Sanchez v. Miami-Dade Cnty.

Decision Date25 April 2018
Docket NumberNo. 3D16–959,3D16–959
Citation245 So.3d 933
Parties Christopher SANCHEZ, Appellant, v. MIAMI–DADE COUNTY, Appellee.
CourtFlorida District Court of Appeals

Beckham & Beckham and Pamela Beckham and Robert J. Beckham, Jr., Miami, for appellant.

Abigail Price–Williams, Miami–Dade County Attorney, and Eric K. Gressman, Joni A. Mosely and Sabrina Levin, Assistant County Attorneys, for appellee.

Before SUAREZ, SALTER and LUCK, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Christopher Sanchez and Noel Pozos were shot while in Miami–Dade County's Benito Juarez Park attending a birthday party. In separate lawsuits before different trial court judges, Sanchez and Pozos sued the county because it negligently failed to allocate off-duty police officers as security to protect the partygoers. The county moved for summary judgment in each case based on sovereign immunity under Florida Statutes section 768.28(9). The trial court in the Pozos case denied the county's summary judgment motion. We dismissed Pozos' appeal because the trial court's unelaborated denial did not determine as a matter of law that the county was not entitled to sovereign immunity. See Miami–Dade County v. Pozos, No. 3D15-2167, 242 So.3d 1152, 1152–53, 2017 WL 621233, at *1 (Fla. 3d DCA Feb. 15, 2017) ("Because the trial court did not determine that, as a matter of law, the County was not entitled to sovereign immunity or immunity under section 768.28(9), Florida Statutes, the County was not authorized to appeal the trial court's order, and we therefore dismiss this appeal as one taken from a nonfinal, nonappealable order.").1 Chief Judge Rothenberg dissented. She would have found that we had jurisdiction and the county was immune from Pozos' claim.

Unlike Pozos, the trial court in the Sanchez case granted the county's summary judgment motion, concluding that the county was immune under section 768.28(9). Sanchez has appealed, and because final summary judgment was entered in favor of the county, there is no jurisdictional issue as there was in Pozos. We have jurisdiction over final judgments. The issue here is the one left unanswered by the majority opinion in Pozos: whether the county's sovereign immunity barred Pozos and Sanchez's negligent security claims. We agree with and adopt the portion of Chief Judge Rothenberg's Pozos dissent concluding under the facts of this case that the county had sovereign immunity under section 768.28(9), and affirm the judgment in favor of the county.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Chief Judge Rothenberg correctly described the summary judgment evidence.

On August 24, 2012, Eli Salgado purchased a Miami–Dade County Park Foundation membership for $149. This membership included a coupon book containing several promotional items, including two tickets to the zoo, a 50% discount coupon for golf, and a coupon for the use of a park shelter without payment of the requisite rental fee. Along with Salgado's membership and the coupon booklet, Salgado was given a copy of the Park's rules and regulations to be followed when renting a facility at the Park. These rules contained a section regarding when permits and off-duty officers are required and provided notice to Salgado that it was his responsibility to obtain the correct permit(s) and to hire off-duty police officers under certain circumstances. For example, these rules provided that when a D.J., live music, or speakers are going to be used, the person renting the facility or hosting the event at the Park must obtain a broadcast permit and hire and pay for off-duty police officers. Depending on the type or size of the party or event, other permits are required, and again, Salgado must hire off-duty police officers to provide security for the event. Specifically, the rules and regulations provided that if Salgado was expecting over a certain number of guests, then he would be required to hire two off-duty police officers and obtain a special events permit. The rules and regulations additionally stated that the Park's employees would not be responsible for providing any of these items.
When Salgado rented a shelter at the Park for his September 22, 2012 birthday party, he simply asked to rent the shelter and used the free rental coupon contained in his membership coupon booklet. He did not advise anyone that he was going to hire a D.J., and he did not obtain any permits or hire any off-duty police officers. Instead, he procured two private security officers to provide security at the party.
The only Park employee present for this after-hours private party was Diogenes Martin, a part-time Park Service Aide, whose responsibilities were to clean the restrooms and the Park before and after an event and to keep the area clean and change the trash bags during the event. Also present was a teenage volunteer who was helping Martin that night. Victor Jenkins, the Goulds South Dade Zone Manager who is responsible for managing seventeen parks for Miami–Dade County Parks and Recreation, testified in his deposition that the County has only budgeted for twenty-seven park security officers to service all of the recreational facilities throughout the County. These officers are directed to mainly patrol the beaches and marinas on the weekends. Because the County does not provide security at these private parties and events, it requires the patron renting a park facility to contact the police department and hire off-duty officers for certain events.
Martin testified in his deposition that he performed his duties as required on the night of the party. He made sure the restrooms and area were clean, the trash was properly disposed of, and the trash bags were changed when the cans became full. He explained that Salgado was celebrating his eighteenth birthday, and the party consisted of mostly sixteen-to-eighteen-year-olds who were eating, dancing, and just having a good time. Salgado's parents were present, and there were also two large men wearing "Security" T-shirts present who appeared to be patrolling the area and providing security for the party. He did not see anyone using drugs, fighting, or having a confrontation with anyone. Everything was calm and everyone seemed to be having a good time when all of a sudden, at around 10:00 or 10:30 p.m., he heard shots fired. As soon as he realized that some of the kids had been shot, he called 911 and then called his supervisor.
Inga Portilla, a Park Manager, confirmed that Park Service Aides are only responsible for maintenance within the Park. They do not provide security, do not check to see if the renter has obtained the required permits, are not trained in crime prevention, and are not authorized to "police" the area. She also confirmed that after Salgado paid his membership fee, a booklet was sent to his house containing the rental coupon and a copy of the Park's rules and regulations. These rules and regulations are also posted at the Park. Portilla explained that "once we rent the facility ... we don't have anything to do with direct involvement of the parties," and that it was Salgado's responsibility to follow the rules, obtain the necessary permits, and hire off-duty police officers if he was having a party that required off-duty police officers, as "[w]e are not responsible for the party."
Pozos presented no evidence to refute any of the above referenced evidence.
The affidavit/statement provided by Salgado, the renter and host of the party, does not refute the testimony of the park employees or the physical evidence. Salgado did not dispute that he had received a copy of the Park's rules and regulations related to rentals of the Park's facilities. He merely states that when he rented the pavilion he was not advised that he needed to hire off-duty officers and that he did not recall if anyone had asked him how many people he expected would be attending the party.

Id. at 1162–64, at 2017 WL 621233, *10–11 (omissions and alterations in original) (emphasis removed).2

DISCUSSION

Chief Judge Rothenberg properly applied the summary judgment evidence to the principles of sovereign immunity articulated by the Florida Supreme Court.

[E]ven where a duty is owed, sovereign immunity may bar an action for an alleged breach of that duty, seePollock 882 So.2d at 932–33 ; Henderson [v. Bowden], 737 So.2d [532] at 535 [ (Fla. 1999) ] ; Kaisner [v. Kolb], 543 So.2d [732] at 734 [ (Fla. 1989) ], because in Florida, "governmental immunity derives entirely from the doctrine of separation of powers, not from a duty of care or from any statutory basis." Kaisner, 543 So.2d at 737.
When addressing the test for determining when a governmental entity enjoys sovereign immunity, the Florida Supreme Court held "that the separation-of-powers provision present in article II, section 3 of the Florida Constitution requires that ‘certain [quasi-legislative] policy-making, planning or judgmental governmental functions cannot be the subject of traditional tort liability.’ " Wallace, 3 So.3d at 1053 (quoting Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian River Cnty., 371 So.2d 1010, 1020 (Fla. 1979) ). On the other hand, decisions made at the operational level—decisions or actions implementing policy, planning, or judgmental governmental functions—generally do not enjoy sovereign immunity. Commercial Carrier, 371 So.2d at 1021. "Planning level functions are generally interpreted to be those requiring basic policy decisions, while operational level functions are those that implement policy." Id. (footnote omitted).
While nearly every endeavor involves some level of discretion, it is the governmental quasi-legislative discretion exercised at the policy-making or planning level which is protected from tort liability. Wallace, 3 So.3d at 1053 ; [Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services v.] Yamuni, 529 So.2d [258] at 260 [ (Fla. 1988) ]. Thus, in addition to the five basic principles identified by the Florida Supreme Court in Trianon, which have been listed at the beginning of this analysis, the Court recognized that
...

To continue reading

Request your trial
9 cases
  • Miami-Dade County v. Perez
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Florida (US)
    • July 27, 2022
    ...are generally interpreted to be those requiring basic policy decisions, while operational level functions are those that implement policy." Id. See also Osorio Metropolitan Dade Cty., 459 So.2d 332, 333 (Fla 3d DCA 1984) (recognizing that, while the county's decision to install a "stop ahea......
  • Miami-Dade Cnty. v. Perez
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Florida (US)
    • July 27, 2022
    ...not upon the County's planning-level decisions, but upon the County's alleged operational-level actions. See Sanchez v. Miami-Dade Cty., 245 So. 3d 933, 936 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018) ("[T]he Florida Supreme Court held ‘that the separation-of-powers provision present in article II, section 3 of the......
  • Sch. Bd. of Broward Cnty. v. McCall
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Florida (US)
    • May 19, 2021
    ...by sovereign immunity. Davis v. State, Dep't of Corr., 460 So. 2d 452, 453 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984); see also Sanchez v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 245 So. 3d 933, 940 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018) ("[A] municipality's decision on where to allocate its police resources is a planning level decision that is not subje......
  • R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Davis
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Florida (US)
    • April 25, 2018
    ...order granting a new trial and remand the case to the trial court with instructions to enter judgment for R.J. Reynolds in accordance 245 So.3d 933with the jury's verdict. Because Davis does not have to prepare for a new trial, we vacate the show-cause order.Reversed and remanded with instr......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT