Sanchez v. Balderrama

Decision Date08 February 2017
Docket NumberNo. 08–15–00088–CV,08–15–00088–CV
Citation546 S.W.3d 230
Parties Martha H. SANCHEZ, Appellant, v. Hugo C. BALDERRAMA and Merika H. Sanchez, Appellees.
CourtTexas Court of Appeals

Hon. David Trosman for Appellant.

Hon. Darrell W. Corzine, Hon. Michael B. McKinney, for Appellee.

Before McClure, C.J., Rodriguez, and Hughes, JJ.

OPINION

ANN CRAWFORD McCLURE, Chief Justice

Martha Sanchez sued her daughter, Merika Sanchez and Hugo Balderrama for negligence in connection with an automobile accident that occurred on January 25, 2010. After a three-day jury trial, the jury found both Balderrama and Merika negligent and apportioned 40% responsibility to Balderrama and 60% to Merika. The jury also awarded Martha $1,000 for past physical pain and mental anguish. Martha filed a motion for new trial which the trial court denied. This appeal follows.

FACTUAL SUMMARY
The Accident

On January 25, 2010, the rear of Balderrama's pickup truck collided with the front of Merika's pickup truck on the street near Balderrama's home. Balderrama was driving alone while Martha and Merika's two-year old son were passengers in Merika's pickup truck at the time. The parties disagreed on how the accident occurred. Balderrama testified that he backed out of his driveway and onto the street and then traveled south on NW 2nd Street. He was about halfway down his block when Merika's pickup truck struck his truck from behind. Once he backed out of his driveway and put his car in drive to proceed southbound, he did not put his truck in reverse again. He also testified that he was not on his cellphone at any time prior to the accident. According to Merika, as she turned left onto NW 2nd Street, she noticed Balderrama's truck moving forward down the street. He stopped his truck, put it in reverse and backed up towards her car. When Merika saw Balderrama backing up, she placed her car in park and honked her horn.

Seatbelt Use

During trial, Merika recalled that Martha complained of chest pain at the scene of the accident and had bruises on her chest. Martha similarly testified that her chest pain was a result of the accident, specifically because of the seat belt she wearing at the time of the impact. She also insisted that her chest never hit the dashboard. However, the investigating officer testified that the accident report revealed that Merika was wearing her seatbelt at the time of the collision but Martha was not.

Martha's Injuries

After the collision, an ambulance transported Martha to the Permian Regional Medical Center. She told hospital personnel that she felt pain in her left foot, left ankle, right knee, back, and chest. Upon arrival, her pain was so severe that she could hardly stand the stabbing pains. The hospital records indicated that Martha's pain was only "mild." The hospital x-rays revealed she had a broken left foot.

Upon discharge, the hospital gave Martha a boot to wear on her left foot as well as a pair of crutches. She declined to use a wheelchair to transport herself from the hospital to her car. Martha testified that she wore the boot on her left foot for approximately three to four months after the accident. Chiropractor Gregory Young, who treated Martha approximately two months, testified that his records indicated she was not wearing a boot for her first appointment. The hospital also recommended that Martha follow up with an orthopedic podiatrist for her foot, but Martha failed to do so because she could not afford it. Martha explained that she tried to seek medical attention but was unsuccessful because doctors would not accept her as a patient because she was without insurance and lacked sufficient resources to pay for her appointments. On cross-examination, Martha admitted that in fact she had medical insurance which paid her hospital bill after the accident. She also has high blood pressure

, is under the care of a physician, and has taken medication for her condition for many years. Martha's son and Merika help Martha pay for her high blood pressure treatment, but she did not ask them to help her pay for treatment for the injuries she sustained in the accident.

Chiropractor Young agreed to treat Martha's injuries from the accident for $10 per visit. At trial, Martha discussed how her visits with Young failed to alleviate any of the pain she experienced and she left her last appointment with Young with pain in her left ankle, right knee, and right ankle. She specifically noted that during her last visit, on a scale of 1–10, her pain was still between a 5 and a 7. In her deposition, Martha admitted that her knee had not bothered her since her final visit with Young and that Young's treatment overall did help her feel better. Young also discussed how well Martha's final appointment went and how she expressed that she was ready to terminate her treatment with him. Young conducted a final examination and concluded that Martha had a full range of motion in her left foot; she was able to walk on her tip toes across his room without any pain, which is indicative of ankle stability; neither ankle exhibited pain or swelling; her gait was normal; and she had full strength and function in her peroneal tendons. Usually a person that suffers from an ankle injury

experiences pain while trying to walk on tip toes. Young then advised Martha to return for an appointment in the event her pain recurred. Martha never returned for treatment. Martha filed negligence claims against both Balderrama and Merika. Throughout the trial, Martha maintained that Merika in no way caused the accident, and that it was solely Balderrama who was at fault. Nonetheless, she explained that she sued her daughter so that a jury could hear both versions of the accident, rather than hearing only Balderrama's version of events.

ADMISSION OF SEATBELT EVIDENCE
Standard of Review

We review a trial court's rulings on the admission or exclusion of evidence under an abuse of discretion standard. Broders v. Heise , 924 S.W.2d 148, 151–52 (Tex. 1996). A person seeking to reverse a judgment based on evidentiary error need not prove that but for the error a different judgment would necessarily have been rendered, but only that the error probably resulted in an improper judgment. TEX.R.APP.P. 61.1 ; Nissan Motor Co. Ltd. v. Armstrong , 145 S.W.3d 131, 144 (Tex. 2004) ; City of Brownsville v. Alvarado , 897 S.W.2d 750, 753 (Tex. 1995) ; McCraw v. Maris , 828 S.W.2d 756, 758 (Tex. 1992) ; King v. Skelly , 452 S.W.2d 691, 696 (Tex. 1970). A successful challenge to evidentiary rulings usually requires the complaining party to show that the judgment turns on the particular evidence excluded or admitted. See GT & MC, Inc. v. Texas City Ref., Inc. , 822 S.W.2d 252, 257 (Tex.App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ. denied) ; Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co. v. Middleman , 661 S.W.2d 182, 185 (Tex.App.–San Antonio 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

We review the entire record, and require the complaining party to demonstrate that the judgment turns on the particular evidence admitted. Armstrong , 145 S.W.3d at 144 ; Interstate Northborough P'ship v. State , 66 S.W.3d 213, 220 (Tex. 2001) ; Tex. Dep't of Transp. v. Able , 35 S.W.3d 608, 617 (Tex. 2000). Whether erroneous admission of evidence is harmful is more a matter of judgment than precise measurement. Armstrong , 145 S.W.3d at 144. We may also consider the amount of emphasis placed on the erroneous evidence. Id.

Did Martha Open the Door?

In her first point of error, Martha alleges that the trial court erred when it admitted evidence as to whether she was wearing her seat belt at the time of the collision. She almost exclusively relies on Nabors Well Service, Ltd. v. Romero , 456 S.W.3d 553 (Tex. 2015) to support her theory that the only time a party's non-use of a seat belt can be relevant is when there is expert testimony to prove that the failure to use a seat belt was a proximate cause of injuries. In response, both Appellees argue that Martha waived her right to complain about the admission of the seat belt evidence on appeal because she first introduced it at trial by way of an accident investigation report and her own testimony. Additionally, Balderrama maintains that he was entitled to raise evidence of seat belt usage, despite the fact that the trial court ultimately declined to submit to the jury an issue concerning Martha's seat belt usage.

The law is clear that "[a] party on appeal should not be heard to complain of the admission of improper evidence offered by the other side, when he, himself, introduced the same evidence or evidence of a similar character." Varel Mfg. Co. v. Acetylene Oxygen Co. , 990 S.W.2d 486, 499 (Tex.App.–Corpus Christi 1999, no pet.) ; Pojar v. Cifre , 199 S.W.3d 317, 336–37 (Tex.App.–Corpus Christi 2006, pet. denied) ("A party on appeal may not object to the admission of incompetent evidence that he offered or brought out that related to an issue which he first injected into the case."); McInnes v. Yamaha Motor Corp. , 673 S.W.2d 185, 188 (Tex. 1984) ; Pouncy v. Garner , 626 S.W.2d 337, 340 (Tex.App.–Tyler 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.) ; Hughes v. State , 302 S.W.2d 747, 750 (Tex.App.–Eastland 1957, writ ref'd. n.r.e.). The record reflects that Martha was not only the first to discuss to the use of her seat belt, but she also introduced, at a pre-trial hearing, the accident investigator's report indicating that she was not wearing her seat belt at the time of the accident. We must conclude that Martha waived any error concerning the admission of the seat belt evidence. See McInnes , 673 S.W.2d at 187–88 ; Varel Mfg. , 990 S.W.2d at 499 ; Pouncy , 626 S.W.2d at 340 ; Hughes , 302 S.W.2d at 750.

Even if Martha had properly preserved the issue for our review, we find her argument without merit. In Romero , the Supreme Court responded to legislative changes and overruled decades of case law which had previously held that a plaintiff's failure to use a seat belt is inadmissible in automobile accidents. 456 S.W.3d at 555. The court held...

To continue reading

Request your trial
15 cases
  • United Rentals N. Am., Inc. v. Evans
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • August 18, 2020
    ...and suffering is inherently difficult because the alleged injury is a subjective, unliquidated, pecuniary loss. Sanchez v. Balderrama , 546 S.W.3d 230, 237 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2017, no pet.) ; SunBridge Healthcare Corp. v. Penny , 160 S.W.3d 230, 248 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2005, no pet.). The ......
  • Sarah Gregory & New Prime, Inc. v. Chohan
    • United States
    • Texas Supreme Court
    • June 16, 2023
    ... ... 372, 375 (1877). Not until comparatively recently did ... our precedent depart from this rule. In 1983, our decision in ... Sanchez v. Schindler departed from the common ... law's traditional teaching about the difficulty of ... assigning a dollar value to ... prejudice, or improper motive, or is so excessive so as to ... shock the conscience." E.g. , Sanchez v ... Balderrama , 546 S.W.3d 230, 237 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2017, ... no pet.). Though our decisions in Parkway , ... Saenz , and Bentley augment that ... ...
  • Howe v. Howe
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • April 11, 2018
    ...under an abuse of discretion standard. Broders v. Heise , 924 S.W.2d 148, 151-52 (Tex. 1996) ; Sanchez v. Balderrama , 08-15-00088-CV, 546 S.W.3d 230, 234-35, 2017 WL 511887, at *2 (Tex.App.—El Paso Feb. 8, 2017, no pet.). We dispose of the authentication objection because it was not raised......
  • Press Energy Servs., LLC v. Ruiz
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • July 16, 2021
    ...may prove pain and mental anguish with his testimony or other evidence, including circumstantial evidence. See Sanchez v. Balderrama , 546 S.W.3d 230, 238 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2017, no pet.). "In the absence of direct evidence of pain, the jury is permitted to infer the occurrence of pain fro......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT