Sanchez v. Clatsop County
Decision Date | 29 January 1997 |
Parties | Maury James SANCHEZ and Robert S. Simon, Appellants, v. CLATSOP COUNTY, Respondent. 95-2116; CA A91110. |
Court | Oregon Court of Appeals |
Robert Simon, Oregon City, argued the cause, for appellants. With him on the briefs was The Robert S. Simon Law Firm.
John H. Chambers, Portland, argued the cause, for respondent. With him on the brief were E. Andrew Jordan and Tarlow, Jordan & Schrader.
Before DEITS, P.J., and De MUNIZ and HASELTON, JJ.
Plaintiffs appeal from a summary judgment dismissing their claim to quiet title to a piece of real property located in Clatsop County, the defendant in this case. They argue that the trial court should have granted summary judgment in their favor and should have declared the property free of any lien held by defendant. We reverse and remand.
Plaintiff Maury Sanchez owned one piece of real property, tax lot 400, and leased another, tax lot 3300, in defendant county. On October 21, 1993, the Enforcement Committee of defendant's Planning Commission held a hearing regarding Sanchez's uses of the two properties and concluded that Sanchez was using the properties in violation of various county ordinances. The Planning Commission adopted these findings and issued two orders, each fining Sanchez $7,500 for the violations. The orders also provided, in part:
On the same day it issued the orders, the Commission recorded them in the Clatsop County Clerk Lien Record and in the circuit court's judgment docket.
Sanchez appealed the Commission's orders, which were defendant's final land use decisions, to the Oregon Land Use Board of Appeals (LUBA). However, before the appeal was heard, the Commission moved to voluntarily remand the appeal back to it for further review. LUBA granted that motion, and, on June 28, 1994, the Commission signed two new orders that adopted the earlier orders' findings, conclusions, and impositions of fines. The Commission recorded the June 28 orders in the circuit court on July 15, 1994. 1
Both sides moved for summary judgment, and the trial court granted defendant's motion.
The issue on appeal is the meaning of Clatsop County Land and Water Development and Use Code (LWDUC) section 10.240(5), which pertains to the Commission's enforcement of county land use ordinance provisions through the impositions of fines. That provision states, in part:
ORS 30.460, on which section 10.240(5)(e) relies, provides:
Plaintiffs argue that the county ordinance requires defendant to wait 60 days before recording its order against a violator and that, because defendant did not comply with that requirement, its liens are void ab initio. Defendant counters that section 10.240(5)(e) must be read in conjunction with ORS 30.460, which, it argues, requires no waiting period. Moreover, defendant argues, regardless of the meaning of the county ordinance, plaintiffs are nevertheless not entitled to the equitable relief they request. We first consider the meaning of section 10.240(5)(e).
In construing a statute or ordinance, our role is to determine the enacting body's intent. The best evidence of that intent is the law's text and context. See Harris v. Sanders, 142 Or.App. 126, 130, 919 P.2d 512, rev. den. 324 Or. 322, 927 P.2d 598 (1996) (); see also PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or. 606, 610, 859 P.2d 1143 (1993). 3 Plaintiffs argue that the text of section 10.240(5)(e) is clear: 60 days must pass before the violator becomes personally liable and before the county may record the order as a lien. Defendant counters that plaintiffs' interpretation of the statute fails to account for the first phrase of the ordinance, that the Commission's orders are to issue "pursuant to ORS 30.460[.]" Given that language, defendant asserts, the statute controls the application of the ordinance. Defendant further asserts that: (1) ORS 30.460 does not require a 60-day waiting period between the issuance of enforcement orders assessing fines and the recording of liens based on those orders; and (2) thus, the ordinance does not and cannot require such a waiting period. 4
Whatever the merits of defendant's view as to the proper operation of ORS 30.460--a question we expressly do not reach--the language of the ordinance is clear and unmistakable: "if the fines assessed are not paid within 60 days of the...
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