinberg & Roger, Victor Van Bourg, William A. Sokol, San Francisco, Stephen Warren Solomon, Carole Heller Solomon, William J. Ramey, Ralph B. Saltsman, Emanuel Cowitt, Troy C. Lee, Jr., Marina del Rey, Joseph R. Grodin, San Francisco, amici curiae for appellants.

[96 Cal.App.3d 542] Thomas M. O'Connor, George P. Agnost, City Attys., George E. Baglin, Burk E. Delventhal, Deputy City Attys., San Francisco, for defendants-respondents.

OPINION

ELKINGTON, Associate Justice.

These two consolidated appeals were retransferred to us after grant of a hearing by the Supreme Court following our earlier decisions thereon, for reconsideration and determination on a single issue "in light of Los Angeles County Civil Service Commission v. Superior Court (1978) 23 Cal.3d 55, 151 Cal.Rptr. 547, 588 P.2d 249."

The issue, as phrased by appellants, is: "Whether a cause of action was stated by the allegations of the complaint(s) that the Board of Supervisors (of the City and County of San Francisco (San Francisco)) failed to comply with the procedural requirements of Sections 3504.5 and 3505 of the Government Code prior to submitting to the electorate proposed amendments to the San Francisco Charter which change wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of municipal employment."

We have reconsidered the appeals, as directed, in the light of Los Angeles County Civil Service Com. v. Superior Court. Our conclusion is that the judgments of the superior court must be affirmed. We state our reasons.

California's Constitution, article XI, section 3, confers upon the electors of a chartered county or city, the Absolute right to amend such a public entity's charter. It states that charter amendments may be proposed:

(1) By the required number of the county's or city's electors under the initiative (see Cal.Const., art. II, § 11); or,

(2) By the county's or city's governing body. ¹ The Legislature may, of course, "enact legislation to facilitate the exercise of the powers directly granted by the Constitution" (People v. Western Air Lines, Inc., 42 Cal.2d 621, 637, 268 P.2d 723, 732), such as the procedure for exercise of the constitutionally granted initiative process (District Election etc. Committee v. O'Connor, 78 Cal.App.3d 261, 114 Cal.Rptr. 442). But such enactments " ' "must not in any particular attempt to narrow or embarrass" ' " the related constitutional provision. (Chesney v. Byram, 15 Cal.2d 460, 464, 101 P.2d 1106, 1108; Chester v. Hall, 55 Cal.App. 611, 616, 204 P. 237.) " 'It is not and will not be questioned but that, if the Constitution has vested such power, it is not within the legislative power, either by its silence or by direct enactment, to modify, curtail, or abridge this constitutional grant.' " (People v. Western Air Lines, Inc., supra, 42 Cal.2d, p. 637, 268 P.2d p. 732; Western Assn. etc. R. R. v. Railroad Com., 173 Cal. 802, 804, 162 P. 391.) And it has been held "self-evident that the Legislature itself could not abridge, nor even hamper, the exercise of those powers" reserved by the Constitution to the electors of a city or county. (Brown v. Boyd, 33 Cal.App.2d 416, 421, 91 P.2d 926, 930.)

Where the state's Constitution, as here, reserves legislative power to the people, statutes will be liberally construed so as to give effect to that power. (Warner v. Kenny, 27 Cal.2d 627, 629, 165 P.2d 889; Gage v. Jordan, 23 Cal.2d 794, 799, 147 P.2d 387; Ley v. Dominguez, 212 Cal. 587, 593, 299 P. 713.)

Article XI, section 3, of the state's Constitution thus gives to San Francisco's board of supervisors the Unabridged right to propose charter amendments to the city's electors.

We next observe that the wages, hours, and conditions of employment embraced by the subject charter amendments are matters of local, not statewide, concern. (See Cal.Const., art. XI, §§ 4, 5.) ² In Sonoma County Organization of Public Employees v. County of Sonoma, 23 Cal.3d 296, 317, 152 Cal.Rptr. 903, 915, 591 P.2d 1, 12-13, the high court stated: "It seems clear to us . . . that both the language of the Constitution and prior authority support the proposition advanced by petitioners that the determination of the wages paid to employees of charter cities as well as charter counties is a matter of local rather than state-wide concern." Appellants have expressed no disagreement. Adverting now to the here at issue Government Code sections 3504.5 and 3505, we note that they are part of the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (enacted 1968) which is codified as part 7, division 4, chapter 10 (entitled "Local Public Employee Organizations") and as sections 3500-3510, of the Government Code.

It provides, inter alia, that "public employees shall have the right to form, join, and participate in the activities of employee organizations of their own choosing for the purpose of representation on all matters of employer-employee relations." (Gov.Code, § 3502.) It also requires that the public employer "Shall give reasonable written notice to (the) employee organization affected of any ordinance, rule, resolution, or regulation directly relating to matters" within the employee organization's scope of representation, and give the "employee organization the opportunity to meet with" representatives of the public employer. (Gov.Code, § 3504.5.) It then provides that such public employer representatives and the employee organization "shall meet and confer in good faith" in respect of such matters. (Gov.Code, § 3505.) (The emphasis of this paragraph has been supplied by us.)

Parenthetically, at this point, we opine that a legislative purpose that the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act shall Necessarily apply to proposals to amend a county's or city's charter in respect of wages, hours and conditions of employment, is most unlikely. It will be recalled that the state's Constitution, article XI, section 3 (fn. 1, Ante ), provides that such proposals shall be by "initiative or by the governing body." (Emphasis added.) Application of Government Code section 3505's "meet and confer" requirements to a county's or city's Initiative process would be manifestly impossible. Nor is it reasonable to suppose a purpose that the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act apply to one, but not to the other, of the constitutional alternatives.

But we conclude that Government Code section 3504 is dispositive of the appeals. It provides that a local public entity's duty to meet and confer in good faith Does not extend to a consideration of the "merits (or) necessity" of any public "activity provided by law. . . ." ³

Giving effect to section 3504, it has been held that a public agency is bound to so "meet and confer" Only in respect of "Any agreement that the public agency is authorized (by law) To make . . . ." (East Bay Mun. Employees Union v. County of Alameda, 3 Cal.App.3d 578, 584, 83 Cal.Rptr. 503, 508; emphasis added.) The agency must "meet and confer" on such wages, hours, and conditions of employment matters As it would be permitted by law to voluntarily engage upon. "(T)he entire import of the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act is to permit as much flexibility in employee-governmental agency relations with regard to all aspects in the employer-employee milieu As a voluntary system will permit." (San Joaquin County Employees' Assn., Inc. v. County of San Joaquin, 39 Cal.App.3d 83, 88, 113 Cal.Rptr. 912, 914, emphasis added.) It is only when " 'the (voluntary) rules and regulations of a public agency to not meet the standard (of the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act, that) the deficiencies of those rules and regulations as to rights, duties and obligations of the employer, the employee, and the employee organization, are supplied by the appropriate provisions of the act,' " (Huntington Beach Police Officers' Assn. v. City and Huntington Beach, 58 Cal.App.3d 492, 502, 129 Cal.Rptr. 893, 900; Los Angeles County Firefighters Local 1014 v. City of Monrovia, 24 Cal.App.3d 289, 295, 101 Cal.Rptr. 78.)

It is observed also, that the guideline case of Los Angeles County Civil Service Com. v. Superior Court, supra, 23 Cal.3d 55, 151 Cal.Rptr. 547, 588 P.2d 249, expressly recognizes a county's section 3504 privilege not to "meet and confer" in relation to the Merits or necessity of any activity provided by law. (23 Cal.3d p. 63, 151 Cal.Rptr. 547, 549, 588 P.2d 249, 251.)

It will thus be seen that a county or city is required by the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act to "meet and confer" with employee representatives on wages, hours, and conditions of employment, Only in respect of such agreements and changes in its rules and regulations as it would be permitted By law to make or enter upon.

Los Angeles County Civil Service Com. v. Superior Court concerned no county or city charter amendment. There, a county charter established a civil service commission and gave that agency broad powers, including the authority to adopt and amend its own rules, but "only after public notice and hearing." The...