San Pedro Hotel Co., Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, s. 96-56627
| Citation | 159 F.3d 470 |
| Decision Date | 06 November 1998 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 96-56627,97-55053,s. 96-56627 |
| Parties | 14 NDLR P 23, 98 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 8271, 98 Daily Journal D.A.R. 11,480 SAN PEDRO HOTEL CO., INC., a California corporation; John Fentis, as trustee for the Fentis Family Marital Trust B; John M. Fentis, an individual; Pearle Fentis, an individual; Maria C. Fentis, an individual; John Fentis, as Trustee for the Fentis Family Survivor's Trust, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, a California municipal corporation; Rudy Svorinich, Jr., an individual, Defendants-Appellees. SAN PEDRO HOTEL CO., INC., a California corporation; John Fentis, as trustee for the Fentis Family Marital Trust B; as Trustee for the Fentis Family Survivor's Trust, and as an individual: Pearle Fentis; Maria C. Fentis, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit) |
William J. Davis, Amanda Vu Dwight (on briefs), Davis & Company, Irvine, CA, for plaintiffs-appellants.
Jess J. Gonzalez, Deputy City Attorney, Los Angeles, CA, for defendants-appellees.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Harry L. Hupp, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV-96-02325-HLH.
Before: WALLACE, TROTT and HAWKINS, Circuit Judges.
The San Pedro Hotel Company, Inc. and its owners, the Fentis family (collectively the "Fentises"), appeal the district court's dismissal of their action alleging claims under the Fair Housing Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631), 42 U.S.C. § 1983, state tort law, and tortious interference with prospective economic advantage. The Fentises allege the City of Los Angeles and an individual councilman (collectively the "City") discriminated against the mentally ill by interfering with the Fentises' sale of their hotel for the development of housing for the mentally disabled.
The Fentises owned a property in the San Pedro district of Los Angeles known as the "California Hotel." In June 1994, the Fentises entered into an agreement to sell the California Hotel to A Community of Friends ("ACOF"), a not-for-profit developer of housing accommodations primarily used to house the mentally disabled. The sale of property was contingent upon ACOF obtaining federal Although the money was to come from federal coffers, the City of Los Angeles was ultimately responsible for approving or rejecting the $1.3 million rehabilitation and acquisition loan to ACOF. Sometime after the proposed sale became public, several local groups, including the San Pedro Chamber of Commerce, expressed their opposition to the proposed redevelopment. The Fentises allege that this opposition had some influence upon Los Angeles City Councilman Rudy Svorinich, Jr. ("Svorinich"), councilman for the San Pedro area and Chairperson of the Housing and Community Redevelopment Committee of the Los Angeles City Council (the "Committee"). The Committee generally reviews proposed loans of this type and recommends to the City Council whether to approve such loans.
financing and an award of tax credits from the California State Tax Credit Allocation Committee. 1
On December 6, 1995, after reviewing the proposed San Pedro project, 2 the Committee passed upon but did not recommend approval of the loan to ACOF. 3 The Committee stated no reasons for its actions, but has subsequently stated that it held up the loan recommendation pending resolution of several issues (e.g., conformance with local community plan; educational links between the project and the community; and increased local community support).
Shortly after the Committee failed to recommend approval of the loan, John Fentis, as family spokesman, was quoted in a San Pedro newspaper as stating that the City had acted illegally by refusing to fund housing for the mentally ill and that his family would sue to obtain approval of the ACOF loan. Several weeks later, in early February, the City of Los Angeles Building and Safety Commissioner and several members of the City's "Slumhouse Task Force" 4 conducted an inspection of the California Hotel. 5 The investigators cited the Fentises for numerous building code violations in response to which the Fentises spent some $40,000 making repairs. 6
The Fentises' attorney then sent a letter to the entire City Council reiterating his clients' intention to sue the City to approve funding for the project. Receiving no satisfactory assurance that the City would approve the loan, the Fentises filed suit against the City and Svorinich. The complaint, filed one month after the Slumhouse Task Force inspection, alleged violation of the federal and state fair housing acts as well as constitutional claims. In addition to damages, the Fentises requested that the City and Svorinich be enjoined from interfering with the funding of a home to be used by the mentally ill.
Shortly after the filing of the complaint, the City re-inspected the California Hotel.
In addition to finding that the Fentises had not made "substantial progress" on previously cited problems, the investigators cited the Fentises for several new violations. At about the same time the City charged the Fentises with criminal slum offenses. 7
The Committee recommended approval of the ACOF loan shortly after which the full City Council approved the loan. ACOF then applied for and received a tax credit award adequate to complete the acquisition and renovation of the California Hotel as housing for the mentally disabled. As a result, the sale of the California Hotel to ACOF closed six months after the City's approval of the loan.
The Fentises elected to go forward with their claims notwithstanding the loan approval. On June 3, 1996, the district court dismissed the majority of the Fentises' complaint. 8 The district court ruled that the Fentises had no standing to complain of the interference by the City with the sale and renovation of the California Hotel either for damages or equitable relief. Believing that the Fentises might have standing to state a cause of action for retaliation under the Fair Housing Act, see 42 U.S.C. § 3617, the district court allowed the Fentises to amend their complaint to properly state a retaliation claim. In addition, the district court held that Councilman Svorinich was entitled to absolute immunity for his actions "as a councilman voting or persuading his colleagues to vote one way or another on approval of the loan to ACOF."
Over the next several months, the Fentises twice amended their retaliation claims. In response, Svorinich moved for and was granted summary judgment on the retaliation claim against him. At the same time, the district court dismissed the retaliation claim against the City with leave to amend and placed the City's motion for summary judgment on that claim "off calendar subject to later renewal."
After the Fentises had filed their second amended complaint, the City filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss (failure to state a claim). Attached to this motion was a memorandum of points and authorities in support thereof. Unlike the motion itself, this document also included, in parenthesis, the words "renewal of previously filed motion for summary judgment." The Fentises filed an opposing brief listing only the 12(b)(6) motion. The Fentises attached over 400 pages of documents to their brief. The City filed a reply brief in which it described its motion as a "motion to dismiss or in the alternative for summary judgment."
Although the City failed to comply with the Local Rules regarding summary judgment (e.g., it offered no "Statement of Uncontroverted Facts and Conclusions of Law" or proposed order as Local Rule 7.14.1 requires) on this motion, it had complied with those rules on its earlier summary judgment motion which it now sought to renew. In addition, the district court informed the Fentises that it had read the documents they submitted as part of their brief. The district court then denied the City's motion to dismiss, but granted its motion for summary judgment.
The Fentises appeal the five separate district court orders which, together, dismissed their entire lawsuit. The Fentises separately appeal the denial of their motion for costs and attorneys' fees as a prevailing party under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1988 and 3613(c), as well as under state law. That appeal has been consolidated with the Fentises' earlier appeal and all of the Fentises' claims are now before this court.
We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
We review de novo the district court's conclusion that the Fentises did not have The Act makes it unlawful to:
standing to sue under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (the "Act"). 9 See Johns v. County of San Diego, 114 F.3d 874, 876 (9th Cir.1997). We hold that this ruling was incorrect as a matter of law
discriminate in the sale or rental, or to otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any buyer or renter because of a handicap of that buyer or renter, a person residing or intending to reside in that dwelling after it is sold, rented or made available, or any person associated with that buyer or renter.
42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1). This act applies to municipalities, see Keith v. Volpe, 858 F.2d 467 (9th Cir.1988), as well as to health, safety, and land use regulations and policies. The Act provides for a private claim to those who are "aggrieved" by discriminatory conduct. 42 U.S.C. § 3613.
The Supreme Court has long held that claims brought under the Act are to be judged under a very liberal standing requirement. Unlike actions brought under other provisions of civil rights law, the plaintiff need not allege that he or she was a victim of discrimination. See Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 115, 99 S.Ct. 1601, 60 L.Ed.2d 66 (1979) (...
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