Sanborn v. Boston & Maine R. R

• Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: YOUNG, J.
• Citation: Sanborn v. Boston & Maine R. R, 91 A. 865, 77 N.H. 307 (N.H. 1914)
• Decision Date: 02 June 1914
• Parties: SANBORN v. BOSTON & MAINE R. R.

91 A. 865

77 N.H. 307

SANBORN

v. BOSTON & MAINE R. R.

Supreme Court of New Hampshire. Merrimack County.

June 2, 1914.

Exceptions from Superior Court, Merrimack County; Pike, Judge.

Action by Crosby A. Sanborn against the Boston & Maine Bailroad. A motion for a new trial for newly discovered evidence was overruled, and the case transferred to the Supreme Court on exceptions. Overruled.

Motion for a new trial, on the ground of newly discovered evidence. The case is the same as that reported in 76 N. H. 523, 86 Atl. 157, where it was held that the evidence did not warrant the conclusion that the defendants had given the plaintiff to understand they would keep the spurs sharp upon the ladder which he was using at the time of his injury. The new evidence, in substance, was: (1) That it was the custom of the man in charge of the planer to sharpen the spurs; and (2) that other workmen who had occasion to use the ladder did so without making an examination of it. The superior court found that the plaintiff was not at fault in failing to offer the new evidence at the trial, and that such evidence, if relevant, was so remote and inconclusive that justice did not require the granting of a new trial, and denied the present motion, subject to the plaintiff's exception.

Bobert W. Upton, of Concord, for plaintiff. Streeter, Demond, Woodworth & Sulloway, of Concord, for defendant.

YOUNG, J. As the case is understood, the court found in effect that if a new trial were granted it would not change the result, because it would be the court's duty to exclude for remoteness the evidence by which the plaintiff seeks to sustain his contention. In other words, the court found that if the evidence on which the plaintiff relies is relevant to the issue of what the defendants gave their employé's to understand in respect to the sharpening of the spurs on the ladder, the inference that can be drawn from it is so uncertain and remote that it is more likely to prevent than to promote the discovery of the truth. It cannot be said that there is no evidence to support this finding.

There is no merit in the plaintiff's contention that the denial of his motion for a new trial is a violation of his right to "a certain remedy * * * for all injuries he may receive" (Bill of Bights, art. 14), or that the court's finding that if the new evidence is relevant it should be excluded on the ground of remoteness deprives him of his constitutional right to a jury trial. Bill of Bights, art....