San Telmo Associates v. City of Seattle

• Decision Date: 16 April 1987
• Docket Number: No. 52978-7,52978-7
• Citation: 108 Wn.2d 20,735 P.2d 673
• Parties: SAN TELMO ASSOCIATES, et al., Respondents. v. CITY OF SEATTLE, Appellant.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

Page 20

108 Wn.2d 20

735 P.2d 673

SAN TELMO ASSOCIATES, et al., Respondents. v. CITY OF SEATTLE, Appellant.

No. 52978-7.

Supreme Court of Washington,

En Banc.

April 16, 1987.

Douglas N. Jewett, Seattle City Atty., James E. Fearn, Jr., Asst. Seattle, for appellant.

Foster, Pepper & Riviera, G. Richard Hill, Michael K. Vaska, Seattle, for respondents.

Stephen Fredrickson, Evergreen Legal Services, Janis P. Bianchi, Katherine R. McFaul, Susan J. Taoka, Barbara Wechsler, Seattle, amici curiae for appellant.

Before the court en banc.

DORE, Justice.

The City of Seattle challenges a trial court's order invalidating a Seattle ordinance restricting the demolition of low income housing. We affirm the trial court as we believe the ordinance imposes an unconstitutional tax on a limited number of property owners.

FACTS

In recent years, the supply of low income housing has steadily decreased in the Seattle downtown region. Seattle Municipal Code section 22.210.020(A)(2). The City has attempted to halt this trend by passing ordinances restricting the right of owners of low income housing to convert this residential property to nonresidential use. In 1980, the City adopted an ordinance which imposed a fee on low income housing owners if they attempted such a conversion. In 1983, however, San Telmo Associates, a limited partnership, successfully challenged this ordinance in King County Superior The City did not appeal the Superior Court ruling, and instead, enacted current SMC § 22.210 (hereinafter the Housing Preservation Ordinance) encompassing the same subject matter. This ordinance differs slightly from the invalidated ordinance. The current ordinance requires that in most cases, if an owner decides to demolish low income residential housing units and convert the property to nonresidential use, the owner must obtain a housing demolition license. SMC § 22.210.050. This license will be granted only if the owner gives the current tenants relocation notice and assistance and replaces a specified percentage of the low income housing with other suitable housing. SMC § 22.210.050(C) & (D). In lieu of providing replacement housing, the owner is given the option to contribute to the low income housing replacement fund. SMC § 22.210.120(A)(4).

Court as an invalid tax pursuant to RCW 82.02.020.

San Telmo, and another limited partnership, Twelve Hundred Five Associates, challenge this ordinance. San Telmo formerly owned some low income housing in downtown Seattle. After successfully challenging the first housing ordinance, it sold the property by a real estate contract to Twelve Hundred Five Associates. Both limited partnerships bring this action to invalidate the second ordinance. Both San Telmo and the City moved for summary judgment, and the King County trial court granted San Telmo's motion and denied the City's motion. The City appeals here.

COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL

San Telmo argues that because the first Housing Preservation Ordinance and the second ordinance are virtually identical, and the City failed to appeal the order invalidating the first ordinance, the City should be precluded from arguing for the validity of the second ordinance. San Telmo, in essence, is arguing that the City is collaterally estopped from relitigating this issue.

Collateral estoppel is appropriate only when the following four factors are present: (1) the issue decided in the prior adjudication is identical with the issue now before the

                court, (2) there was a final judgment on the merits, (3) the party against whom the plea is now asserted is a party or is in privity with a party to the prior adjudication, and (4) the application of the collateral estoppel doctrine will not work an injustice against the party against whom the doctrine is applied.   Rains v. State, 100 Wash.2d 660, 665, 674 P.2d 165 (1983).   In this case, the first requirement is not met.   There is no indication that the City attempted to adopt the second ordinance merely to avoid the trial court order invalidating the first ordinance;  rather, the second ordinance was specifically enacted with changes designed to cure the defects in the original ordinance.   We agree with the trial court that collateral estoppel does not apply
                

VALIDITY OF THE SECOND HOUSING PRESERVATION ORDINANCE

RCW 82.02.020 precludes cities from levying "any tax, fee, or charge, either direct or indirect ... on the development, subdivision, classification, or reclassification of land." Furthermore, while Const. art. 7, § 9 and Const. art. 11, § 12 authorize the Legislature to grant municipalities the power under certain conditions to levy taxes, there must be a specific legislative pronouncement allowing for the tax in order for the tax to be valid. Carkonen v. Williams, 76 Wash.2d 617, 627, 458 P.2d 280 (1969); Ivy Club Investors Partnership v. Kennewick, 40 Wash.App. 524, 699 P.2d 782, review denied, 104 Wash.2d 1006 (1985). Thus, the central focus of our inquiry is whether the new Housing Preservation Ordinance is a tax.

San Telmo claims that the ordinance imposes a tax because in order to demolish his low income housing, the owner must either make a "contribution" in cash to the low income housing replacement fund, or replace the low income housing with other suitable housing. Either option the owner selects requires a large expenditure of money for the public good, which San Telmo characterizes as a tax.

The City, to the contrary, claims that the ordinance's requirement that the low income housing sought to be The question of whether an ordinance is best described as a regulation or a tax is not a novel question. Recently, this court in Hillis Homes, Inc. v. Snohomish Cy., 97 Wash.2d 804, 650 P.2d 193 (1982) set forth a test which both...