Sanchez v. Kerry
| Decision Date | 27 June 2014 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:11-CV-02084 |
| Parties | DAVID ISRAEL SANCHEZ, Plaintiff, v. JOHN KERRY, SECRETARY OF STATE, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas |
This case was tried to the bench in June 2014. The plaintiff, David Israel Sanchez, sought a declaratory judgment that he was a United States citizen by birth in the United States. He sought to compel the defendant, the Secretary of State, to issue him a passport based on his citizenship. The defendant asserted that Sanchez had been born in Mexico and had not met his burden of proving birth in the United States. The only issue is whether, under 8 U.S.C. § 1503(a), the plaintiff has met his burden of proof of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that he is a United States citizen by birth in the United States. There is no issue of naturalization, and no issue of derivative citizenship.1 The court finds and concludes that David Israel Sanchez has not met his burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he was born in the United States.2 The following findings and conclusions are entered.
The Mexican birth certificate issued on October 21, 1987 recording the birth of a male child named Israel Sanchez Reyes is the plaintiff's birth certificate. The plaintiff asserted that the United States birth certificate issued on April 19, 1988 for a birth on March 14, 1988 of a male child named David Israel Sanchez is the valid and only certificate of his birth. This court finds and concludes that the United States birth certificate is not a valid birth certificate for the plaintiff. The invalid American birth certificate provides no support for the plaintiff's assertion that he was a United States citizen by virtue of having been born in 1988 in Brownsville, Texas, as opposed to having been born in 1987 in Matamoros, Tamaulipas, Mexico, as shown by the valid Mexican birth certificate. The evidence as to the Texas birth certificate is simply not credible in relation to the evidence as to the Mexican birth certificate.
The testimony of Javier Cavazos amply demonstrated that the Mexican birth certificate -- particularly when viewed in relationship to the marriage certificate of David Israel Sanchez's parents -- was a birth certificate of the son born to Elizabeth Sanchez and Marcelino Sanchez in 1987 in Matamoros, Tamaulipas, Mexico. The number linking the two documents clearly shows that the parents designated on the birth certificate are the same people whose marriage is recorded in the marriage certificate. In addition, as Javier Cavazos explained. -- and as evidenced in the document itself (based on the child's fingerprint) -- this child must have been physically present at the Civil Registry in Matamoros, Tamaulipas, Mexico, in order to be registered. The Mexican birth record also contains the correct names, ages and address of David Israel Sanchez's parents; the correct names and addresses for his grandparents; and the correct names, addresses and ages for his aunt (Guadalupe Reyes Brito) and great-grandmother (Soledad Reyes Roman). It was undisputed that Soledad Reyes Roman could not read or write and, therefore, as Javier Cavazos explained, her fingerprint was placed on the Mexican birth record inlieu of a signature. Additionally, neither the plaintiff's aunt or great-grandmother was mentioned on his parents' marriage certificate, but accurate information identifying them (and evidencing Soledad Reyes Roman's inability to read and write) is on this Mexican birth record. There is no basis to find this document to be a fake, forgery, or otherwise untrustworthy or improperly created. David Israel Sanchez presented no credible evidence to explain the existence of the Mexican birth certificate or to cast its validity into doubt, or to show that it recorded another person's birth.
The handwriting testimony was at best of marginal assistance to the court. But it did point out to the court the areas of comparison that are useful to examine. The court has examined them, and based on what it has personally observed, finds -- as the case law permits -- that it is clear that the handwriting of the people who signed the Mexican marriage certificate is the same as that of the people who signed the birth record in Mexico of Israel Sanchez Reyes. Based on comparisons with other known samples of the handwriting of those individuals, those signatures are those individuals' signatures. All the other information -- the names of family members, occupations, and other similar details -- clearly supports finding that the Mexican birth record is a valid birth record of a male child named Israel Sanchez Reyes, born in Mexico in 1987, and that the child is the plaintiff in this case.
Elizabeth Sanchez gave testimony that in many ways called her credibility into question. One area in which she was credible is that David Israel Sanchez or Israel Sanchez Reyes --- and the court finds that these names refer to the same person, the plaintiff --- was her firstborn child and firstborn son. There was no earlier child, and there is no evidence that she had any children before the plaintiff was born. But her testimony that she gave birth to the plaintiff in Brownsville in 1988 is not credible.
Marcelino Sanchez, David Israel Sanchez's father, and other individuals also testified, based on personal knowledge, that David Israel Sanchez was born in Brownsville, Texas, as opposed to Matamoros, Tamaulipas, Mexico. This testimony was not credible. The plaintiff's parents and the other individuals have a strong incentive to place the location of his birth in this country as opposed to in Mexico. Moreover, there are indications, as the government pointed out, that some of the details offered about Mrs. Sanchez's delivery of her child in the midwife's house may well have occurred as described, but that baby was not David Israel Sanchez. Instead, it was Mr. Sanchez's younger sister. This explanation - offered by Ms. Leticia Flores, who had no incentive to place Mr. Sanchez's birth in the United States or Mexico - is far more plausible than the testimony provided by witnesses who have an interest in the outcome of this case.
The other documentary evidence the plaintiff submitted is insufficient to meet the plaintiff's burden. The secondary evidence that he offered is too uncertain in both authenticity and evidentiary trustworthiness to displace the evidentiary effect of the valid Mexican birth record. The school records do not show anything with respect to place and date of birth other than the information supplied by Elizabeth Sanchez, who was involved in generating the false American birth record. The most credible explanation of the existence of the U.S. birth certificate is that it was procured for Elizabeth Sanchez at her request, and that it was fraudulent.
The medical records dated in and around 1988 purporting to relate to care provided a baby named David Israel Sanchez are full of unexplained discrepancies. Their existence does not displace the evidentiary weight properly given to the Mexican birth and marriage records.These records do not support the plaintiff's claim to have been born in Brownsville, Texas in 1988 as opposed to Matamoros, Mexico in 1987.
The Texas administrative agency's finding that the American birth certificate was sufficiently reliable to be credited in lieu of a foreign birth record is not entitled to evidentiary weight, much less preclusive effect. Questions regarding passport eligibility and issuance, as well as United States citizenship, are exclusively within the authority of the federal government. They are not within the purview of the state administrative agencies or any other part of the state government. The issues and legal standards in this case are different than the issues and standards before the state agency, and the evidence this court heard is far more extensive than was presented at the state agency proceeding. The Secretary had no notice of, or opportunity to be heard in, the Texas proceeding. There is no basis in the record to give evidentiary weight to the Texas administrative agency finding.
Having considered all of the testimony, having considered the evidence that was admitted into the record, and having even considered evidence that may well be inadmissible, the court finds that the plaintiff, David Israel Sanchez, has not met his burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he was born in this country, is a citizen by birth, and is entitled to a United States passport.
Title 8 U.S.C. § 1503(a) allows any person who has been denied a right or privilege on the basis of non-nationality to file a declaratory judgment action for a de novo determination of his or her citizenship. See Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252, 256 (1980).
There are "two sources of citizenship, and two only: birth and naturalization." Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 423-34 (1998) (quoting United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649,702 (1898)). Here, as only citizenship based on being born in the United States is being alleged, the plaintiff has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he was born in the United States. See Bustamante-Barrera, 447 F.3d 388, 394 (5th Cir. 2006); Reyes v. Neely, 264 F.2d 673, 674-75 (5th Cir. 1959); Tijerina v. Brownell, 141 F. Supp. 266, 270 (S.D. Tex. 1956); Patel v. Rice, 403 F. Supp. 2d 560, 562 (N.D. Tex. 2005).
Proving a fact by a preponderance of the evidence means showing that the existence of said fact is more likely than not. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 390 (1983); Matter of Briscoe Enterprises, Ltd. II, 994 F.2d 1160, 1164 (5th Cir. 1993).
There is no burden shifting analysis in this proceeding - that is, the burden does not shift to the government to either produce evidence demonstrating that the plaintiff was born outside the United States or...
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