Sanchez v. Galey

Decision Date17 April 1989
Docket NumberNo. 16974,16974
Citation115 Idaho 1064,772 P.2d 702
PartiesLorenzo SANCHEZ, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Frank GALEY, Jr., d/b/a Bennett Creek Farms, and Rusty Anderson, Defendants-Respondents.
CourtIdaho Supreme Court

Hepworth, Nungester & Lezamiz, Twin Falls, and Goicoechea Law Office, Boise, for plaintiff-appellant. John Hepworth and John T. Lezamiz argued.

Elam, Burke & Boyd, Boise, for defendants-respondents. Robert M. Tyler, Jr., and J. Ray Durtschi argued.

BISTLINE, Justice.

This is the second appeal in this case. Our opinion on the first appeal, Sanchez v. Galey, 112 Idaho 609, 733 P.2d 1234 (1987) (Sanchez I ), detailed the course of the litigation in the trial court proceedings and need not be repeated, other than to note that Sanchez suffered severe injuries when his right hand was caught in the chain drive of a potato harvester owned by his employer, Bennett Creek Farms, and operated by its employee, Rusty Anderson. A unanimous jury awarded Sanchez a verdict totaling $1.35 million in damages.

After the entry of the judgment, Bennett Creek and Anderson moved for a remittitur reducing the amount of damages awarded, or in the alternative, for a new trial on various grounds, including excessiveness of the damages pursuant to I.R.C.P. 59(a)(5). The district court granted the defendants' motion. Sanchez was given the option of accepting a $400,000 reduction in damages or a new trial. On Sanchez's appeal this Court reversed the trial court order and remanded with instructions that the district court reconsider its earlier ruling on defendants' motion in light of the principles announced in our opinion and in Quick v Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 727 P.2d 1187 (1986) announced the same day as Sanchez I.

Following proceedings on remand, the district court once again ordered Sanchez to remit $400,000 and to accept $950,000 in damages or face a new trial. Although our opinion in Sanchez I explicitly required the entry of findings of fact as to whether the trial court was, in fact, shocked by the jury award, or found such award unconscionable so as to have the appearance that it was given under the influence of passion or prejudice, the trial court did not make new findings as such, but utilized his prior written decision which was altered by interlineating six additional words at two different places and adding a 39-word conjunctive clause. This will be more easily understood by printing the pertinent part of the earlier opinion of the trial court with the interlineated additions in bold face type:

In this particular case, several observations are initially noteworthy. This is the largest verdict I have seen returned by a jury in any personal injury action tried before me. On the other hand, I have never tried a case which was more thoroughly prepared for trial nor more skillfully presented, including the effective use of visual aids. The plaintiff is a handsome man, likeable and appealing, who obviously made a favorable impression on co-workers as well as doctors, psychologists, therapists, and other professionals who worked with him. His attending physician was exceptionally competent and knowledgeable in his field who had available for viewing detailed photos of most stages of his surgeries and medical treatment of the plaintiff. He had taken numerous photos to assist him in lectures on the surgical repair of hands. I cannot say that I have ever witnessed a better prepared or more thorough and skillful representation by defense counsel either, but the chips here just seemed to be stacked heavily in plaintiff's favor. Accordingly, the large verdict is understandable[.] and it did not shock me.

After thus "weighing" the evidence to determine what amount (as a "thirteenth juror") I would have awarded in order to do substantial justice in this case, and fully and fairly compensate plaintiff for all his damages, I cannot in good conscience, come within $400,000 of the jury's verdict[.] and I find such award unconscionable. That is a substantial difference, and the disparity between the jury's award and what this Court would have awarded is so great as to suggest that the award is what might be expected of a jury acting under influence of passion or prejudice, and unless plaintiff is willing to accept a remittitur to $950,000, plus interest thereon at the highest legal rate from the date of judgment, I must therefore grant defendants a new trial.

I must acknowledge that it has been extremely difficult for me to discharge this "obligation" and in effect substitute my judgment on the damages for that of the jury. I have always felt a jury verdict is entitled to great deference particularly in the difficult area of damages, and particularly where, as here, it is unanimous. I have never had a case where so much of the damages were for items which are especially difficult of ascertainment with mathematical precision, such as pain and suffering. The fact that I could not have the benefit of any extensive discussion and consideration with 11 fellow jurors concerned me. The guidelines or suggestions as to how to discharge this obligation given in Dinneen are limited.

I will therefore attempt to explain how I have arrived at this result, after assuming that the case had been tried to the court, without a jury, and after I had decided the issue of liability in plaintiff's favor. I first considered the various elements of damage separately.

In weighing the evidence on damages it clearly indicated almost $100,000 in actual medicals, considering time and transportation for medical treatment. In addition, $30,000 would be reasonably probable for future medical and psychological care and treatment and vocational rehabilitation. About $21,000 had been lost in wages between the accident and the trial. I would allow another year's wages of $10,500 for him to obtain appropriate repatriation into the labor force.

After weighing the evidence in the case as to the earning capacity, age, life expectancy, habits, disposition, education, work history, aptitude, interest, intelligence and other pertinent factors in computing future lost wages, I would feel it reasonable to consider the defendant's faculties and capacity for work is about 50% impaired due to the effective loss of his right hand. That such percent of impairment would likely decrease with training and after developing compensatory work skills and ability at at least the rate of earnings increases due to inflation. I would therefore multiply $5,250.00 (50% of his $10,500/yr. earnings) by 40 years--(assuming he would likely cease work around 60 years of age, or at least fully compensate for his disability by then) and thus arrived at $210,000 as the present cash value of reasonably probable lost future wages.

With regard to plaintiff's inability to perform usual activities, I feel it would be just to award him about $25,000 to permit him to purchase special compensatory devices and appliances as they now exist or may hereafter become available, and I feel that another $50,000 would be fair to attempt to compensate him for the substantial disfigurement of his right hand and loss of enjoyment of life, i.e. hobbies and recreation.

Finally, in view of the considerable physical and mental pain and suffering unquestionably experienced by the plaintiff in view of the nature, extent and duration of the injury here, (permanent and entire loss of dominant hand) the psychological impact on the plaintiff, the multiple surgeries he has gone through, and the disruption of his life, I would feel that $300,000 would be fair compensation; and for such pain and suffering reasonably certain to be experienced in the future, an additional sum of $200,000.

In thus reluctantly discharging my "Dinneen obligation," I have found it particularly difficult in this case. It is usually much easier in cases involving solely property damage or lost income or wages. I cannot honestly say that I would personally be willing to go through the loss, pain or suffering experienced by the plaintiff here for any amount of money. That has also been true in most other personal injury cases I have presided over, however. Nevertheless, the injury and suffering and loss having occurred, some measure of just compensation must be attempted.

Secondly, as sort of a check on the amount I arrived at through the foregoing analysis, I attempted to mentally compare other cases I have tried, adjusting them as best I can according to the respective ages, and vocations of the injured persons, the nature, extent and duration of their injuries, the recency of the case, and the various other appropriate aggravating or mitigating circumstances involved in the respective cases. After doing so, I feel that an award in the neighborhood of as much as $950,000 would not be significantly out of line with such other awards.

III--INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE

I.R.C.P. 59(a)(6) provides that a new trial may be granted if there is insufficient evidence to justify the verdict or it is against the law. There was clearly sufficient evidence to support both the verdict in plaintiff's favor on the issue of liability and the amount of damages awarded to him.

In addition, by its post-remittitur memorandum opinion, the trial court ruled that its post-judgment order "which granted a new trial unless a remittitur was accepted, effectively vacated the [earlier judgment] entered upon the jury's verdict." The trial court stated only the conclusion that, "from that time no judgment was in effect upon which interest would run unless the Supreme Court had reinstated the judgment on appeal." No authority for that proposition was cited.

Sanchez's appeal requires us to address the following issues:

I. Did the district court err in its decision concerning the accrual of post-judgment interest?

II. Did the district court err by again directing Sanchez to accept a remittitur or, alternatively, undergo a new trial on the issue of damages?

I. POST...

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6 cases
  • Lubcke v. Boise City/Ada County Housing Authority, Worrell, 18691
    • United States
    • Idaho Supreme Court
    • September 9, 1993
    ...Allan G. Shepard wrote before his death on May 17, 1989, i.e., the concurring and dissenting opinion filed in Sanchez v. Galey, 115 Idaho 1064, 1081, 772 P.2d 702, 719 (1989). Justice Shepard's opinion, as were all of his opinions, was well-written and soundly based on the appeal records. I......
  • Beitzel v. Orton
    • United States
    • Idaho Supreme Court
    • February 19, 1992
    ...a new trial pursuant to I.R.C.P. 59(a)(5) on the ground that the jury awarded excessive damages. See also Sanchez v. Galey, 115 Idaho 1064, 1070, 772 P.2d 702, 708 (1989) (Sanchez II ); Sanchez v. Galey, 112 Idaho 609, 614-16, 733 P.2d 1234, 1239-41 (1986) (Sanchez I In this case, in denyin......
  • Bennett By and Through Bennett v. Hospital Corp. of America
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit
    • August 14, 1990
    ...v. United States, 557 F.Supp. 1041 (D.Idaho 1983); Sanchez v. Galey, 112 Idaho 609, 733 P.2d 1234 (1987) ("Sanchez I") amended, 772 P.2d 702 (1989) ("Sanchez II"); Soria v. Sierra Pacific Airlines, Inc., 111 Idaho 594, 726 P.2d 706 (1986) ("Soria I"), aff'd, 114 Idaho 1, 752 P.2d 603 (1988)......
  • Barnett v. Eagle Helicopters, Inc.
    • United States
    • Idaho Supreme Court
    • February 25, 1993
    ...that the amount of the verdict indicated that the jury was acting under the influence of passion or prejudice." Sanchez v. Galey, 115 Idaho 1064, 1070, 772 P.2d 702, 708 (1989). As a result, this Court refused to "tinker with the exercise of the trial court's discretion" and affirmed the or......
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