Sanchez v. City of Chi.
| Decision Date | 15 September 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 12 C 06347,12 C 06347 |
| Parties | RUBEN SANCHEZ, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF CHICAGO, LOUIS GARCIA, TOM DART, Cook County Sheriff in his official capacity, and TYRONE FELIX, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Ruben Sanchez brought this civil-rights action against Chicago Police Officer Louis Garcia for false arrest and excessive force, and against Cook County Sheriff's Correctional Officer Tyrone Felix for excessive force.1 After a three-day trial, the Court accepted the jury's unanimous verdict in favor of Officer Garcia on both the false arrest and excessive force claims, and declared a mistrial on the excessive force claim against Officer Felix after the jury deadlocked on that claim. R. 245, 08/07/15 Minute Entry.2 Sanchez now moves for a new trial on his two claims against Officer Garcia under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a). R. 271, New Trial Mot. For the reasons discussed below, the motion is denied.
The jury found in favor of Officer Garcia, so the evidence as to the case against Garcia must be viewed in his favor. Late at night on August 10, 2010, Ruben Sanchez picked up a six-pack of beer at a store and began driving home. Chicago Police Officers Louis Garcia and William Murphy, who were patrolling the neighborhood, saw Sanchez drive through numerous stop signs and swerve across the center divider line. The officers signaled for Sanchez to pull over. Sanchez was nearly home at this point, however, so he decided to keep driving for a few blocks before pulling over by his parked trailer.
As Officer Garcia approached Sanchez, Sanchez stumbled out of his car. The officer could see that Sanchez's eyes were bloodshot and could smell alcohol on him. Garcia then directed Sanchez to get on the ground, which Sanchez refused to do. (Sanchez underwent stomach surgery a few years earlier, which according to Sanchez, prevented him from lying on the ground.) Instead, Sanchez clenched his fists and took a swing at the officer. Garcia forced Sanchez to the ground. With the help of other officers now on the scene, Garcia handcuffed him. At the time, Sanchez had an open can of beer in his car and marijuana in his pocket.
The officers drove Sanchez to the police station and placed him in an interview room. Chicago Police Officer Karen Etti found Sanchez lying on the interview room floor as she approached him to administer breathalyzer and field sobriety tests. Sanchez refused to take the tests. Officer Etti noticed that Sanchez had bloodshot eyes, slurred speech, and smelled of alcohol. Though Sanchez saidthat he did not need medical attention, Etti arranged for him to go to the hospital anyway. Sanchez refused any medical treatment at the hospital.
Sanchez was charged with aggravated driving under the influence of alcohol (at the time of the stop, Sanchez's driver's license was suspended for a similar prior offense), possession of cannabis, aggravated assault of a peace officer, and resisting/obstructing a peace officer. The Cook County State's Attorney ultimately prosecuted Sanchez for aggravated driving under the influence and dropped the other charges.
While awaiting trial on the D.U.I. charge at Cook County jail, Sanchez had a run-in with Cook County Correctional Officer Tyrone Felix. When Sanchez tried to leave the dormitory to go to lunch on August 28, 2010, Officer Felix told Sanchez that he could not go. The officer also blocked the door so that Sanchez could not leave. For his part, Felix claims that Sanchez had earlier decided to skip lunch so was not part of the lunch count (which was necessary for movement of detainees from the dormitory to the lunch building). Felix testified that Sanchez (because he was not part of the lunch count) needed permission from a supervisor to go to lunch, which is why Felix could not let Sanchez leave the dormitory. Despite Felix's warning, Sanchez tried to go to lunch anyway, at which point (Sanchez claims), Felix threw him to the ground. Felix, by contrast, maintains that he never used any physical force against Sanchez that day.
At Sanchez's criminal trial for aggravated driving under the influence, Sanchez chose not to testify or call any witnesses. The jury found him guilty, andthe state court sentenced Sanchez to 18 months' imprisonment. Sanchez directly appealed his conviction, which the appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court later denied Sanchez's petition for leave to appeal. Sanchez also instituted post-conviction proceedings challenging his conviction, but that petition was denied by the trial court and again affirmed by the appellate court. The Illinois Supreme Court also denied the petition for leave to appeal at this post-conviction stage.
Sanchez brought this § 1983 action in 2012, alleging that Officer Garcia unlawfully arrested him and used excessive force to effectuate the arrest, and that, at the Cook County Jail, Officer Felix used excessive force when he refused to let Sanchez go to lunch. R. 1, Compl.; R. 69, Third Am. Compl. Following a three-day trial and jury deliberations, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Garcia on both the false arrest and excessive force claims, but deadlocked as to the excessive force claim against Felix. 08/07/15 Minute Entry. The Court entered judgment in favor of Garcia and declared a mistrial on the claim against Felix. Id.
After the trial, Sanchez settled his claim against Felix, R. 267, 11/10/15 Minute Entry, but now moves for a new trial on his two claims against Garcia, R. 257, New Trial Mot. Sanchez asserts seven arguments in support of his motion, arguing that the Court erred by: (1) dismissing one juror for cause and not dismissing another juror for cause; (2) denying three of Sanchez's motions in limine and granting, in full or in part, five of the Defendants' motions in limine; (3) refusing to allow Sanchez's arrest report into evidence; (4) rejecting Sanchez's jury instructions on issue preclusion and false arrest; and (5) accepting the jury's partialverdict. Id. Sanchez also asserts that (6) cumulative prejudicial error deprived him of a fair trial; and (7) the jury's verdict was contrary to the clear weight of the evidence. Id.
Sanchez moves for a new trial under Rule 59, which can only be granted "if the jury's 'verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence, ... or if for other reasons the trial was not fair to the moving party.'" Willis v. Lepine, 687 F.3d 826, 836 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting Marcus & Millichap Inv. Servs. v. Sekulovski, 639 F.3d 301, 313 (7th Cir. 2011)). "In passing on a motion for a new trial, the district court has the power to get a general sense of the weight of the evidence, assessing the credibility of the witnesses and the comparative strength of the facts put forth at trial." Mejia v. Cook Cnty., Ill., 650 F.3d 631, 633 (7th Cir. 2011). But even with the trial court's authority to assess credibility, the new-trial standard is tough to satisfy, because generally "the district court is bound to the same evidence the jury considered, and can strike a piece of evidence from its weighing process only if reasonable persons could not believe it because it contradicts indisputable physical facts or laws." Id. at 633 (quotation omitted).
Sanchez asserts that the Court erred when deciding whether to dismiss two potential jurors for cause. During jury selection, the Court dismissed Mr. Francisco Camacho in light of his limited English-speaking ability, and refused to dismiss Mr.Kenneth Myers despite the fact that his ex-girlfriend's brother, a policeman, was killed 20 years ago while on duty. Sanchez contends that these decisions prejudiced him and warrant a new trial. New Trial Mot. at 2-5; R. 273, Pl.'s Reply Br. at 2-4. The Court addresses each for cause determination in turn.
Mr. Camacho is a Mexican native who learned English as a second language by interacting with his coworkers. 08/03 AM Tr. at 107:8-108:4. During voir dire, he acknowledged that his English was "not very perfect," and that the language was "difficult to understand sometimes." Id. Sanchez maintains that the Court improperly dismissed Mr. Camacho due to his "strong accent and a lack of a high school or college education ... ." New Trial Mot. at 3. Sanchez further contends—but without explanation—that the dismissal "prejudiced [him] and therefore necessitate[s] a new trial." Id. at 5.
Prospective jurors must be able to speak the English language in order to serve on a jury. 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b)(3). Without that ability, a juror cannot "comprehend the issues presented at trial, assess the evidence, and come to an independent judgment." United States v. Pineda, 743 F.3d 213, 217 (7th Cir. 2014). It is within the trial judge's sound discretion to dismiss any juror whom the judge is convinced lacks English language proficiency. Id. . And that dismissal will be upheld on appeal "unless no legitimatebasis for the court's decision can be found in the record, and the [party challenging the dismissal] shows that the juror's dismissal prejudiced his case." Id. (emphasis in original) (citing United States v. Vega, 72 F.3d 507, 512 (7th Cir. 1995)).
In United States v. Pineda, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the trial court's decision to remove a juror who "did not possess the requisite English language proficiency to serve as a juror without an interpreter." 743 F.3d at 217. The Seventh Circuit observed that the juror could not "understand trial proceedings without the assistance of an interpreter," and that the juror "had great difficulty understanding and communicating with the other...
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