Sanchez-Ravuelta v. Yavapai Cty.

• Docket Number: 2 CA-CV 2023-0059
• Decision Date: 03 April 2024
• Citation: 548 P.3d 347
• Parties: Victor SANCHEZ-RAVUELTA and Janette Dodge, a married couple, on behalf of themselves and their minor children, Elijah Sanchez and Amelia Sanchez, Plaintiffs/Appellants, v. YAVAPAI COUNTY, Town of Dewey-Humboldt, and State of Arizona, Defendants/Appellees. Victor Sanchez-Ravuelta and Janette Dodge, a married couple, on behalf of their minor children, Elijah Sanchez and Amelia Sanchez, Cross-Appellees, v. Town of Dewey-Humboldt, Cross-Appellant.
• Court: Arizona Court of Appeals

548 P.3d 347

Victor SANCHEZ-RAVUELTA and Janette Dodge, a married couple, on behalf of themselves and their minor children, Elijah Sanchez and Amelia Sanchez, Plaintiffs/Appellants,

v.YAVAPAI COUNTY, Town of Dewey-Humboldt, and State of Arizona, Defendants/Appellees.

Victor Sanchez-Ravuelta and Janette Dodge, a married couple, on behalf of their minor children, Elijah Sanchez and Amelia Sanchez, Cross-Appellees,

v.Town of Dewey-Humboldt, Cross-Appellant.

No. 2 CA-CV 2023-0059

Court of Appeals of Arizona, Division 2.

Filed April 3, 2024

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County, No. CV2022051670, The Honorable Melissa Iyer Julian, Judge.DISMISSED IN PART; AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED

Ahwatukee Legal Office P.C., Phoenix, By David L. Abney and Amara & Associates LLC, Phoenix, By Amara Edblad, Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants/Cross-Appellees

Wieneke Law Group PLC, Tempe, By Kathleen L. Wieneke, Laura Van Buren, and Jacob A. Weld, Counsel for Defendant/Appel- lee Yavapai County

Doyle Hernandez Millam, Phoenix, By William H. Doyle, Brandon D. Millam, and Nathan R. Andrews, Counsel for Defendant/Appellee/Cross-Appellant Town of Dewey-Humboldt

Kristin K. Mayes, Arizona Attorney General, By Lawrence V. Robertson, Assistant Attorney General, Tucson, and Daniel P. Schaack, Assistant Attorney General, Phoenix, Counsel for Defendant/Appellee State of Arizona

Judge Eckerstromauthored the opinion of the Court, in which Judge Kellyconcurred and Presiding Judge Eppich concurred in part and dissented in part.

OPINION

ECKERSTROM, Judge:

¶1PlaintiffsVictor Sanchez-Ravuelta and Janette Dodge appeal from the dismissal of their personal-injury-related claims against defendantsYavapai County, the Town of Dewey-Humboldt, and the State of Arizona.¹The town cross-appeals the superior court’s partial grant of the plaintiffs’ motion for new trial.For the following reasons, we dismiss the town’s cross-appeal and affirm the court’s dismissal of plaintiffs’ claims for failing to provide a proper notice of claim.We reverse the court’s dismissal of plaintiffs’ claim of gross negligence by the Arizona State Department of Liquor Licenses, and we remand for further proceedings as to that claim.

Factual and Procedural Background

¶2 On appeal from the grant of a motion to dismiss, we take the facts alleged in the complaint as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs.Mintz v. Bell Atl. Sys. Leasing Int’l, Inc.,183 Ariz. 550, 552, 905 P.2d 559, 561(App.1995).The complaint alleges that in April 2021, David Browne caused a multi-vehicle collision at an intersection on State Route 69 in the Town of Dewey-Humboldt in Yavapai County.After leaving the parking lot of Billy Jack’s Saloon and Grill, a bar, Browne stopped at a stop sign and then pulled his vehicle into traffic.Browne struck the passenger side of a passing vehicle, causing it to spin and collide with the plaintiffs’ vehicle.As a result, the plaintiffs suffered serious physical and emotional injuries.Browne had a blood alcohol concentration of more than .30 at the time of the accident.

¶3The plaintiffs brought the present lawsuit claiming the defendants had collectively breached their duties to warn of the unreasonably dangerous and hazardous intersection; the state had breached its duty to enforce Browne’s suspended license, court-ordered interlock, and court-ordered incarceration for Browne’s previous driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI) convictions;² and the state had breached its duty to take reasonable measures to prevent Billy Jack’s from creating hazardous conditions by overserving its customers.The plaintiffs also asserted a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress as to all defendants.

¶4The defendants each moved to dismiss the complaint arguing, in part, that the notices of claim they had received were defective.³The state also argued that it owed no duty to the plaintiffs to prevent Billy Jack’s from creating hazardous conditions by overserving customers.After oral argument on the motions, the superior court entered an unsigned under-advisement ruling dismissing all of the plaintiffs’ claims.It found that the notices of claim did not contain sufficient facts as to any of the claims except those against the state relating to its duty to prevent Billy Jack’s from creating hazardous conditions.As to those claims, the court found the state owed no duty to the plaintiffs to "prevent drunk drivers from causing collisions."

Jurisdiction

A.Plaintiffs’ Appeal

[1]¶5 The town challenges our jurisdiction to hear the plaintiffs’ appeal, arguing it "should be denied as untimely due to the procedural irregularities introduced by Plaintiffs."We also have an independent duty to determine whether we have jurisdiction to entertain an appeal.Sorensen v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Ariz.,191 Ariz. 464, 465, 957 P.2d 1007, 1008(App.1997).

¶6 After the superior court dismissed all of the plaintiffs’ claims, the minor plaintiffs filed a series of motions, countered by the defendants, litigating whether various claims should have been dismissed with or without prejudice.That litigation ultimately resulted in the court entering four different final judgments, each purporting to amend the previous judgment.

¶7 The town argues that the plaintiffs’ notice of appeal from the second purported final judgment was operative because, by not addressing the motion for new trial, that judgment denied the motion by operation of law.They further argue that because jurisdiction transferred to the court of appeals at that point, any further orders by the superior court were void, and the plaintiffs’ failure to pursue that appeal is fatal to their present appeal by making it untimely.We disagree.

[2, 3]¶8 A superior court’s failure to rule on a motion may constitute a denial of that motion by operation of law.SeePearson v. Pearson,190 Ariz. 231, 237, 946 P.2d 1291, 1297(App.1997)(failure to rule on fee request);State v. Hill,174 Ariz. 313, 323, 848 P.2d 1375, 1385(1993)(failure to rule on motion to strike presentence report).However, the second purported final judgment was based on the town’s proposed form of judgment, which had been filed nineteen days before the plaintiffs filed their motion for new trial.Furthermore, the court explicitly stated in a subsequent order that it had "inadvertently entered" a final judgment "without realizing that an appeal-tolling motion for new trial had been filed."We therefore cannot conclude that the second purported final judgment denied the plaintiffs’ motion for new trial by operation of law.Further, this time-extending motion was still pending when the plaintiffs filed their notice of appeal.Thus, the appeal was premature and effectively suspended until the motion was decided.SeeAriz. R. Civ. App. P. 9(e).

[4]¶9We also disagree with the town that we lack jurisdiction because the plaintiffs failed to provide us notice that a motion was still pending before the superior court.SeeAriz. R. Civ. App. P. 9(e)(2)(notice of pending time-extending motion must be given to court of appeals when appellate case number assigned under Rule 12, Ariz. R. Civ. App. P.).In this case, the appellate clerk issued the notice regarding assignment of a case number pursuant to Rule 12 on January 5, 2023.At that time, the motion for new trial was pending, and the superior court had issued its order vacating the second purported final judgment.As those proceedings were part of the record at the time we received it, we see no reason to have required the appellant to provide separate notice.The record itself gave this court notice of the pending motion.Indeed, in view of the superior court having vacated its earlier purported final judgment, that court could have dismissed the appeal.SeeAriz. R. Civ. App.P. 26.

[5, 6]¶10 Shortly after the Rule 12 notice, the superior court entered its third final judgment, which disposed of the plaintiffs’ motion for new trial.The court properly certified the third final judgment under Rule 54(b) because although the adult plaintiffs’ claims were dismissed with prejudice, the minor plaintiffs’ claims were all dismissed without prejudice, and thus, there was no final judgment as to the minor plaintiffs’ claims.See, e.g., Grand v. Nacchio,214 Ariz. 9, ¶ 12, 147 P.3d 763(App.2006)(dismissal without prejudice not appealable final judgment);Osuna v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,214 Ariz. 286, ¶ 11, 151 P.3d 1267(App.2007)(similar).The time for the plaintiffs to file a notice of appeal therefore began when the court entered the third final judgment.Because the plaintiffs filed a timely notice from that judgment, their appeal is not defeated on the basis of timeliness.SeeAriz. R. Civ. App. P. 9(a), (e)(1)(D).As such, we have jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ appeal.

B.The Town’s Cross-Appeal

[7]¶11 Although the plaintiffs do not challenge our jurisdiction over the town’s cross-appeal, we have an independent duty to evaluate our jurisdiction.SeeSorensen,191 Ariz. at 465, 957 P.2d at 1008.A notice of cross-appeal must be filed "no later than 20 days after appellant’s filing of a notice of appeal, or 30 days after entry of the judgment from which the appeal is taken, whichever is later."Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 9(b).As noted above, the plaintiffs perfected their appeal by filing a notice of appeal from the third final judgment.The superior court therefore lost jurisdiction, and the fourth purported final judgment it entered was void because it was not in furtherance of the appeal.SeeIn re Marriage of Johnson & Gravino,231 Ariz. 228, ¶ 6, 293 P.3d 504(App.2012).The town did not file a notice of cross-appeal in this matter until after the plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal from the void, fourth judgment.Because the notice of cross-appeal was filed thirty-four days after the plaintiffs’ operative notice of appeal and sixty-three days...