Sanchez v. Gomez

• Court: New Mexico Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: COORS; SADLER; McGHEE
• Citation: Sanchez v. Gomez, 57 N.M. 383, 259 P.2d 346, 1953 NMSC 53 (N.M. 1953)
• Decision Date: 07 July 1953
• Docket Number: No. 5565,5565
• Parties: SANCHEZ v. GOMEZ.

Page 346

259 P.2d 346

57 N.M. 383

SANCHEZ v. GOMEZ.

No. 5565.

Supreme Court of New Mexico.

July 7, 1953.

Edwin L. Felter, Santa Fe, for appellant.

F. A. Catron and Thomas B. Catron III, Santa Fe, for appellee.

COORS, Justice.

The basic question before the court in this cause is whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury to find the issues of fact for the defendant and against the plaintiff. Whether the court's directed verdict was proper depends upon whether any evidence was introduced on which a jury could reasonably have found for the plaintiff-appellant and against the defendant-appellee under a theory of last clear chance, and possibly also, upon which a jury might reasonably have found against the defendant and for the plaintiff upon the question of contributory negligence.

An action was brought to recover for injuries, loss of pay, and doctor bills as a result of being struck by a taxicab driven by one of defendant's employees when plaintiff was attempting to cross from the south side of Water Street to the north side of the street in Santa Fe, at a point approximately 75 feet west of the west side of Galisteo Street. Plaintiff's conduct in crossing the street at a point other than a regular pedestrian crosswalk constituted a violation of Section 3-109(1) of the Ordinances of the City of Santa Fe, which provides:

'Crossing Streets.--Pedestrians shall cross streets at a right angle at street intersection or designated crossings and at no other place. Where a traffic officer is stationed, pedestrians shall cross with the released traffic.'

Plaintiff also was in at least technical violation of the right of way provisions of the state statutes and of the ordinances. Section 68-518, New Mexico Statutes, 1941 Compilation, in the last sentence of subsection (c), provides:

'(c) * * * Every pedestrian crossing a highway within a business or residence district at any point other than a pedestrian crossing, cross-walk or intersection shall yield the right of way to vehicles upon the highway.'

This same provision appears as item (iii) of Section 3-105, subsection (5), paragraph (B) of the Ordinances of the City of Santa Fe in these words:

'* * * Every pedestrian crossing a street within a business or residence district at any point other than a pedestrian crossing, or cross-walk, or intersection shall yield the right-of-way to vehicles upon the street.'

Defendant's taxi apparently turned out of its stall into Water Street to answer a call at a point east of the Galisteo intersection, then turned straight west toward the intersection. In connection with the driver's operation of the vehicle parts of two sections of the city ordinances need to be considered. Section 3-102(A) reads:

'Any person driving a vehicle on a street shall drive the same at a careful and prudent speed not greater than is reasonable and proper, having due regard to the traffic, surface and width of the street and of any other conditions then existing; and no person shall drive any vehicle upon a street at such speed as to endanger the life, limb or property of any person.'

Subdivision (B) of Section 3-102(1) provides:

'Subject to the provisions of subdivision (A) of this section and except in those instances where a lower speed is specified in this article, it shall be prima facie lawful for a driver of a vehicle to drive the same at a speed not exceeding the following, but in any case when such speed would be unsafe, it shall not be lawful.

'V. (Being Sec. 241 of the 1930 Code of Ordinance of the City of Santa Fe.)

'20 miles an hour in a business district as defined herein;'

Section 3-115 of the Ordinances provides in part as follows:

'The City Council may create and provide for the designation of, by erection of appropriate signs or signals such traffic signals, stop streets, through highways and, one-way streets as it may deem necessary or expedient. * * *'

In accordance with the foregoing provision the city had installed a mechanically operated stop and go signal at the Galisteo and Water Streets intersection. Section 3-117 of the city ordinance provides punishment for the driver of any vehicle who is convicted of failing to stop at a duly marked stop-sign or traffic light.

Defendant's driver in proceeding across Galisteo while the stop and go signal showed red, was in violation of the ordinance and there is some evidence in the record tending to show that the taxicab was proceeding at a speed greater than 25 miles an hour and greater than might be found reasonable and proper under the circumstances.

At the moment plaintiff was about to cross Water Street several eastbound cars were stopped behind the Galisteo Street intersection on the south side of Water Street, the signal being on red. Plaintiff's testimony was to the effect that she had a clear line of vision between the point from which she left the sidewalk on the south side of Water Street and the taxicab which was approaching the intersection on the north side of the street east of the intersection. Presuming that the taxi would stop for the red light, plaintiff felt she would have enough time to cross the street and started across. Defendant's taxicab did not stop for the red signal, however but proceeded in a westerly direction at a rate of speed which was testified to by various witnesses. Their estimates ranged from around 20 to 30 miles an hour. When plainiff reached a point somewhere near the middle of the street she realized her peril, started to run, and was hit. There is testimony to the effect that the taxidriver did not see plaintiff until it was too late to avert the accident, and skid marks, measuring 26 feet, indicated, according to the testimony of Capt. A. B. Martinez of the police force, that the driver was about 47 feet from plaintiff before he became aware of the plaintiff's position of danger.

It is now well established that before the trial court may properly remove a case from the jury it should appear that no true issues of fact have been presented, for it is a party's right to have such issues decided by the judgment of his peers under provisions of state and federal constitution. The basis for a directed verdict, therefore, is the absence of an issue for a jury to resolve. It follows that when the evidence forms an issue the right to a jury determination persists. It is to safeguard this basic right of jury determination that the rule arose, and frequently announced by the court, that when a verdict is directed because a contrary result would be without support in the evidence, the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom it rules; in other words, it must indulge all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence in favor of such party. This is so because the jury may feel and agree among themselves that it is this evidence and this evidence alone that is to be believed and that, therefore, all the evidence which was presented favoring the position of the adverse party is erroneous, false, or otherwise ineffective. It is in accordance with this principle that the question of whether a pedestrian who negligently crosses a street in the middle of the block should recover for injuries sustained when struck by a taxicab was held a question for the jury under the last clear chance doctrine in Center v. Yellow Cab Co. of Los Angeles, 1932, 216 Cal. 205, 13 P.2d 918, a case which is in many respects identical with the one at bar.

In the instant case one of the most controverted issues of fact appears to have been whether the taxicab driver had a clear line of vision to the point on Water Street at which the plaintiff attempted her unfortunate crossing. If he did have such a clear line of vision, a jury could have found that he should have seen and recognized plaintiff's peril in time to have averted the accident and under those circumstances the doctrine of last clear chance might have become applicable. On the other hand, if his line of vision was obscured and he did not have an opportunity to see the plaintiff until she reached a point well out into the street, the negligence of the driver and that of the plaintiff might well have been found to be substantially concurrent so that plaintiff's contributory negligence would bar recovery.

Reference to the record discloses at least some testimony which tends to establish that the taxicab had a clear line of vision in plaintiff's direction.

Plaintiff, Mabel Sanchez, testified as follows:

'Q. Now, did you have a clear vision of this taxicab at that time? A. I certainly did. I had a clear vision, that was the only car coming at the time.

'Q. Now, what part of the taxicab were you able to see from where you were then standing? A. I saw a clear vision of the cab.

'Q. What part of the cab did you see? A. All the front and all one side.

'Q. Were you able to see the wheels on that taxicab? A. Yes.

'Q. Were you able to see the windshield? A. Yes, sir. * * *

'Q. Were you able to see the position in which the driver of the taxicab was sitting? A. Yes.

'Q. Were there any other cars in your line of vision, between you and the taxicab? A. There was (were?) no other cars.

'Q. Where there any pedestrians or people between you and the taxicab and your line of vision? A. No, sir.

'Q. Were there any objects between you and the taxicab, in your line of vision? A. No, sir, I could see a clear vision of the car, that's how come I knew it was a taxi.'

Fernando Mier, who investigated the accident in question immediately after it happened, testified that there were no unusual factors of weather, time of day or road conditions to create an obstructed view. Efforts to establish the fact that any particular number of eastbound cars were backed up behind the stop and go signal waiting for the light to change proved unsuccessful since none of the witnesses was able to state with certainty whether there were one, two, three or more cars ahead of the car...