San Joaquin Deputy Sheriffs' Ass'n v. Cnty. of San Joaquin, CIV. S–12–1361 LKK/GGH.

• Decision Date: 24 September 2012
• Docket Number: No. CIV. S–12–1361 LKK/GGH.,CIV. S–12–1361 LKK/GGH.
• Citation: 898 F.Supp.2d 1177
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California
• Parties: SAN JOAQUIN DEPUTY SHERIFFS' ASSOCIATION; Kim Poeun, Plaintiffs, v. COUNTY OF SAN JOAQUIN; San Joaquin County Sheriff's Office; Steve Moore, Sheriff, in his official and individual capacities; and Does 1 through 100, inclusive, Defendants.

898 F.Supp.2d 1177

SAN JOAQUIN DEPUTY SHERIFFS' ASSOCIATION; Kim Poeun, Plaintiffs,

v.COUNTY OF SAN JOAQUIN; San Joaquin County Sheriff's Office; Steve Moore, Sheriff, in his official and individual capacities; and Does 1 through 100, inclusive, Defendants.

No. CIV. S–12–1361 LKK/GGH.

United States District Court,

E.D. California.

Sept. 24, 2012.

Christopher Wayne Miller, Mastagni, Holstedt & Amick, Sacramento, CA, for Plaintiffs.

Mark Emmett Berry, Mayall Hurley Knutsen Smith and Green, Stockton, CA, for Defendants.

ORDER

LAWRENCE K. KARLTON, Senior District Judge.

This case arises from a confrontation between Plaintiff Deputy Sheriff Kim Poeun and Defendant Sheriff Steve Moore that occurred on September 30, 2011, in the parking lot of the San Joaquin County Sheriff's Office. Plaintiffs bring this case pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Constitution for the State of California, California Government Code §§ 3303 and 3500, and tort law theories.¹

Pending before the court is Defendants' motion to dismiss, ECF No. 9, which Plaintiffs oppose, ECF No. 15. For the reasons provided herein, the court GRANTS, in part, and DENIES, in part, Defendants' motion.²

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background³

Beginning in 2006, Plaintiff Deputy Sheriff Kim Poeun (“Poeun”) was assigned to a position in the Patrol Division. At the time of the incident alleged herein, Poeun was assigned to transportation.

On or about September 30, 2011, at around 6:00 A.M., Poeun arrived in his personal vehicle for work at the San Joaquin County Sheriff's Office. As Poeun arrived, Defendant Sheriff Steve Moore (“Moore”) stopped his own vehicle behind Poeun. Moore ordered Poeun to approach him, and Poeun complied.

Moore then ordered Poeun to produce his driver's license and told him that he would be cited for speeding. Poeun responded that he did not have his driver's license. Moore ordered Poeun to surrender his car keys and to report to Moore's office at 9:00 A.M. the same day.

Poeun reported to Moore's office as ordered. At that time, Moore told Poeun that he had observed Poeun speeding as well as running a stop sign. Moore “interrogated Poeun about those alleged incidents but did not advise Poeun he was under investigation,” or “advise him of his rights.”

Before questioning Poeun about his alleged violations of the California Vehicle Code, Moore also “did not advise Poeun of his rights pursuant to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and the decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436[, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694] (1966).”

Moore ordered Poeun to issue himself a traffic citation admitting to violations of the California Vehicle Code. Poeun complied by issuing himself a citation for violations of California Vehicle Code sections 22450(a), failure to stop at a stop sign; 22350, basic speed law; and 12951(a), driver's license not in possession, with a date to appear in San Joaquin County Superior Court.

Moore returned Poeun's car keys to him during the 9:00 A.M. meeting, thus depriving Poeun of his keys for approximately three hours.

As ordered, Poeun provided the citation to the Sheriff's Office the same day.

Plaintiffs assert that Defendants violated Poeun's rights under the Fourth Amendment, the Fifth Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment (under both substantive and procedural due process theories), the Constitution of the State of California, and California Government Code §§ 3303(b), 3303(c), 3303(g), 3303(i), and 3500, et seq. Pls' Mot., ECF No. 5, at 5–12. Plaintiffs further assert claims for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Id. at 13–14. Plaintiffs seek actual damages, injunctive and declaratory relief, civil penalties, attorneys fees and costs, and “constitutional tort damages.” Id. at 13–15.

B. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss

On July 3, 2012, Defendants filed the motion to dismiss presently before the court, see Defs' Mot., ECF No. 9, which Plaintiffs oppose, Pls' Opp'n, ECF No. 15.

II. STANDARD FOR A MOTION TO DISMISS

A Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion challenges a complaint's compliance with the pleading requirements provided by the Federal Rules. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” The complaint must give defendant “fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (internal quotation and modification omitted).

To meet this requirement, the complaint must be supported by factual allegations. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1950, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). “While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint,” neither legal conclusions nor conclusory statements are themselves sufficient, and such statements are not entitled to a presumption of truth. Id. at 1949–50.Iqbal and Twombly therefore prescribe a two step process for evaluation of motions to dismiss. The court first identifies the non-conclusory factual allegations, and the court then determines whether these allegations, taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, “plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id.;Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007). ⁴

“Plausibility,” as it is used in Twombly and Iqbal, does not refer to the likelihood that a pleader will succeed in proving the allegations. Instead, it refers to whether the non-conclusory factual allegations, when assumed to be true, “allow[ ] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955). A complaint may fail to show a right to relief either by lacking a cognizable legal theory or by lacking sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir.1990).

III. ANALYSIS

A. The San Joaquin County Sheriff's Office as Defendant

Defendants argue that the San Joaquin County Sheriff's Office should be dismissed as a defendant because it is a subdivision of the County of San Joaquin (“County”) and “suing both the San Joaquin County Sheriff's Office and County is redundant.” Defs' Mot., ECF No. 9, Att. 1, at 12.⁵

A number of Plaintiffs' claims for relief are brought under the California Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act (“POBRA”). Cal. Govt. Code §§ 3300, et seq.Section 3309.5(a) of POBRA provides, “It shall be unlawful for any public safety department to deny or refuse to any public safety officer the rights and protections guaranteed to him or her by this chapter.” Cal. Govt. Code § 3309.5(a) (emphasis added). Because the statute explicitly provides that public safety departments are liable for violations of POBRA, and the court assumes that the San Joaquin County Sheriff's Office is a public safety department, the San Joaquin County Sheriff's Office is properly named as a defendant in this action.

Defendants' motion to dismiss the San Joaquin County Sheriff's Office as a named defendant therefore fails.

B. Moore's Entitlement to Qualified Immunity

Defendants argue that Moore is entitled to qualified immunity on all of Poeun's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims and should be dismissed as an individual defendant. Defs' Mot., ECF No. 9, Att. 1, at 12–14.

The doctrine of qualified immunity “protects government officials from ‘liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’ ” Tibbetts v. Kulongoski, 567 F.3d 529, 535 (9th Cir.2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982)). In Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001), the Supreme Court established a two-pronged inquiry for determining whether qualified immunity applies in a given situation: (1) whether the facts that a plaintiff has alleged or shown make out a violation of a constitutional right; and (2) whether the right at issue was “clearly established” at the time of the defendant's alleged misconduct. Id. at 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151 (citations omitted).⁶

Qualified immunity is applicable unless the official's conduct violated a clearly established constitutional right. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009). A right is clearly established only if “it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001).

If the court determines, however, that no constitutional violation occurred, the qualified immunity inquiry is at an end. Aguilera v. Baca, 510 F.3d 1161, 1167 (9th Cir.2007). The court addresses whether the facts as alleged make out a violation of a constitutional right in the following sections of this order, and when necessary, analyzes Moore's entitlement to qualified immunity.

C. Fourth Amendment Claim

Defendants argue that Poeun's Fourth Amendment claim fails because Moore had probable cause to stop Poeun for multiple violations of the vehicle code and because Moore's retention of Poeun's car keys was not so unreasonable as to constitute an illegal seizure. Defs' Mot., ECF No. 9, Att. 1, at 14–15.

At issue is whether the following incidents, as alleged, violated Poeun's Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures: (1) Moore's stop of Poeun; and (2) Moore's deprivation of Poeun's car keys.

i. Moore's Stop of Poeun

The Ninth Circuit has provided that, while “policemen, like teachers and lawyers, are not relegated to a watered-down version of...