Sanchez v. Cnty. of Sacramento
| Decision Date | 07 September 2021 |
| Docket Number | 2:19-cv-01545-MCE-AC |
| Parties | CRYSTAL R. SANCHEZ, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO, SACRAMENTO COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT, SCOTT R. JONES, and DAREN D. ALLBEE, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
Through this action, Plaintiff Crystal R. Sanchez (“Plaintiff”) seeks to recover damages against the County of Sacramento (“County”), the Sacramento County Sheriff's Department (“SCSD”), Sheriff Scott R. Jones (“Jones”), and Deputy Daren D. Allbee (“Allbee”) (collectively “Defendants”) for violations of various rights arising under both state and federal law. First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), ECF No. 46. Presently before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss/Strike Plaintiff's FAC, which Plaintiff timely opposed. ECF Nos 51, 53. For the reasons that follow, Defendants' Motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.[1]
BACKGROUND[2]
Plaintiff is affiliated with several organizations whose mission is to assist homeless individuals. For months prior to May 2019 Plaintiff was assisting homeless persons on an undeveloped lot on the 5700 block of Stockton Boulevard in Sacramento County. Plaintiff alleges that she had several encounters with Deputy Allbee during this time, including when he threatened to arrest her while she was protesting law enforcement clearing homeless people from the area.
On May 17, 2019, Plaintiff heard that SCSD deputies were making arrests in the area and she returned to the Stockton Boulevard location. According to Plaintiff, Allbee called her by name, immediately handcuffed her, and accused her of driving without a valid California Driver's License. Allbee then informed Plaintiff that, incident to her arrest he was going to have her vehicle towed and impounded, despite the presence of several individuals with valid driver's licenses who purportedly offered to take custody of the vehicle. Prior to the vehicle being towed, Allbee searched it and its contents, including Plaintiff's purse. According to Plaintiff, to date she lacks the necessary funds to obtain release of her vehicle, which remains impounded.
Plaintiff thereafter initiated this action alleging claims for: (1) Retaliation in violation of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution (); (2) False Detention/Arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment (); (3) Unreasonable Search and Seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment (); (4) False Detention/Arrest under the California Constitution (); (5) Unreasonable Search and Seizure under the California Constitution (); (6) violation of California's Bane Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1 (); (7) False Imprisonment (ninth cause of action); (8) Trespass (tenth cause of action); (9) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (“IIED”) (eleventh cause of action); and (10) Negligence (twelfth cause of action). Defendants now seek to strike certain elements of Plaintiff's allegations and to dismiss the entire FAC.[3]
On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) 12(b)(6), all allegations of material fact must be accepted as true and construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir. 1996). Rule 8(a)(2) “requires only ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief' in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). A complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not require detailed factual allegations. However, “a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). A court is not required to accept as true a “legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 ().
Furthermore, “Rule 8(a)(2) . . . requires a showing, rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 n.3 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Thus, “[w]ithout some factual allegation in the complaint, it is hard to see how a claimant could satisfy the requirements of providing not only ‘fair notice' of the nature of the claim, but also ‘grounds' on which the claim rests.” Id. (citing Wright & Miller, supra, at 94, 95). A pleading must contain “only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. If the “plaintiffs . . . have not nudged their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, their complaint must be dismissed.” Id. However, “[a] well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable, and ‘that a recovery is very remote and unlikely.'” Id. at 556 (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)).
The Court may strike from a pleading “an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(f). “The function of a 12(f) motion to strike is to avoid the expenditure of time and money that must arise from litigating spurious issues by dispensing with those issues prior to trial.” Whittlestone, Inc. v. Handi-Craft Co., 618 F.3d 970, 973 (9th Cir. 2010) (cleaned up). “Motions to strike are generally disfavored and should not be granted unless the matter to be stricken clearly could have no possible bearing on the subject of the litigation.” Holmes . Elec. Document Processing, Inc., 966 F.Supp.2d 925, 930 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (cleaned up).
A court granting a motion to dismiss a complaint must then decide whether to grant leave to amend. Leave to amend should be “freely given” where there is no “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, . . . undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [or] futility of the amendment . . . .” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003) (). Not all of these factors merit equal weight. Rather, “the consideration of prejudice to the opposing party . . . carries the greatest weight.” Id. (citing DCD Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 185 (9th Cir. 1987)). Dismissal without leave to amend is proper only if it is clear that “the complaint could not be saved by any amendment.” Intri-Plex Techs. v. Crest Group, Inc., 499 F.3d 1048, 1056 (9th Cir. 2007) ().
Plaintiff contends her arrest was unlawful because it was not supported by probable cause. Indeed, an officer who conducts “an arrest without probable cause violates the Fourth Amendment and gives rise to a claim for damages under [42 U.S.C.] § 1983.” Rosenbaum v. Washoe Cty., 663 F.3d 1071, 1076 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). “An officer has probable cause to make a warrantless arrest, ” however, “when the facts and circumstances within his knowledge are sufficient for a reasonably prudent person to believe that the suspect has committed a crime.” Id. As is relevant here, the California Vehicle Code prohibits operating a motor vehicle on a suspended driver's license, so long as the driver has proper notice. Cal. Veh. Code § 14601.1(a); cf. Cal. Veh. Code § 12500 ().
Plaintiff has acknowledged that she was driving without a license at the time of her arrest. See Reply, ECF No. 54 at 6. Even so, she contends that Allbee was not privy to that fact because he did not see her driving the vehicle.[4] Opp'n at 12 (citing FAC at 7). Under federal law, a probable cause determination is not dependent on the officer being present when a suspect committed a misdemeanor. “Rather, the crucial inquiry is whether [the officer] had probable cause to make the arrest.” Barry v. Fowler, 902 F.2d 770, 772 (9th Cir. 1990). Here, the facts as alleged plausibly state a claim that Allbee lacked probable cause to arrest Plaintiff. Accordingly, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss as to False Detention / Arrest (Claim Two) is DENIED.
Plaintiff next contends that the constitutional violations alleged occurred in retaliation for her protesting removal of homeless individuals earlier in the month. Defendants contend that the FAC fails to state such a claim because under the facts as alleged, Allbee had probable cause for Plaintiff's arrest. Given this Court's finding to...
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