Sanchez-Cuprill v. United States

• Decision Date: 20 January 2016
• Docket Number: CIVIL 14-1329CCC
• Citation: Sanchez-Cuprill v. United States, CIVIL 14-1329CCC (D. P.R. Jan 20, 2016)
• Parties: ABRAHAM SANCHEZ-CUPRILL Plaintiff v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Defendant
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

ABRAHAM SANCHEZ-CUPRILLPlaintiff v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICADefendant

CIVIL 14-1329CCC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

FILED: January 25, 2016

January 20, 2016

RelatedCr. 10-0325-01(CCC)

OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court is the Amended Motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 filed by PetitionerAbraham Sánchez-Cuprillpro se(hereinafter "Petitioner" or "Sánchez-Cuprill")(D.E. 2), his Memorandum in Support (D.E. 2-2), the Government's Response (D.E. 4), and Petitioner's Reply to the Government's Response (D. E. 6).For the reasons discussed below, the Court finds that the Amended Petition must be DENIED.Petitioner's request for an evidentiary hearing is also DENIED.

I.BACKGROUND

Petitioner Sánchez-Cuprill was charged along with two (2) other co-defendants in an eight-count Indictment¹(D.E. 3 in Cr. 10-0325CCC).Count One (1) charged: "On or about March 19, 2010, in the District of Puerto Rico and elsewhere within the jurisdiction of this Court, defendant: [1]Abraham Sánchez-Cuprill, did knowingly and intentionally attempt to possess with intent to distribute five (5) kilograms or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of cocaine, a Schedule II, Controlled Substance.All in violation of Title 21, United States Code, Section 846and841(a)(1)and (b)(1)(A)(ii)(II)."(D.E. 3at page 1 in Cr. 10-0325CCC).Count Two (2) charged: "Beginning in or around March 30, 2010, up to and including April 8, 2010, in the District of Puerto Rico and elsewhere within the jurisdiction of this Court, defendants: [1]Abraham Sánchez-Cuprill and an additional co-defendant, did knowingly and intentionally combine, conspire, confederate and agree together with each other, and others, both known and unknown to the Grand Jury, to commit an offense against the United States, that is: to possess with intent to distribute five (5) kilograms or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of cocaine; a Schedule II, Controlled Substance.All in violation of Title 21, UnitedStates Code, Sections 846and841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A)(ii)(II)."(D.E. 3at page 2 in Cr. 10-0325CCC).Count Three (3) charged: "On or about April 8, 2010, in the District of Puerto Rico and elsewhere within the jurisdiction of this Court, defendants: [1]Abraham Sánchez-Cuprill and an additional co-defendant, aided and abetted by each other, did knowingly and intentionally attempt to possess with intent to distribute five (5) kilograms or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of cocaine; a Schedule II, Controlled Substance.All in violation of Title 21, United States Code, Sections 846and841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A)(ii)(II)andTitle 18, UnitedStates Code, Section 2."(D.E. 3at pages 2-3 in Cr. 10-0325CCC).

On January 19, 2011, Petitioner, through his counsel, filed a Motion for Change of Plea (D.E. 53 in Cr. 10-0325CCC).On April 5, 2011, Sánchez-Cuprill's Plea Agreement with the government was filed.(D.E. 75, in Cr. 10-0325CCC).On April 5, 2011, Petitioner's Change of Plea Hearing was held.Petitioner proceeded to plead guilty only to Count Two (2) of the Indictment (D.E. 77 in Cr. 10-0325CCC).

On June 22, 2011, Sánchez-Cuprill's Pre Sentence Report was filed (D.E. 112 in Cr. 10-0325CCC).On March 29, 2012, Petitioner's Amended Pre Sentence Report, with complete mental heath history as previously instructed by the Court, was filed (D.E. 203 in Cr. 10-0325CCC).

On May 9, 2012, Sánchez-Cuprill's Sentencing Hearing was held.Petitioner was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of eighty four (84) months, a term of supervised release of four (4) years, a Special Monetary Assessment of one hundred ($100.00) dollars and a forfeiture of four thousand dollars ($4,000.00) dollars²(D.E. 209 in Cr. 10-0325CCC).

On May 15, 2012, Judgment was entered (D.E. 210 in Cr. 10-0325CCC).On May 24, 2012, Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal (D.E. 213 in Cr. 10-0325CCC).On April 30, 2013, the First Circuit court issued its Judgment in which it ordered that the appeal be voluntarily dismissed³(D.E. 332 in Cr. 10-0325CCC).Sánchez-Cuprill did not file a petition for writ of certiorari before the Supreme Court, therefore his conviction became final on July 29, 2013.⁴

On April 7, 2014, Sánchez-Cuprill signed his § 2255 Petition, as well as his Amended §2255 Petition, therefore the same is timely (D.E. 1andD.E. 2).As such, the case is ready for disposition by this Court.

II.DISCUSSION

In his § 2255Amended Petition and Memorandum in Support, Sánchez-Cuprill raised the following allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel:

(1) Defense counsel was ineffective for telling him to sign a plea agreement which contained false information.Counsel further assured, incorrectly, that he would not be held accountable for use of a dangerous weapon (D.E. 2at p. 4).

(2) Defense counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the Sentencing Guideline calculation which included an enhancement for possession of a dangerous weapon.Counsel did not provide Sánchez-Cuprill a copy of the Pre-Sentence Report (D.E. 2-2at p. 3).

(3) Additionally, Sánchez-Cuprill alleged that the sentencing enhancement of two (2) levels for possession of a dangerous weapon was imposed incorrectly by the Court as it is not supported by the facts (D.E. 2-2at p. 4).

In Petitioner's Reply to the United States Response, Sánchez-Cuprill, for the first time, raised two (2) additional issues:

(1) Ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to raise an entrapment defense (D.E. 6at p. 8) and

(2) Claim of actual and factual innocence (D.E. 6at p. 11).

Petitioner further requested an evidentiary hearing.

The Court will first address the claims raised by Sánchez-Cuprill in his Amended § 2255 Petition and Memorandum in support.

A.Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Standard

The standard for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied upon as having produced a just result.Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668(1984);Lema v. United States, 987 F.2d 48(1st Cir.1993).In order to succeed in a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Sánchez-Cuprill must show both incompetence and prejudice: (1)petitioner must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.Argencourt v. United States, 78 F.3d 14(1st Cir.1996);Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168(1986);Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364(1993).

Petitioner bears a "very heavy burden" in his attempt to have his sentence vacated premised on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.Argencourt v. United States, 78 F.3d 14, 16(1st Cir.1996);Lema v. United States, 987 F.2d 48, 51(1st Cir.1993).Even more so under the Strickland standard, where ineffective assistance occurs "only where, given facts known at the time, counsel's choice was so patently unreasonable that no competent attorney would have made it."United States v. Rodriguez, 675 F.3d 48, 56(1st Cir.2012), quotingTevlin v. Spencer, 621 F.3d 59, 66(1st Cir.2010), which in turn quotes Knight v. Spencer, 447 F.3d 6, 15(1st Cir.2006).

In order to successfully satisfy the first prong of the Strickland test, petitioner must show that "in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions [allegedly made by his counsel] were outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance."Tejeda v. Dubois, 142 F.3d 18, 22(1st Cir.1998)(citingStrickland, 466 U.S. at 690).Petitioner must overcome the "strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance."Smullen v. United States, 94 F.3d 20, 23(1 st Cir. 1996)(citingStricklandat 689).Finally, a court must review counsel's actions deferentially, and should make every effort "to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight."Argencourt v. United States, 78 F.3d at 16(citingStrickland, 466 U.S. at 689).

The second prong of the Strickland test, the element of prejudice, also sets the bar high."An error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment."Argencourt v. UnitedStates, 78 F.3d at 16(citingStrickland, 466 U.S. at 691).Petitioner must "prove that there is a reasonable probability that, but for his counsel's errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different."Knight v. United States, 37 F.3d 769, 774(1^st Cir.1994)(citingStrickland, 466 U.S. at 687).

This means that if petitioner is successful in showing deficiencies in his counsel's representation, he then must conclusively establish that those deficiencies led to a real prejudice against him in the criminal proceedings.Id. at 694.Sánchez-Cuprill has failed to meet the Strickland standard in all of his claims.

B.Ineffective Assistance of Counsel - Defense counsel was ineffective for telling Petitioner during plea discussions that the dangerous weapon sentencing enhancement would not be used against him.Thus convincing Petitioner to sign the plea agreement

Sánchez-Cuprill alleged that while discussing the Plea Agreement with his attorney, he told his counsel that there was a error in the sentencing guideline calculation.Petitioner pointed out that the two (2) level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) for possession of a dangerous weapon was wrong.Sánchez-Cuprill alleged that he told his attorney of the incorrectly applied enhancement and his attorney dismissed the same by informing him "don't worry they are not going to use that against you."(D.E. 2-2at p. 2).

Petitioner alleged that if were not for his counsel's supposed statement of not to worry he would not have signed the plea agreement as...