San Miguel v. Nesco Redondo, S.E.
| Decision Date | 09 June 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. Civ. 04-1051JAF.,Civ. 04-1051JAF. |
| Citation | 394 F.Supp.2d 416 |
| Parties | Elena Pagan SAN MIGUEL, Plaintiffs, v. NECSO REDONDO, S.E., Redondo Entrecanales, S.E., American International Insurance Company of PR, Inc., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico |
Manuel Duran-Rodriguez, Manuel Duran Law Office, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiffs.
Carmen Lucia Rodriguez-Velez, Pedro J. Manzano-Yates, Fiddler Gonzalez & Rodriguez, P.S.C., Hato Rey, PR, Hector F. Oliveras-Delgado, Jeannette M. Lopez, Pinto-Lugo, Oliveras & Ortiz, PS, San Juan, PR, for Defendants.
Plaintiff, Elena Pagán San Miguel, filed the present complaint against Defendants Necso Redondo, S.E., Redondo Entrecanales, S.E., and American International Insurance Company of Puerto Rico, Inc. ("AIICO") alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e and 2000e-3 (2003 & Supp.2004); 29 P.R. LAWS ANN. §§ 194-194b (2001) ("Puerto Rico Law No. 115"); 29 P.R. LAWS ANN. § 185 et seq. (2001) ("Puerto Rico Law No. 80"); 29 P.R. LAWS ANN. § 146 (2001) ("Puerto Rico Law No. 100"); and 29 P.R. LAWS ANN. §§ 1321-1341 (2001) ("Puerto Rico Law No. 69"). Docket Document No. 1.
Defendant Necso/Redondo moves for summary judgment, Docket Document No. 20, and Plaintiff opposes the motion. Docket Document No. 40. Defendant AIICO also moves for summary judgment, Docket Document Nos. 29, 77, 78, and Plaintiff and Defendant Necso/Redondo oppose the motion. Docket Document Nos. 55, 58. Upon careful review of the pleadings, the submitted evidence, and applicable case law, we grant in part and deny in part Defendant AIICO's motion and grant in part and deny in part Defendant Necso/Redondo's motion.
Unless otherwise indicated, we derive the following factual summary from the complaint and the statements of facts submitted by the parties in their summary judgment and opposition motions. Docket Document Nos. 21, 31, 40, 55, 57, 65, 79, 80.
Plaintiff is a Puerto Rico resident and former employee of Defendants Necso Redondo, S.E. and Redondo Entrecanales, S.E.
Defendant Necso Redondo ("NR") was a partnership formed between Necso Entrecanales Cubiertas ("NEC"), a Spanish company, and Consorcio Redondo Construction ("CRC"), a Puerto Rican company. The managing partner of NR was NEC. NR was incorporated under Puerto Rico law to contract with the Puerto Rico Government to construct five Hato Rey Stations of the Tren Urbano Project including: Sagrado Corazón, Nuevo Centro, Roosevelt, Domenech, and Piñero (Judicial Center). One administrative office serviced the five stations.
Redondo Entrecanales ("RE") was a second partnership formed between the same parent companies. The managing partner of RE was CRC. RE was incorporated to construct three stations of the Tren Urbano Project: Centro Médico, Río Bayamón, and Villa Nevarez. RE had an administrative office in each of the three stations under its contracts.
On March 20, 2000, NEC bought CRC's share in the partnership of each company. NR and RE were "single employers" for the purpose of Plaintiff's complaint and will be referred to jointly as "Defendant Necso/Redondo."
Defendant AIICO was Defendant Necso/Redondo's insurer from April 22, 2002, to April 22, 2003.
Plaintiff began working for Defendant Necso/Redondo on June 18, 2001, as a clerk in the Hato Rey Project Administrative Office. In July 2001, Juan Luis Bustamante began working for Defendant Necso/Redondo as the Project Administrative Manager in the Hato Rey office.
In August 2001, Plaintiff arrived at work to find approximately twenty pages of pornographic material left in the printer dock. According to Plaintiff's allegations, Bustamante was the only person besides her with access to the computer. She believed that he was responsible for leaving the pornographic material in the printer, and reported the incident to the Human Resources director, Rosa Nieves.
Approximately two months later, in October 2001, Plaintiff overheard Bustamante, a Colombian citizen, refer to his co-workers, and Puerto Rican women in general, as a "bunch of prostitutes." Plaintiff reported the incident to Nieves, who relayed the report to Jacinto Piris, the controller and administrative manager of NR's Hato Rey Project. Soon thereafter, Plaintiff was relocated to the Río Bayamón Administrative Office. Deliana Vélez, the clerk at the Río Bayamón administrative office, was relocated to the Hato Rey project.
At the Río Bayamón office, Plaintiff worked alongside Aris Trinidad, a Puerto Rican woman. Within two weeks of joining the new project, Plaintiff heard Piris, a Spanish citizen, make offensive, threatening comments to Trinidad, saying that she "should not exist," and was a "dumb Puerto Rican." Over the course of the following four months, several incidents occurred wherein Piris lashed out at Trinidad and/or Plaintiff, calling them "stupid," denigrating their Puerto Rican origins, and making physically-threatening gestures. During an incident on or about January 31, 2002, Piris grabbed Trinidad's arm. As a result, Trinidad filed a police complaint against Piris. Piris returned without incident to the Río Bayamón office once or twice over the next four months.
On May 16, 2002, Plaintiff filed a discrimination complaint with the Puerto Rico Department of Labor's Anti-Discrimination Unit and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), and delivered a copy of the charge to Nieves' office. Four days later, on May 20, 2002, Plaintiff was terminated. The Río Bayamón office closed two months later because the project had reached completion.
Plaintiff filed the present complaint on January 27, 2004, alleging gender and national origin discrimination and retaliatory discharge. Docket Document No. 1. Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief, back pay, and compensatory, punitive and liquidated damages. Id.
On December 23, 2004, Defendant Necso/Redondo moved for summary judgment. Docket Document No. 20. On January 21, 2005, Plaintiff filed an opposition to the motion. Docket Document No. 40. Defendant Necso/Redondo filed a reply on February 14, 2005. Docket Document No. 66.
Defendant AIICO filed a separate motion for summary judgment on January 3, 2005. Docket Document No. 29. On January 27, 2005, Plaintiff filed an opposition. Docket Document No. 55. On January 28, 2005, Defendant Necso/Redondo also filed a motion in opposition to Defendant AIICO's summary judgment motion. Docket Document No. 58. On March 4, 2005, Defendant AIICO filed a separate reply to each opposition. Docket Document Nos. 77, 78.
Summary Judgment Standard Under Rule 56©
The standard for summary judgment is straightforward and well-established. A district court should grant a motion for summary judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56©. A factual dispute is "genuine" if it could be resolved in either party's favor, and "material" if it potentially affects the case's outcome. Calero-Cerezo v. United States Dep't of Justice, 355 F.3d 6, 19 (1st Cir.2004).
The moving party carries the burden of establishing that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). However, the burden "may be discharged by `showing'-that is, pointing out to the district court-that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." See id. at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The burden has two components: (1) an initial burden of production that shifts to the non-moving party if satisfied by the moving party; and (2) an ultimate burden of persuasion that always remains on the moving party. See id. at 331, 106 S.Ct. 2548.
The non-moving party "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse party's pleading, but ... must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e). Summary judgment exists "to pierce the boilerplate of the pleadings and assess the proof in order to determine the need for trial." Euromodas, Inc. v. Zanella, 368 F.3d 11, 17 (1st Cir.2004) (citing Wynne v. Tufts Univ. Sch. of Med., 976 F.2d 791, 794 (1st Cir.1992)).
Defendant AIICO moves for summary judgment on the grounds that the Financial Lines Employment Practices Liability Policy ("EPL") created a duty to indemnify Defendant Necso/Redondo, but not a duty to defend Defendant Necso/Redondo. Docket Document No. 29. Defendant AIICO also asserts that the insurance contract issued to Defendant Necso/Redondo does not extend coverage over Plaintiff's claims. Id.
Defendant AIICO first argues that the EPL terms do not create a duty to defend and, therefore, summary judgment is appropriate. Docket Document No. 77. Defendant Necso/Redondo agrees with this interpretation, but insists that we should deny Defendant AIICO's summary judgment motion because Defendant AIICO's duty to indemnify depends upon facts established at trial. Docket Document No. 58.
We find Defendant AIICO's assertion has no bearing on its liability under state law. Under Puerto Rico law, "[a]ny individual sustaining damages and losses shall have, at his option, a direct action against the insurer under the terms and limitations of the policy...." 26 P.R. LAWS. ANN. § 2003; see de Leon Lopez v. Corporacion Insular de Seguros, 742 F.Supp. 44, 47 (D.P.R.1990) ). That is to say, Puerto Rico law creates a substantive claim against an insurer separate and distinct from any claim that a plaintiff may have against an...
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