Sanchez v. Melendrez

• Decision Date: 28 March 2013
• Docket Number: No. 11 CV 657 MV/RHS.,11 CV 657 MV/RHS.
• Citation: 934 F.Supp.2d 1325
• Parties: Preston SANCHEZ, Plaintiff, v. Benjamin MELENDREZ, Cole Knight, William Young, Louis Armijo, Jane Doe, Police Chief Ray Schultz and the City of Albuquerque, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of New Mexico

934 F.Supp.2d 1325

Preston SANCHEZ, Plaintiff,

v.Benjamin MELENDREZ, Cole Knight, William Young, Louis Armijo, Jane Doe, Police Chief Ray Schultz and the City of Albuquerque, Defendants.

No. 11 CV 657 MV/RHS.

United States District Court, D. New Mexico.

March 28, 2013.

Matthew Coyte, Attorney for Plaintiff.

Kathryn Levy, Paul M. Cash, Attorneys for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

MARTHA VÁZQUEZ, District Judge.

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum in Support, Requesting Dismissal of Plaintiff's Entire Complaint (Doc. 18). The Court has considered the motion, briefs, and the relevant law, and being otherwise fully informed, FINDS that the motion shall be GRANTEDIN PART and DENIED AS MOOT IN PART for the reasons stated herein.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Preston Sanchez has brought the instant lawsuit against the team of Albuquerque Police (“APD”) Officers who arrested him on July 23, 2010, as well as Police Chief Ray Schultz, the City of Albuquerque, and an unknown employee of the Second Judicial District Attorney's Office. In his complaint (Doc. 1), Plaintiff alleged four claims: (1) a Fourth Amendment violation; (2) municipal liability; (3) state tort claims of false arrest and false imprisonment; and (4) a claim for equitable relief in the form of expungement of his arrest record. Defendants now move for summary judgment under a theory that the doctrine of qualified immunity shields them from liability as to Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claim. Defendants further move for dismissal of Plaintiff's municipal liability claim, arguing that Plaintiff has disclosed no evidence that would support this claim.¹ Defendants additionally move for summary judgment with respect to Plaintiff's state law claims on grounds that they are immune from such claims under the New Mexico Tort Claims Act. They move for dismissal of Plaintiff's claim for equitable relief on grounds that he fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Finally, Defendant Albuquerque Police Chief Ray Schultz moves for dismissal of all claims against him, arguing that Plaintiff has brought no cognizable claim against him.

In the spring and summer of 2010, Defendant Sergeant Armijo was the sergeant in charge of the “John Squad” or the “Power Squad,” an Albuquerque police squad that addressed specific criminal issues in its area command. In response to reports of larcenies in downtown Albuquerque, Sergeant Armijo sought ideas from members of a former police unit that conducted undercover tactical operation plans, or “tact plans,” in the Valley Area Command. Members of this unit suggested that the squad use different items as bait for potential thieves, including bicycles, beer, and laptop computers.

First, Sergeant Armijo and his squad conducted a tact plan using a bicycle. They placed the bicycle in the back of a pickup truck and parked the truck in various locations in downtown Albuquerque. They observed a number of people look at the bike and touch it, but no one ever took it. When no one attempted to steal the bicycle, the squad moved on to a laptop computer. They placed it in various places in the downtown area, “open, or just left,” Doc. 21–4 at 2, yet no one ever attempted to take it. The squad then placed cigarettes and alcohol in parked cars with the windows down on a number of occasions, but again failed to observe anyone attempt to remove these items from the vehicles.

After these tact plans were unsuccessful, Sergeant Armijo contacted Jill Martinez, an assistant district attorney in the Community Crimes division with whom he had communicated about the contours of the tact plan involving laptop computers. Sergeant Armijo asked Ms. Martinez if she thought placing a laptop in a backpack and leaving it in a public area would be an appropriate tact plan. Ms. Martinez responded that she did not see a problem with such a plan. Sergeant Armijo proceeded to speak to his lieutenant, Kevin Rowe, and his captain, Ray Mason, about the idea. Neither officer saw any problem with the plan, so Sergeant Armijo took steps to implement it. After the plan was implemented, Ms. Martinez left the District Attorney's office, and Sergeant Armijo began meeting regularly with an assistant district attorney named Chris Schultz, who provided him direction in conducting the operation.

On July 23, 2010, at Sergeant Armijo's direction, Defendant Officers Melendrez, Knight and Young ran the operation which ultimately resulted in Plaintiff's arrest. Sergeant Armijo was not present during the operation. Officer Melendrez, dressed in plain clothes, placed a backpack containing a broken laptop, beer and cigarettes next to an ATM which was located directly across the street from a high school. Sergeant Armijo and Officer Young both stated with some equivocation that the backpack had a label on it with contact information for the owner. Officer Melendrez pretended to use the ATM and he then walked away, “forgetting” his backpack. After between ten and twenty minutes, Plaintiff approached the ATM. He stood in line behind another customer, and he noticed the backpack. Defendants observed him speaking to the other customer. The other customer left, and Plaintiff began to examine the backpack. He saw the beer, cigarettes, and computer, and he placed the backpack in his truck, which he had left with the engine running, positioned ten to fifteen feet away from the ATM. He then returned to the ATM and completed his transaction. He returned to his vehicle and prepared to drive away, at which point Defendants arrested him.

Officer Melendrez made the decision to arrest Plaintiff, with Officers Young and Knight as part of the arrest team. Officer Melendrez placed Plaintiff in handcuffs and read him his Miranda rights. Officer Melendrez then contacted the on-call assistant district attorney to request his opinion as to whether or not he should proceed with the arrest. In Officer Melendrez's words, “I was calling to see what their opinion was ... of what kind of case we are going to have if we were to prosecute this case.” Doc. 21–1 at 4. The assistant district attorney, whose name Officer Melendrez does not remember, told him that “it seemed to be a good arrest.” Id. Officer Melendrez proceeded to arrest Plaintiff and charge him with felony larceny. Plaintiff spent one night in jail.

APPLICABLE LAW

I. Dismissal Under Rule 12(b)(6)

Pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a court may dismiss a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) “tests the sufficiency of the allegations within the four corners of the complaint after taking those allegations as true.” Mobley v. McCormick, 40 F.3d 337, 340 (10th Cir.1994). This Court must accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint, view those allegations in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Moore v. Guthrie, 438 F.3d 1036, 1039 (10th Cir.2006).

To pass muster under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint need not recite detailed factual allegations, but a plaintiff must set forth the grounds of his or her entitlement to relief beyond “labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Id. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (citation omitted). A plaintiff's “allegations must be enough that, if assumed to be true, the plaintiff plausibly (not just speculatively) has a claim for relief.” Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir.2008). Pursuant to Twombly, a plaintiff must “nudge his claims across the line from conceivable to plausible” in order to survive a motion to dismiss. 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. Thus, “the complaint must give the court reason to believe that this plaintiff has a reasonable likelihood of mustering factual support for these claims.” Ridge at Red Hawk, L.L.C. v. Schneider, 493 F.3d 1174, 1177 (10th Cir.2007) (emphasis removed).

II. Summary Judgment

Summary judgment “should be rendered if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(2). The moving party bears the initial burden of showing “an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case.” Bacchus Indus., Inc. v. Arvin Indus., Inc., 939 F.2d 887, 891 (10th Cir.1991) (internal quotation and marks omitted). The burden then shifts to the non-moving party to show a genuine issue of material fact. Id. In response to a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the non-movant “may not rely merely on allegations or denials in its own pleading ... [but rather must] set out specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial.” Id.

In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, it is not the Court's role to weigh the evidence, assess the credibility of witnesses, or make factual findings. Utah Lighthouse Ministry v. Found. for Apologetic Info. & Research, 527 F.3d 1045, 1050 (10th Cir.2008). Rather, the Court's task is to “determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 243, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Where a rational trier of fact, considering the record as a whole, could not find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).

DISCUSSION

I. Fourth Amendment Claim

A. Qualified Immunity

The qualified immunity doctrine shields...