Sanchez v. City of Rosevile, 2:19-cv-01086-WBS-DB

• Decision Date: 10 February 2021
• Docket Number: No. 2:19-cv-01086-WBS-DB,2:19-cv-01086-WBS-DB
• Parties: FELIX SANCHEZ, JR., Plaintiff, v. CITY OF ROSEVILE; ROSEVILLE POLICE DEPARTMENT; DANIEL MEDINA; CURTIS WATKINS; ADARIS WILSON; BRANDON FERNANDEZ; DOES 1 through 3, inclusive, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California

FELIX SANCHEZ, JR., Plaintiff, v. CITY OF ROSEVILE; ROSEVILLE POLICE DEPARTMENT; DANIEL MEDINA; CURTIS WATKINS;ADARIS WILSON; BRANDON FERNANDEZ; DOES 1 through 3, inclusive, Defendants.

No. 2:19-cv-01086-WBS-DB

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

February 10, 2021

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff Felix Sanchez, Jr. ("plaintiff") brought this action against the City of Roseville ("Roseville"); the Roseville Police Department; Officers Daniel Medina, Curtis Watkins, and Adaris Wilson; Sergeant Brandon Fernandez; and DOES 1-3 seeking damages against defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of the Fourth Amendment and malicious prosecution, and for violation of the Tom Bane Civil Rights Act, California Civil Code § 52.1(c). Before the court is the Motion for Summary Judgment brought by the City of Roseville, Roseville Police Department, Officers Daniel Medina, Curtis Watkins, Adaris Wilson, and Sergeant Brandon Fernandez. (Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J.) (Docket No. 11.)

I. Factual and Procedural Background¹

On May 15, 2018, Roseville Police Department ("RPD") Officers Medina, Watkins, and Wilson were on patrol in the City of Roseville. (See Undisputed Material Fact ("UMF") 1, Docket No. 11-2).) At approximately 11:10 P.M., an anonymous caller, later confirmed to be plaintiff's niece Olivia Sanchez, called the City of Roseville's non-emergency police dispatch line and stated that she wished to report a truck on her street. (See UMF 8.) She said that "a couple of guys just got home. Honestly, by the way that they kind of got out of the truck, I would assume that they are drunk, and the truck is parked the wrong way." (Id.) She later testified in a deposition that prior to her call, she happened to be driving through an intersection down the street from plaintiff's residence when she saw the truck parked in front of plaintiff's residence and the occupants get out of the vehicle. (See UMF 10.)

At approximately 11:12 P.M., RPD dispatch radioed to the officers that there was a reported potential violation of California Vehicle Code § 23152, driving under the influence. (See UMF 12-14.) Officers Watkins and Medina arrived at approximately 11:17 P.M. and located an unoccupied white Chevy Silverado pick-up truck parked on the left side of the road withits driver's side tires closest to the curb in front of the residence at 309 Lorraine Avenue (later determined to be plaintiff's residence). (See UMF 18.) Officer Wilson arrived at the residence at approximately 11:20 P.M. (See UMF 20.) The vehicle was unoccupied and there was nobody in the nearby area. (See UMF 21.) Officers Watkins and Medina discussed the situation and then Officer Medina started writing a parking citation for a violation of Roseville Municipal Code section 11.20.050 which provides: "No person shall stop, park or leave standing a vehicle on the left-hand side of a two-way street." (See UMF 22.)

When Officer Medina was preparing a citation, plaintiff walked down the driveway of the residence at 309 Lorraine Avenue toward them. (See UMF 24.) Plaintiff suspected that the officers were writing a ticket for the truck. (See UMF 26.) Plaintiff and the officers then had a conversation. (See UMF 27.) Plaintiff informed the officers that the truck belonged to his brother, Steve Sanchez, but that he had driven the truck and parked it where it was located. (See UMF 28.) Officer Medina asked plaintiff if he had been drinking. (See UMF 29.) Plaintiff stated that he drank three beers earlier that evening. (See UMF 30.) Officer Medina asked plaintiff if he had anything to drink since returning home and plaintiff refused to answer the question. (See UMF 31.) Plaintiff stated that he could get someone to move the truck or they could ticket it. (See UMF 33.) Plaintiff stated that he was going back inside, turned around, and began walking toward his residence. (See UMF 34.)

As plaintiff turned and started walking toward hisresidence, the officers said something to the effect of "Come here" and "You can't just leave." (See UMF 35.) Plaintiff took approximately two more steps towards his home. (See UMF 36.) Officer Medina grasped plaintiff on the left while Officer Wilson grasped plaintiff on the right to stop him from continuing to walk away from them. (See UMF 37.) Plaintiff is approximately 5'11" tall and weighs 250 pounds. (See UMF 25.) Plaintiff flexed his arms and tensed up.² (See UMF 38.) Officer Wilson used a "leg sweep" maneuver, putting his leg behind plaintiff's legs and pulling plaintiff backward over his leg, to take plaintiff to the ground. (See UMF 39.) The officers took plaintiff to the ground on his back and then rolled plaintiff onto his stomach. (See UMF 40.) Plaintiff's arms were underneath his body when he was rolled onto his stomach. (See UMF 41.) The officers yelled at plaintiff to stop resisting. (See UMF 42.)³ After the officers handcuffed plaintiff, they picked him up and asked him if he was injured, to which he said no. (See UMF 44.) The officers then walked plaintiff to Officer Wilson's patrol vehicle and put him in the back seat. (See UMF 45.)

Officer Watkins requested for a patrol supervisor,Sergeant Fernandez, to respond to the scene. (See UMF 46.) Sergeant Fernandez spoke to plaintiff while plaintiff was in the back of Officer Wilson's patrol vehicle. (See UMF 48.) Sergeant Fernandez read plaintiff his Miranda Rights and plaintiff indicated that he understood them. (See UMF 49-50.) Sergeant Fernandez informed plaintiff that the vehicle was parked the wrong way on the street to which plaintiff responded: "I know." (UMF 51.) Plaintiff told Sergeant Fernandez that he did not want to re-park the vehicle because he was concerned it could subject him to being arrested for driving under the influence ("DUI"). (See UMF 52.) Plaintiff explained to Sergeant Fernandez that he had been at a concert for the Downtown Tuesday Night in Roseville, went and got some fast food, had a few beers, and then his wife looked out at the house and noticed the police were there. (See UMF 53.) Plaintiff stated that he "didn't want to get in the truck and drive because, you know, like I said, I'm not, like, totally wasted but- you know, legally drunk, but I don't wanna take that chance because, you know, I have a commercial license." (Id.)

Plaintiff told Sergeant Fernandez that he had told the other officers that he had driven the vehicle earlier and parked it where it was parked. (See UMF 54.) Plaintiff told Sergeant Fernandez that he said to the officers "I'm going back inside" to which they responded "Well, come here. You're not-- you can't just leave . . ." to which plaintiff replied "Well, I'm going back inside." (See UMF 55.) Sergeant Fernandez told Plaintiff: "So you're -- you're intoxicated at this point" and plaintiff responded: "I said I've had -- I'm not denying that I didn't havea few beers you know? But like I said, with a commercial license, I'm not gonna get in a truck and give them the opportunity to say, 'Oh, now you're driving?'" (See UMF 56.) Sergeant Fernandez told plaintiff that he thought that the main reason plaintiff was in the back of the police car was because the other officers wanted plaintiff to stop. (See UMF 57.) Sergeant Fernandez told plaintiff that the other officers "gave you a lawful order not to go back inside and you tried to go back inside and that's -- could you -- could we agree on that?" (Id.) Plaintiff responded: "Yeah, they said, 'Come here.' I said -- I'm in the driveway, so you know, 'Okay.' I'm -- I'm home . . . . I'm not bothering anybody, just trying to find out. And, you know, I don't know why they didn't just say why they were here." (See UMF 58.) Sergeant Fernandez said: "Okay. So, you tried to go back inside, they -- had to physically stop you from going bac inside. Is that what happened?" (See UMF 59.) Plaintiff replied: "I was in my driveway." (See UMF 60.) Later, Sergeant Fernandez asked plaintiff whether he was injured or needed medical attention and plaintiff stated that he would not go to the doctor for this. (See UMF 61-62.) Plaintiff also told Sergeant Fernandez that when the officers grasped him, he "tensed up. " (See UMF 63.)

Plaintiff was arrested and transported to jail by Officer Wilson for violating California Penal Code Section 148(a)(1). (See UMF 69.) California Penal Code Section 148(a)(1) states that: "Every person who willfully resists, delays, or obstructs any public officer, peace officer. . . in the discharge or attempt to discharge any duty of his or her office oremployment, when no other punishment is prescribed, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by imprisonment in a county jail not to exceed one year, or by both that fine and imprisonment." See Cal. Pen. Code § 148(a)(1). Plaintiff posted bail the next morning and was released from jail. (See UMF 70.) The Placer County District Attorney's Office filed a criminal complaint against plaintiff charging him with violating California Penal Code § 148(a)(1). (See UMF 70.) Plaintiff filed a Motion to Suppress. (See UMF 72.) The Court granted the Motion to Suppress and the District Attorney's office dismissed plaintiff's criminal case. (See UMF 74-75.)

II. Discussion

Summary judgment is proper "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A material fact is one that could affect the outcome of the suit, and a genuine issue is one that could permit a reasonable jury to enter a verdict in the non-moving party's favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and can satisfy this burden by presenting evidence that negates an essential element of the non-moving party's case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S....