Sanchez-Mercedes v. Bureau of Prisons

CourtUnited States District Courts. United States District Court (Columbia)
Citation453 F.Supp.3d 404
Docket NumberCase No. 1:19-cv-00054 (TNM)
Parties Isael SANCHEZ-MERCEDES, Plaintiff, v. BUREAU OF PRISONS, et al., Defendants.
Decision Date10 April 2020

Isael Sanchez-Mercedes, Cresson, PA, pro se.

Marsha Wellknown Yee, U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia, Washington, DC, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

TREVOR N. McFADDEN, U.S.D.J.

Isael Sanchez-Mercedes, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se , alleges that he fell and suffered injuries six years ago after a correctional officer confiscated his cane. He also alleges that the Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") has failed to give him adequate medical care for these injuries. He seeks damages of $50 million from the BOP, the Department of Justice ("DOJ"), the officer who confiscated the cane, and a prison warden (collectively, the "Government").

The Court treats the Complaint as raising claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"), Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics , 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971), and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Government moves to dismiss all claims. The Court agrees with the Government that this District is the wrong venue for the FTCA claims, that it lacks personal jurisdiction over the Bivens defendants, and that any claims under § 1983 plainly fail.

The main issue here is whether to dismiss Sanchez-Mercedes's claims outright or transfer any of them to a proper venue. See 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). The Court concludes that transfer is not in the interest of justice, so it will grant the Government's motion and dismiss the Complaint.

I.

For this background, the Court relies on all filings—including declarations—as well as filings in an earlier federal suit that Sanchez-Mercedes brought. The Court looks beyond the Complaint for three reasons. First, the Government moves to dismiss on some grounds that permit the Court to look outside the pleadings. See infra Section II. Second, the Government's motion to dismiss encompasses a motion for partial summary judgment. See Mot. to Dismiss ("Defs.' Mot.") at 1–2 & n.1,1 ECF No. 11. Third, the Court must construe a pro se Complaint together with all the plaintiff's filings. Brown v. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc. , 789 F.3d 146, 152 (D.C. Cir. 2015). For its analysis, the Court will look outside the pleadings only when the law allows.

Sanchez-Mercedes has been a federal prisoner since 2007. Second Fornshill Decl. ¶ 3, ECF No. 22-1. For seven years, he was an inmate at the medium-security Federal Correctional Institution, Petersburg ("FCI Petersburg"). Id. ¶¶ 3–4. In 2012, he injured his knee

. Pl.'s Opp'n at 6, ECF No. 19. While awaiting surgery, he received a cane to help him walk. Id. He had permission to use the cane until August 2014. Pl.'s Opp'n Exs. at 5, ECF No. 19-1.

The incident at the heart of this suit occurred at FCI Petersburg on May 6, 2014. Compl. at 2, ECF No. 1. It involved a correctional officer who Sanchez-Mercedes identifies by surname only—Patterson. Id. Patterson "intercepted" Sanchez-Mercedes and asked him for his cane and identification. Pl.'s Opp'n Exs. at 3.2 After comparing the information on the cane with the identification that Sanchez-Mercedes provided, Patterson confiscated the cane. Id. Sanchez-Mercedes insisted that he needed his cane to walk up a flight of stairs to his prison cell. Id. But Patterson was unmoved. Id.

When Sanchez-Mercedes tried climbing the stairs to his cell without the cane, he fell onto his back. Id. Blood appeared in his mouth and on his shirt. Id. Two officials "came running up the stairs" with his cane. Id. They told him to go to his cell and wait there for medicine. Id. But no one came. Id.

The next day, Sanchez-Mercedes complained to another prison official about what happened. Id. The official summoned Patterson and asked why he had taken the cane. Id. Patterson responded that the cane "was full of dirt." Id.

Sanchez-Mercedes also requested medical attention. Id. The medical staff tended to him and gave him pain medicine for his back and shoulder. Id. at 3–4.

Three weeks later, Sanchez-Mercedes submitted a "Request for Administrative Remedy." Id. at 6. He demanded to know why Patterson had confiscated his cane. Id. at 2, 6. Prison officials investigated. Id. at 8. Warden Eric D. Wilson soon notified Sanchez-Mercedes of his decision. Id. He concluded that Patterson confiscated the cane because Sanchez-Mercedes failed to provide "proper medical documentation" for it. Id. Patterson's actions were thus "appropriate." Id. Wilson informed Sanchez-Mercedes that he could appeal this decision to the Mid-Atlantic Regional Director for the BOP. Id. Sanchez-Mercedes filed a "Regional Administrative Remedy Appeal." Id. at 7.

It is somewhat unclear what happened next with Sanchez-Mercedes's grievance. According to the Government, it "was reviewed and responded to by all three levels of review for the Federal Bureau of Prisons (Institution, Regional Office, and Central Office)." First Fornshill Decl. ¶ 4, ECF No. 11-3.3 According to an email exchange that Sanchez-Mercedes provides, the "Central Office"—the final level of review—received the grievance by December 2014. Pl.'s Opp'n Exs. at 17. Neither party has provided documentation showing when the Central Office made its decision.

In July 2014, while the grievance process was ongoing, Sanchez-Mercedes received his knee surgery at FCI Petersburg. Pl.'s Opp'n at 7; Second Fornshill Decl. ¶ 3. Two weeks later, the BOP transferred him to a different prison—FCI Danbury. Pl.'s Opp'n at 7; Second Fornshill Decl. ¶ 3. The reason for the transfer was "a reclassification to a lower security institution." Second Fornshill Decl. ¶ 4. While at FCI Danbury, Sanchez-Mercedes incurred an "assault disciplinary charge." Id. So in December 2016, the BOP transferred him to FCI Loretto. Id. ¶¶ 3–4. Then, in July 2019, the BOP moved him to FCI Loretto's adjacent camp after again reclassifying him to "a lower security level." Id.

Ever since his fall at FCI Petersburg, Sanchez-Mercedes has complained to medical staff at his prisons about the back and shoulder injuries he suffered. Pl.'s Opp'n at 7–8. He laments that it took the BOP two years to give him shoulder surgery. Id. at 7. And he has "consistently" demanded surgery for his back and spine. Id. at 7–8. As of July 2019, when he filed his opposition brief, he had not received this surgery. Id. at 8. But in a recent affidavit, he noted that BOP was "scheduling" surgery for a "spinal injury." Affidavit ¶ 3, ECF No. 23.

This is not his first foray into federal court. Back in April 2016, Sanchez-Mercedes—represented by counsel—sued in the District of Connecticut. Compl., Sanchez-Mercedes v. United States , No. 3:16-cv-560, 2017 WL 736869 (AWT) (D. Conn. 2017), ECF No. 1. He brought an FTCA claim, alleging that Patterson acted negligently when he confiscated the cane. Id. ¶¶ 3, 22. He sought $2 million in damages. Id. at 6.

The Government moved to dismiss. It pointed out that while the FTCA operates as a limited waiver of sovereign immunity for negligent conduct, it does not apply to certain claims. Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss at 5, Sanchez-Mercedes (D. Conn.), ECF No. 11-1. For example, it does not apply to a claim "based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty." Id. at 5–6 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) ). This is known as the "discretionary function exception." Id. The Government argued that Patterson's actions fell within this exception, and so it had immunity from suit. Id. at 4. Judge Alvin Thompson agreed and dismissed the Complaint under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Ruling at 1, 11, Sanchez-Mercedes (D. Conn.), ECF No. 14.

Nearly two years later, Sanchez-Mercedes brought this action against the BOP, the DOJ, Patterson, and Warden Wilson. Compl. at 1. His Complaint purports to bring claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deliberate indifference and violations of the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 3. He alleges two wrongs. First, he claims that Patterson unjustifiably confiscated his cane, causing him lasting injuries. Id. Second, he complains that the BOP has failed to provide adequate medical care for these injuries. Id. at 3–4. This inadequate medical care, he alleges, is an "ongoing situation." Pl.'s Opp'n at 5.

The Government moves to dismiss the Complaint on several grounds. Defs.' Mot. at 1–2. It also seeks partial summary judgment as an alternative reason to dismiss the second half of the Complaint. Id. at 1–2, 19–20.4

The Government's motions are ripe for disposition.

II.

In its motion to dismiss, the Government invokes Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), 12(b)(2), 12(b)(3), and 12(b)(6). Defs.' Mot. at 1–2.

To survive a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, a plaintiff must establish the Court's jurisdiction over his claims. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife , 504 U.S. 555, 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). The Court must "assume the truth of all material factual allegations in the complaint and construe the complaint liberally, granting plaintiff the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged." Am. Nat'l Ins. Co. v. FDIC , 642 F.3d 1137, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (cleaned up). The Court may also "consider materials outside the pleadings" in deciding this motion. Jerome Stevens Pharm., Inc. v. FDA , 402 F.3d 1249, 1253 (D.C. Cir. 2005). If the Court determines that it lacks jurisdiction as to any claim, it must dismiss that claim. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), 12(h)(3).

A motion under Rule 12(b)(2) concerns personal jurisdiction, which refers to a court's power over the defendants , rather than power over a plaintiff's claims. The plaintiff has "the burden of establishing a factual basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendant[s]." Crane v. N.Y. Zoological Soc'y , 894 F.2d 454, 456 (D.C. Cir. 1990). To do so, he "must allege specific acts connecting [each] defendant with...

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