Sanchez v. City of Littleton

• Decision Date: 30 September 2020
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 19-cv-01871-PAB-MEH
• Citation: 491 F.Supp.3d 904
• Parties: Marta SANCHEZ, the Estate of Stephanie Lopez, and Dominic Martinez, Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF LITTLETON, Doug Stephens, Police Chief of Littleton, in his official capacity, Anthony Guzman, individually, Luke McGrath, individually, Joseph Carns, individually, City of Englewood, John Collins, Police Chief of Englewood, in his official capacity, and Brian Martinez, individually, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Colorado

491 F.Supp.3d 904

Marta SANCHEZ, the Estate of Stephanie Lopez, and Dominic Martinez, Plaintiffs,

v.CITY OF LITTLETON, Doug Stephens, Police Chief of Littleton, in his official capacity, Anthony Guzman, individually, Luke McGrath, individually, Joseph Carns, individually, City of Englewood, John Collins, Police Chief of Englewood, in his official capacity, and Brian Martinez, individually, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 19-cv-01871-PAB-MEH

United States District Court, D. Colorado.

Signed September 30, 2020

James J. Gende, II, Gende Law Office SC, Pewaukee, WI, Robert E. Barnes, Barnes Law LLP, Los Angeles, CA, David J. Lang, Judge Lang & Katers LLC, Wauwatosa, WI, for Plaintiffs.

Eric Michael Ziporin, SGR, LLC, Joseph David Williams, Legal Solutions LLC, Denver, CO, David James Goldfarb, Josh Adam Marks, Berg Hill Greenleaf & Ruscitti LLP, Boulder, CO, for Defendants.

ORDER

PHILIP A. BRIMMER, Chief United States District Judge This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ Partial Motion to Dismiss [Docket No. 61] filed by defendants the City of Littleton, Douglas Stephens, Anthony Guzman, Luke McGrath, and Joseph Carns (collectively, the "Littleton defendants") and Defendants City of Englewood, John Collins, and Brian Martinez's Motion for Partial Dismissal [Docket No. 62] filed by defendants the City of Englewood, John Collins, and Brian Martinez (collectively, the "Englewood defendants"). Plaintiffs responded to both motions, see Docket Nos. 74 and 72, to which the Littleton defendants and the Englewood defendants replied. See Docket Nos. 76 and 77, respectively.

I. BACKGROUND¹

On June 29, 2017,² the Littleton Police Department received a report that a vehicle had been stolen from a Dunkin Donuts in Littleton, Colorado. Docket No. 54 at 7, ¶ 34. Littleton police officers observed what they believed to be the stolen car at various times that evening: defendant Luke McGrath observed what he suspected to be the stolen car at a gas station located on Santa Fe Drive, while defendant Joseph Carns observed the same vehicle traveling northbound on Santa Fe Drive. Id. at 2, ¶¶ 3-4. The vehicle in question was occupied by plaintiffs: Marta Sanchez was driving, Stephanie Lopez was in the front passenger seat, and Dominic Martinez was in the back seat. Id. , ¶ 6.

Defendant Carns pulled his patrol car in behind plaintiffs’ vehicle and followed it. Id. , ¶ 4. After defendant Anthony Guzman received a radio command from the Littleton Police Commander to pursue the vehicle, he fell in behind defendant Carns’ patrol car and followed the vehicle. Id. , ¶ 5. Defendant McGrath followed behind defendant Guzman in his marked car. Id. at 8, ¶ 38. After requesting permission to do so, defendant Carns executed a precision immobilization technique ("PIT") maneuver to stop plaintiffs’ vehicle, striking the rear end of plaintiffs’ vehicle and causing it to spin and come to a stop on Santa Fe Drive. Id. at 2-3, ¶ 7; id. at 8, ¶ 42.

Defendant Guzman got out of his car and drew his pistol. Id. at 8, ¶ 44. He walked toward plaintiffs’ stopped vehicle and shot into the vehicle at least nine times without giving a warning and without being in imminent danger. Id. Defendants Carns and McGrath also left their vehicles and each fired shots into plaintiffs’ stopped vehicle without giving a warning or being in imminent danger; McGrath fired at least seven shots into the vehicle. Id. at 9, ¶¶ 46-47. As defendants shot into plaintiffs’ vehicle, plaintiffs did not move their vehicle, did not use their vehicle as a weapon, and did not use or display any firearms. Id. , ¶ 48.

Plaintiffs "started their vehicle slowly" and proceeded to drive away while defendant Guzman fired at the vehicle. Id. , ¶¶ 49-51. Defendants Guzman, Carns, and McGrath followed plaintiffs’ vehicle down the street; Guzman conducted another PIT maneuver on plaintiffs’ vehicle, which caused the vehicle to come to a rest on Bannock Street. Id. at 9-10, ¶¶ 51-55. At this point, plaintiff Martinez, who had a gunshot wound

to his leg, jumped out of the car. Id. at 10, ¶¶ 53-54; id. at 12, ¶ 70.³

While plaintiffs’ vehicle was stopped, defendant Carns fired his gun at least five times into the vehicle without warning and without fearing for his own safety. Id. at 3, ¶ 11; id. at 10-11, ¶¶ 58, 60. Defendant Guzman did the same, shooting his gun into plaintiffs’ car without warning and without being in imminent danger. Id. at 10, ¶ 56. Plaintiff Sanchez then placed the car in reverse and drove south on Bannock. Id. , ¶ 57. Defendant Guzman followed plaintiffs’ vehicle in his patrol car and collided with it, causing plaintiffs’ vehicle to strike a pole, rendering it inoperable. Id. at 3, ¶ 12; id. at 11, ¶¶ 61-62. Defendant Guzman then fired at least 21 shots into plaintiffs’ vehicle. Id. , ¶¶ 62-63.

Defendant Brian Martinez of the Englewood Police Department arrived on the scene after plaintiffs’ vehicle had struck the pole and been rendered inoperable. Id. , ¶ 64. Martinez fired several shots into plaintiffs’ vehicle. Id. , ¶ 65. Defendant Martinez then noticed that Sanchez was holding her hands up and shouted to Guzman to hold his fire. Id. at 12, ¶ 67. Sanchez had held her hands up during each of the three separate stops. Id. , ¶ 68. Martinez had his hands up during the first stop. Id. at 8, ¶ 45.

Plaintiff Sanchez suffered fourteen bullet wounds

from defendants’ gunshots, which left her paralyzed. Id. , ¶ 69. Plaintiff Lopez suffered several gunshot wounds, one of which was a fatal gunshot wound to her head. Id. at 4, ¶ 15. Collectively, at least 44 shell casings were found at the scenes of the stops. Id. at 12, ¶ 71.

Plaintiffs – Sanchez, Dominic Martinez, and the Estate of Stephanie Lopez ("the Estate") – assert four claims for relief: (1) a § 1983 excessive force claim in violation of plaintiffs’ Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights against defendants Guzman, McGrath, Carns, and Martinez;⁴ (2) a § 1983 Monell claim against defendants Stephens, Collins, Littleton, and Englewood; (3) a negligence claim against all defendants; and (4) a wrongful death claim by the Estate against defendants Guzman, McGrath, Carns, and Martinez. Id. at 13-20. Defendants move for partial dismissal of plaintiffs’ claims. Docket No. 61; Docket No. 62.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint must allege enough factual matter that, taken as true, makes the plaintiff's "claim to relief ... plausible on its face." Khalik v. United Air Lines , 671 F.3d 1188, 1190 (10th Cir. 2012) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). "[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has not shown – that the pleader is entitled to relief." Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (internal quotation marks and alteration marks omitted); see also Khalik , 671 F.3d at 1190 ("A plaintiff must nudge [his] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible in order to survive a motion to dismiss." (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955 )). If a complaint's allegations are "so general that they encompass a wide swath of conduct, much of it innocent," then plaintiff has not stated a plausible claim. Khalik , 671 F.3d at 1191 (quotations omitted). Thus, even though modern rules of pleading are somewhat forgiving, "a complaint still must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory." Bryson v. Gonzales , 534 F.3d 1282, 1286 (10th Cir. 2008) (alteration marks omitted).

Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, "government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald , 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). Thus, to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) "where a qualified immunity defense is implicated, the plaintiff ‘must allege facts sufficient to show (assuming they are true) that the defendants plausibly violated their constitutional rights.’ " Hale v. Duvall , 268 F. Supp. 3d 1161, 1164 (D. Colo. 2017) (quoting Robbins v. Oklahoma ex rel. Dep't of Human Servs. , 519 F.3d 1242, 1249 (10th Cir. 2008) ).

III. ANALYSIS

The Littleton defendants seek dismissal of plaintiffs’ excessive force claim, to the extent that it is based on the first and second shootings, and plaintiffs’ due process claim, in its entirety, on the basis that they are entitled to qualified immunity.⁵ Docket No. 61 at 3-8. In addition, they seek dismissal of plaintiffs’ municipal and supervisory liability claim under Monell on the basis that plaintiffs fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Docket No. 61 at 8-12. The Englewood defendants seek dismissal of plaintiff's excessive force claim against defendant Martinez based on qualified immunity grounds. Docket No. 62 at 3. They also move for dismissal of plaintiffs’ supervisory liability claim against defendant Collins, on the basis that he is entitled to qualified immunity, and argue that plaintiffs’ Monell claim should be dismissed for failure to state a claim. Id. at 7-14.

A. Plaintiffs’ State-Law Claims

The Littleton defendants argue that plaintiffs’ negligence claim against the individual officers is barred under the statute of limitations, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-103(1)(c) ("[a]ll actions against ... police officers" must be "commenced within one year after the cause of action accrues"), and that plaintiffs’ negligence claim against the city defendants is barred under the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act ("CGIA") on the basis that the claim does "not fall within one of the...